Fowler v. Bank of Americus

40 S.E. 248, 114 Ga. 417, 1901 Ga. LEXIS 727
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedDecember 13, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 40 S.E. 248 (Fowler v. Bank of Americus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fowler v. Bank of Americus, 40 S.E. 248, 114 Ga. 417, 1901 Ga. LEXIS 727 (Ga. 1901).

Opinion

Fish, J.

The Bank of Americus sought, by scire facias against J. B. Fowler, administrator of the estate of B. C. Williford, to revive a judgment foreclosing a mortgage. It was alleged in the hank’s petition that Williford, on April 8, 1884, executed to the bank a mortgage on certain described realty situated in Taylor county, to secure a debt of a given amount to become due October 1, 1884; that at the August term, 1886, of the superior court of Taylor county, a judgment of foreclosure was rendered, and a fi. fa. issued thereon September 3; that Williford subsequently died, and Fowler was appointed administrator upon his estate. The defendant, by a demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition, made the point that a judgment foreclosing a mortgage does not become dormant. The court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant excepted. We think the demurrer should have been sustained- and the petition dismissed. It was held, as early as Butt v. Maddox, 7 Ga. 495, that judgments on the foreclosure of mortgages are not within the dormant-judgment act, and this ruling has been consistently followed. This is so because such a judgment creates no lien. The lien of a mortgage arises by the contract of the parties in executing [418]*418the same; and the judgment of foreclosure, the execution issued thereon, and the levy do not aid the lien, but only the enforcement of the same. The judgment of foreclosure is merely an order authorizing the sale of the specific property mentioned in the mortgage, in satisfaction of the lien therein created, and, consequently, does not, like an ordinary judgment from which a lien arises, be. come dormant under the statute declaring that ordinary judgments shall become dormant under certain conditions. In this connection see Wall v. Jones, 62 Ga. 728; Stiles v. Elliott, 68 Ga. 83. As the judgment was not dormant, but still alive, and as a scire facias can only be issued to revive a dormant judgment, there was no cause of action set out in the petition, and the proceeding instituted by the bank was useless and unnecessary.

Judgment r ever sed.

All the Justices concurring.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
40 S.E. 248, 114 Ga. 417, 1901 Ga. LEXIS 727, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fowler-v-bank-of-americus-ga-1901.