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<pre> United States Court of Appeals <br> For the First Circuit <br> ____________________ <br> <br> <br>No. 98-1316 <br> <br> MARK J. FOURNIER, <br> <br> Plaintiff, Appellee, <br> <br> v. <br> <br> CHARLES REARDON, ETC., ET AL., <br> <br> Defendants, Appellants. <br> <br> ____________________ <br> <br> APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT <br> <br> FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS <br> <br> [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge] <br> <br> ____________________ <br> <br> Before <br> <br> Torruella, Chief Judge, <br> <br> Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. <br> <br> _____________________ <br> <br> William P. Breen, Jr., with whom John J. Davis and Morrison, <br>Mahoney & Miller were on brief, for appellants. <br> Thomas C. Regan, with whom Pearl, McNiff, Crean, Cook & <br>Sheehan was on brief, for appellee. <br> <br> <br> ____________________ <br> <br> November 10, 1998 <br> ____________________
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Defendant-appellants appeal the final <br>order and judgment denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. <br>Plaintiff-appellee, Mark J. Fournier ("Fournier"), claims that he <br>is entitled to monetary damages for personal injuries allegedly <br>sustained as a result of the defendants' alleged deprivation of <br>his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Fournier <br>asserts that the defendants are liable under the Federal Civil <br>Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and under the Massachusetts Civil <br>Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11I. For the following <br>reasons, we reverse. <br>BACKGROUND Fournier was employed by the Essex County Sheriff's <br>Department as a corrections officer for more than ten years prior <br>to entering a basic training academy ("academy") run by the Essex <br>County Sheriff's Department. On May 1, 1995, Fournier and twenty <br>other corrections officers began attending a nine week basic <br>training course which the Essex County Sheriff's Department <br>required for full-time employment. The academy was staffed by <br>other Essex County Sheriff's Department corrections officers. It <br>offered both classroom and physical training such as standing at <br>attention, instruction as to chain of command, and protocol in <br>interacting with superior officers. <br> On the second day of the course, Fournier was ordered to report <br>to the academy training staff's office. Protocol taught and <br>enforced at the academy required that Fournier, an academy <br>recruit: (1) knock outside the instructors' office door; (2) <br>announce his presence; and (3) request permission to enter before <br>entering the instructors' office. Fournier breached academy <br>protocol when he failed to follow this regimented procedure and <br>entered the office unannounced. <br> To punish Fournier for violating academy protocol, one of the <br>drill instructors present in the room ordered Fournier to turn <br>around and bend over. When Fournier complied, the drill <br>instructor placed handcuffs on his wrists and informed Fournier <br>that he was being placed under "house arrest" for entering the <br>instructors' office without having requested permission. The <br>drill instructor then allegedly put Fournier's written reports in <br>his mouth and ordered him to return to the classroom. The other <br>drill instructors in the room failed to intervene on Fournier's <br>behalf. <br> Fournier returned, in handcuffs, to the classroom. Within five <br>minutes of the "house arrest," the drill instructor entered the <br>classroom. Pursuant to academy protocol, the recruits rose to <br>attention upon the entrance of a superior officer. When the <br>drill instructor ordered the class to be seated, Fournier <br>attempted to seat himself. Unfortunately, Fournier missed his <br>chair and fell to the ground, allegedly sustaining serious <br>personal injuries, including a fractured vertebra. <br>DISCUSSION <br>I. Standard of Review <br> Although most denials of motions to dismiss are not "final <br>decisions," and thus are not independently appealable, a district <br>court's rejection of a qualified immunity defense is a "final <br>decision," Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985), and <br>thus we review it here. Because "[a] necessary concomitant to <br>the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by <br>a plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the time the defendant <br>acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted <br>a violation of a constitutional right at all," Siegert v. <br>Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991), we will consider whether <br>Fournier has asserted a violation of any constitutional right in <br>his complaint. <br>II. Section 1983 Claims <br> Section 1983 states, in relevant part: <br> Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, <br> regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or <br> causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . <br> to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities <br> secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party <br> injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper <br> proceeding for redress. <br> <br>42 U.S.C. 1983. "[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of <br>substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for <br>vindicating federal rights conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 <br>U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, <br>144 n.3 (1979)). "To succeed, a section 1983 plaintiff must show <br>a violation of a right secured by federal law." Skinner v. City <br>of Miami, 62 F.3d 344, 346 (11th Cir. 1995). <br> Fournier claims three separate constitutional violations: (1) a <br>violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) a violation of his <br>right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) a <br>violation of his right to equal protection of the laws under the <br>Fourteenth Amendment. None of his arguments is persuasive. <br> A. Fourth Amendment <br> The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to <br>be secure . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be <br>violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Mendenhall test, <br>formulated by Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 <br>U.S. 544, 554 (1980), and adopted by the United States Supreme <br>Court in later cases, see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, <br>573 (1988): "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of <br>the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances <br>surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed <br>that he was not free to leave." