Fowler v. United States

273 F. 15, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1410
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 16, 1921
DocketNo. 3597
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 273 F. 15 (Fowler v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fowler v. United States, 273 F. 15, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1410 (9th Cir. 1921).

Opinion

WOLVERTON, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above).

[1] By their third assignment of error, plaintiffs in error challenge the sufficiency of each count of the indictment. Counsel in his brief here admits the sufficiency of the-first count, but insists that the second and third counts are not good, because the property that it was charged to be the purpose of the conspirators to purloin was not the property of the United States, and could not be so considered, within [17]*17the purview of section 35 of the Penal Code as amended, or of section 37 of such Code (Comp. St. § 10201).

We think it a sufficient answer to this contention to say that the general government was at the time in the actual control and management of the railroads of the country in pursuance of law, and was acting in that capacity as a bailee for hire. As such common carrier, it had a special property in the goods, chattels, and merchandise carried, and by virtue of such ownership it was entitled to- maintain as against third parties an action for damages to tlm property, or to recover possession thereof, if wrongfully taken from it. 6 Cyc. 435.

[2] So it is that in an indictment for larceny it is. sufficient to allege ownership in the lawful possessor of the goods, whether^ such owner has the legal title or not. 25 Cyc. 89. We are of the opinion, therefore, that such special ownership in the government, in view of the indictment, meets the purposes of section 35 of the Penal Code as amended, and of section 37 of such Code, and that counts 2 and 3 of the indictment are sufficient.

Assignments of error 1, 2, and 4 may be considered together. They relate to certain motions addressed to the court to require the government to elect upon which of several supposed conspiracies it would proceed to trial. For instance, at the conclusion of the testimony given by William Ratcliff, a witness for the government, who was jointly indicted with the other defendants and entered a plea of guilty, and when it was attempted to examine Roy Ayers, also a witness for the government, the defendants moved that the government be required to elect as to which of the several conspiracies that might appear to have been entered into by the several alleged conspirators it would pursue on the trial. The statement of counsel at the time indicates the purpose of the motion. He says:

“Now, to narrow this caso, we demand at this time, or at least to save time, the government .state to the court what conspiracy they are trying here, and who they intend to prove the conspirators are, and they be permitted to introduce no testimony against any defendant, except such as they may state, to the court their proof wiu show to be members of the conspiracy that Ratcliff has already testified to.”

The court overruled the motion, on the ground that he could not say in advance what the evidence would be. This ruling counsel now admits was not error. At the conclusion of the government’s testimony, the defendants again moved:

“That the government be compelled to elect upon which of the number of separate and distinct and unrelated and disconnected criminal agreements the proof as framed shows to have been established the government seeks a conviction.”

This was based upon the contention that the testimony of Ratcliff disclosed that he had an agreement with Dave Jones and Hanson to steal certain shoes and matting, and that he never had any further criminal agreement with any of the other defendants, or any person, except the arrangement he had with the decoy salesman, Ayers.

Ratcliff did say, on cross-examination, that Hanson and Jones were the only defendants with whom he had an agreement to commit a [18]*18crime against the railroad. This relates to an express understanding he had with these two defendants. Ratcliff was a conductor on a freight train of the railroad. C. H. Goldman, Dave Jones, and H. W. Hanson were brakemen on the same train. Ratcliff testified that he overheard a conversation between Jones and Hanson relative to getting some cases of shoes from a freight car; that after the conversation they carried the shoes off the train and put them in the salal brush; that Hanson said he had a sale for the shoes, and that the money would be divided among the three of them (Ratcliff, Jones, and Hanson); that Hanson gave samples of the shoes to a man by the name of Ayers, to be sold at Renton; that later, on the evening of March 27th, the witness, Hanson and his wife, and Ayers went to the place of deposit and got two cases of the shoes, put them into Ayers’ car, and took them to Auburn. On arriving there Hanson, claiming to be tired, prevailed upon Ratcliff to go to Renton and collect the money for the shoes. Witness and Ayers went to the St. Elmo Hotel in Auburn to find Fowler, one of the plaintiffs in error. Not finding him there, they went to the foot of Cemetery Hill and worked a signal a few times, in response to which Fowler came, with another man, in a car containing 12 automobile tires. After some conversation between Ayers and Fowler, Ayers, accompanied by witness, drove his car to Renton, followed by Fowler. Ayers' drove into a garage at Renton, and after unloading the shoes backed out. Fowler and Mellison— the latter being the man first seen with Fowler — drove their car into the garage. At this time the officers came and arrested Ratcliff, Fowler, and Mellison. Ratcliff further testified to the fact that Hanson and Jones took two rolls of matting off Hanson’s train on March 2d, which' were afterwards hauled to Covington and put off in the brush. He also testified to some tire transactions he had with Hanson.

Roy Ayers, who was really a decoy, corroborates Ratcliff in almost every material detail as to their relations with Fowler and with each other, and it was he who had arranged to dispose of the shoes for Rat-cliff and the tires for Fowler. Ayers testified, on cross-examination, that he learned that Fowler had tires to sell through a conversation with one Scott, and that Fowler came to him and told him he had 13 tires, and witness told him he had a buyer at Renton; that “Fowler was just an addition to the party.” To the question, “You picked him ■up accidentally?” he answered, “Just accidentally.”.

Clifford W. Scott testified that he had a conversation with Fowler, in which he asked him if he had some tires he wanted to get rid of, to which Fowler answered in the affirmative, and that afterwards they met Ayers.

As to the defendant Thomas Singer, an overcoat and two suits of clothes were found in his possession. There is much detail about this. Singer was associated, in relation to the overcoat, with defendant Edward Bourdell, who, after he had changed his plea to guilty, committed suicide. It was also in testimony that Singer at one time was endeavoring to sell some shoes cheaply. Bourdell and Singer were operating together in that transaction.

[19]*19It was further shown in evidence that 294 tires were shipped by railroad in interstate commerce from Seattle to Portland; that when checked up at Auburn 58 were found to be missing, and that 13 of these tires were found in the possession of Fowler at Renton; that a shipment of overcoats was made by railroad from Chicago to Seattle, which upon arrival was found to be short; 5 of these were found -in the house of defendant Creed Fane, 2 in the possession of defendant Bellamy, and 1 in the store of Singer.

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Bluebook (online)
273 F. 15, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1410, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fowler-v-united-states-ca9-1921.