Fox One, LLC v. City of Miami
This text of Fox One, LLC v. City of Miami (Fox One, LLC v. City of Miami) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed December 3, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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Nos. 3D24-0211 & 3D24-0936 Lower Tribunal No. 22-21983-CA-01 ________________
Fox One, LLC, Appellant,
vs.
City of Miami, Appellee.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Thomas J. Rebull, Judge.
The Ferro Law Firm, P.A., and Simon Ferro, Leon Cosgrove Jimenez, LLP, and Scott B. Cosgrove, for appellant.
George K. Wysong III, City Attorney, and Eric J. Eves, Assistant City Attorney Supervisor, for appellee.
Before EMAS, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
MILLER, J. These consolidated appeals implicate amendments the Florida
Legislature enacted in 2019 to the Florida Building Codes Act, which prohibit
local governments from amassing and retaining surpluses garnered from
building permitting and inspection fees. Appellant, Fox One, LLC, appeals
from a final judgment and antecedent interlocutory order dismissing all
claims for monetary relief alleged against appellee, the City of Miami, in the
second amended complaint in its putative class action lawsuit. The crux of
the claims was that the City unlawfully charged building permitting and
inspection fees and failed to rebate the surplus exceeding the average of its
operating budget for the last four fiscal years. The trial court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that Fox One could not recover any surplus that
was generated from the fees paid before the statutory amendments were
enacted because no cause of action existed prior to that date. Concluding
that this issue cannot be disposed of on a motion to dismiss, we reverse.
I
Before July 1, 2019, local governments were authorized to carry
forward unexpended revenues collected from permitting and building fees to
future years or refund fees at their discretion. Effective July 1, 2019, the
legislature amended the Florida Building Codes Act, prohibiting local
governments from carrying forward any unexpended revenue exceeding the
2 average of their operating budgets for enforcing the Code over the previous
four fiscal years. See § 553.80(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019). Any excess revenue
under the amendments must be used to rebate or reduce fees. See id.
§ 553.80(7)(a)2. The amendments authorized an exception for those local
governments that established a Building Inspections Funds Advisory Board
as of January 1, 2019. See id. § 553.80(7)(a).
In 2022, Fox One filed suit seeking a refund of fees paid during the
2017 to 2018 fiscal year with a group of similarly situated plaintiffs requesting
similar relief. The City moved to dismiss, contending that the 2019
amendment could not be used to support a rebate of fees collected before
the effective date of the statute. The trial court granted the motion. Fox One
voluntarily dismissed its remaining causes of action, and this consolidated
appeal ensued.
II
A
“On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the
standard of review is de novo.” People’s Tr. Ins. Co. v. Alonzo-Pombo, 307
So. 3d 840, 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). “In doing so, we are confined to the
four corners of the complaint and attachments, and we must accept all well-
3 pleaded allegations as true.” Steinmetz v. Pickholtz, 414 So. 3d 309, 312
(Fla. 3d DCA 2025).
B
To resolve this appeal, we must determine whether surpluses derived
for building and permitting fees collected before July 1, 2019, are exempt
from the statutory carrying forward prohibition and rebate provision. Section
553.80(7), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: “A local government
may not carry forward an amount exceeding the average of its operating
budget for enforcing the Florida Building Code for the previous 4 fiscal years
. . . Any amount exceeding this limit must be used as authorized in
subparagraph [(a)]2.” § 553.80(7), Fla. Stat. Subparagraph two, in turn,
states: “[a] local government must use any excess funds that it is prohibited
from carrying forward to rebate and reduce fees . . . .” Id. § 553.80(7)(a)2.
Absent ambiguity, “we need only resort to what Justice Thomas has
described as the ‘one, cardinal canon [of construction] before all others’—
that is, we ‘presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there.’” Page v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams.,
308 So. 3d 953, 958 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). And here, the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous. Section 553.80(7)(a)2 prohibits local governments from
4 carrying forward surpluses after the effective date of the statute. There is no
exception for surpluses accumulated before July 1, 2019.
Indeed, the legislature did carve out an exception to the carrying
forward prohibition. Those local governments that established an advisory
board as of January 1, 2019, are permitted to carry forward revenues.
See § 553.80(7)(a), Fla. Stat. We decline the invitation to engraft another
exception. See Young v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 80, 85 (Fla.
2000) (“Under the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.”
(citation omitted)); see also State v. C.M., 154 So. 3d 1177, 1180 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2015) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012) (“[T]he ‘Omitted–Case Canon,’
mean[s] ‘nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies
(casus omissus pro omisso habendus est). That is, a matter not covered is
to be treated as not covered.”)); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power
Agency, 789 So. 2d 320, 324 (Fla. 2001) (“Under fundamental principles of
separation of powers, courts cannot judicially alter the wording of statutes
where the Legislature clearly has not done so.”); Morgan v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 357 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (“To engraft into the
5 statute an exception which the legislature did not see fit to itself put in the
statute would amount to judicial legislation.”).
The City’s reliance on the 2018 version of the statute does not compel
any different conclusion. It is true that the 2018 version governed at the time
the City collected Fox One’s fees. But that version does not govern the
prospective retention and use of the funds post-collection. Instead, each
local government must comply with the requirement imposed by the statute
at the end of each fiscal year after the enactment.
Finally, to the extent the City raises persuasive arguments it is shielded
by waiver, the funds were committed or allocated before the enactment of
the amendment, and others had rebate priority over Fox One, hence Fox
One does not stand to recover, we cannot stray from our four-corners review.
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