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. <br> Fournier argues that when the drill instructor placed him under <br>"house arrest" and handcuffed him behind his back, he was seized <br>for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. We disagree. Under <br>the Mendenhall test, a court must look at all the circumstances <br>surrounding the incident to determine if a reasonable observer <br>would have believed that Fournier was not free to leave. <br> Although Fournier was handcuffed, no evidence presented would <br>support a finding that he was not free to leave at any point <br>during the scenario. Fournier understood that "house arrest" was <br>part of the basic training academy course. He submitted to being <br>handcuffed, and then returned to the classroom. We grant that if <br>he did object to being handcuffed, there could possibly have been <br>negative consequences for his continued employment as a <br>corrections officer. However, the possible effect that refusing <br>to be handcuffed may have had on his employment status is not an <br>issue for us to consider. Rather, the question is whether a <br>violation of Fournier's right to be free from seizure occurred. <br>In view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a <br>reasonable observer would conclude that Fournier was the subject <br>of improper hazing, which might give rise to a state law claim <br>based on tort or employment theories, but would not believe that <br>Fournier was not free to call an end to the "house arrest" and <br>have the handcuffs removed. <br> B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims <br> The Fourteenth Amendment states that a "State [shall not] deprive <br>any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of <br>law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Due process claims may <br>take either of two forms: "procedural due process" or <br>"substantive due process." Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 <br>(1st Cir. 1991). Procedural due process requires that the <br>procedures provided by the state in effecting the deprivation of <br>life, liberty or property are adequate in light of the affected <br>interest. Id. Substantive due process, however, imposes limits <br>on what a state may do regardless of what procedural protection <br>is provided. Id. (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 <br>(1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)). In this <br>case, Fournier invokes the latter prong of due process <br>protection: (1) by arguing that he had a constitutionally <br>protected liberty interest in being disciplined only as set forth <br>in the Essex County Sheriff's Department Training Manual; and (2) <br>by contending that the county owed him and others similarly <br>situated a constitutional right to safe conditions and freedom <br>from bodily restraint. <br> 1. Disciplinary Procedure Due Process Claim <br> It is well established that a state actor's failure to observe a <br>duty imposed by state law, standing alone, is not sufficient to <br>establish a 1983 claim. See Martnez v. Coln, 54 F.3d 980, <br>989 (1st Cir. 1995). Although it is true that constitutional <br>significance may attach to certain interests created by state <br>law, not every transgression of state law does double duty as a <br>constitutional violation. Id. As this Court stated in Martnez: <br>"[T]he Constitution is not an empty ledger awaiting the entry of <br>an aggrieved litigant's recitation of alleged state law <br>violations . . . ." Id. <br> Fournier cites Massachusetts law, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, <br>40, and departmental regulations which govern the discipline of <br>recruits in training programs, to found his claim of a 1983 <br>violation. However, whether Massachusetts law was violated or <br>the department failed to follow its own disciplinary procedures <br>matters little because neither alleged deficiency establishes a <br>1983 violation. <br> 2. Affirmative Obligation Due Process Claim <br> The substantive element of the Due Process Clause protects those <br>rights that are fundamental, rights that are "implicit in the <br>concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, <br>325 (1937). The Supreme Court has deemed that most, but not all, <br>of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are fundamental. <br>In addition, certain unenumerated rights, such as the right to <br>privacy, are deemed fundamental. <br> While the Supreme Court has extended substantive due process <br>protection to certain unenumerated rights, it has not extended <br>Fourteenth Amendment coverage to many areas. "Tort law is one <br>such area that remains largely outside substantive due process <br>jurisprudence." Skinner, 62 F.3d at 346 (citing Daniels v. <br>Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (noting that the Due Process <br>Clause "does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in <br>laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries <br>that attend living together in society")) (citations omitted). <br> Fournier contends that there is a constitutional right to safe <br>conditions. But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of <br>Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195, 202 (1989) ("The Clause is <br>phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a <br>guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security . . . <br>. A State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such <br>affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it <br>wishes. But not 'all common-law duties owed by government actors <br>were . . . constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" <br>(quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335)). Second, Fournier claims his <br>constitutional right to freedom from bodily restraint was <br>violated when he was handcuffed. As discussed above, Fournier's <br>"house arrest" does not rise to the level of a constitutional <br>violation. See supra, at 5-6. Fournier's Complaint attempts to <br>conflate an ordinary tort--battery--into a constitutional <br>violation. Unfortunately for his cause, not everything is a <br>federal case. <br> 3. Equal Protection Clause Claim <br> In a novel, yet utterly misguided attempt at an Equal Protection <br>Clause claim, Fournier contends: "[The drill instructor] placed <br>the plaintiff under house arrest because of the plaintiff's <br>conduct as a recruit. It is fair to infer that . . . [the drill <br>instructor] would not have placed a non-recruit under house <br>arrest for similar conduct." Appellee's Br. at 13. We do not <br>find that such a distinction rises to the level of an Equal <br>Protection violation. <br>CONCLUSION <br> Because Fournier has not been able to show a violation of a <br>federal right, it is not necessary for this Court to reach the <br>defense of qualified immunity. For the reasons stated in this <br>opinion, we reverse the judgment of the district court. Judgment <br>is issued for the defendant-appellants. <br></pre>
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