Fowler v. Fowler

28 S.E.2d 458, 197 Ga. 53, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 465
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedNovember 30, 1943
Docket14740.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 28 S.E.2d 458 (Fowler v. Fowler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fowler v. Fowler, 28 S.E.2d 458, 197 Ga. 53, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 465 (Ga. 1943).

Opinion

The motion for new trial by the caveators of a will, besides the general grounds, contains two special grounds: (1) that the judge in his charge limited the question of insanity to old age, whereas there was evidence to support their averment that the testamentary capacity of the testatrix was affected by pellagra; and (2) that the judge erred in failing to submit to the jury the question of undue influence.

1."Old age and weakness of intellect resulting therefrom does not, of itself, constitute incapacity" to make a will. Code, § 113-205. "A person has testamentary capacity who understands the nature of a testament or will, viz., that it is a disposition of property to take effect *Page 54 after death, and who is capable of remembering generally the property subject to disposition and the persons related to him by the ties of blood and affection, and also of conceiving and expressing by words, written or spoken, or by signs, or by both, any intelligible scheme of disposition. If the testator has sufficient intellect to enable him to have a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of his property, this will suffice." Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747 (57 S.E. 69, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1); Griffin v. Barrett, 183 Ga. 152, 163, 164 (190 S.E. 2), and cit. While there was testimony for the caveators that the testatrix, who was 74 years old when the will was executed, had suffered from pellagra for about 15 years, and that this disease had "affected" her mind and rendered her mentally "weak," and there was medical testimony that she was "in the advanced stages of pellagra," which "would affect" and "had affected her mind," there was no evidence to indicate that the disease had deprived her of the capacity of remembering her property and children, and of otherwise making a rational testamentary disposition, under the preceding rules, so as to destroy her capacity to make a will. Accordingly, the failure of the judge to charge the contention of the caveators as to pellagra was not reversible error, since there was no testimony going to indicate that the pellagra, although weakening her mind, had affected her testamentary capacity.

(a) Nor should the case be reversed on the general grounds, since under the disputed evidence it cannot be said that a verdict was demanded in favor of the caveators on the general question of testamentary capacity.

2. An attack on a will as having been obtained by undue influence may be supported by a wide range of testimony, since such influence can seldom be shown except by circumstantial evidence. Thus, a confidential relation between the parties, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the disposition of the testator's estate, old age, or disease affecting the strength of the mind, tending to support any other direct testimony or any other proved fact or circumstance going to show the exercise of undue influence on the mind and will of the testator, are relevant. While the quantity of influence varies with the circumstances of each case, according to the relations existing between the parties and the strength or weakness of mind of the testator, the amount of influence necessary to dominate a mind impaired by age or disease may be decidedly less than that required to control a strong mind. Dean v. Littleton, 161 Ga. 651 (4), 654 (131 S.E. 507); Stephens v. Bonner, 174 Ga. 123 (162 S.E. 383); Evans v. Arnold, 52 Ga. 169 (4), 182; Walker v. Roberts, 20 Ga. 15, 25; Smith, v. Smith, 75 Ga. 477 (4); Davis v. Frederick, 155 Ga. 809 (5-7) (118 S.E. 206); Peretzman v. Simon, 185 Ga. 681 (196 S.E. 471); Griffin v. Barrett, 185 Ga. 443 (195 S.E. 746); Gaither v. Gaither, 20 Ga. 709, 721; Code, § 37-706; Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 191 Ga. 821 (14 S.E.2d 64).

(a) The evidence, taken as a whole, while not demanding a verdict in favor of the caveators on the ground of undue influence, was sufficient to raise an issue, which the jury should have been permitted to determine.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, J., disqualified.

No. 14740. NOVEMBER 30, 1943. REHEARING DENIED DECEMBER 10, 1943. *Page 55
Olin Fowler, a son of Mrs. Fannie Fowler, who died on February 4, 1942, filed a petition to probate a will, which she had executed on March 4, 1940, and in which she left him her real estate consisting of a tract of 85 acres as described, all of her personal property, and named him as executor. Four of the children of the testatrix filed a caveat, in which they alleged that, at the time the will was made, she was over 74 years old and had for many years been suffering from pellagra, and was then mentally incapable of making the will; that the execution of the will was obtained by undue influence of the propounder, in that she was then "feeble in body and mind and easily influenced and persuaded;" that he obtained such influence over her by flattery, threats, and fears of his violence, with acts as alleged, so that she would never leave his home to visit her other children because of his objections and refusal to allow her to do so; and that the "pretended will is not the will of their mother, but is the will of [the propounder] who dominated by threats and otherwise the entire life and thought of their mother."

On appeal to the superior court by the caveators from a judgment probating the will, the judge submitted to the jury the question of mental capacity, but refused to submit any question as to undue influence. The jury found in favor of the will, and the judge refused a new trial. The caveators excepted on the general grounds; and because of the failure to charge their pleaded contention as to the effect of pellagra and old age on the mental capacity of the testatrix. They also excepted on the ground that under testimony, as they quoted, the judge erred in refusing to submit to the jury the question of undue influence.

There was evidence that the testatrix was 76 years old at the time of her death, about 2 years after the execution of the will; that she had suffered from pellagra for over 16 years; that this disease had "affected her mind, . . had affected her mentally and physically . . made her mind weak, and in her latter years she was a person who was easily persuaded;" and there was medical testimony that she "was in the advanced stages of pellagra, and that advanced stages of pellagra had affected her mind." However, there was no evidence as to whether or how the pellagra had *Page 56

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Bluebook (online)
28 S.E.2d 458, 197 Ga. 53, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 465, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fowler-v-fowler-ga-1943.