Fournerat v. Higgins

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 18, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2520
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WAYNE FOURNERAT, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 24-02520 (UNA) ) ) CLAYTON R. HIGGINS, JR., ) ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Wayne Format is a retired attorney residing in Fort Worth, Texas. Appearing pro

se, Fournerat has sued U.S. Supreme Court Deputy Clerk Clayton Higgins, Jr., in his individual

and official capacities and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court will grant

the IFP motion and dismiss this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring in IFP

proceedings immediate dismissal of a case upon a determination that the complaint fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from an immune

defendant).

Fournerat alleges that Higgins intentionally abused his “civil process rights” on July 3,

2023, when Higgins while “acting as the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court refused to file

conforming pleadings with the Court in a Capital Case[.]” Combined Complaint for Violation of

Civil Rights and Declaratory Relief, ECF No. 1 at 5-6; see id. at 13 (Higgins’ letter returning

submission). Fournerat seeks monetary damages exceeding $26 million, a declaratory judgment,

and injunctive relief. Id. at 8-9.

It is well-established that the U.S. Supreme Court “has inherent [and exclusive] supervisory

authority over its Clerk” and “neither a district court nor a circuit court of appeals has jurisdiction to interfere with it by mandamus or otherwise.” In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(per curiam); see Caprice v. United States, No. 11-cv-0535, 2011 WL 902128, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar.

14, 2011) (“This Court has no authority to determine what action, if any, must be taken by the

Justices of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court’s administrative officers with respect to

plaintiff's petition” for a writ of certiorari). Moreover, “the Supreme Court Clerk and Clerk’s

office staff enjoy absolute immunity from a lawsuit for money damages based upon decisions

[such as alleged here] falling within the scope of their official duties.” Miller v. Harris, 599 F.

App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam), citing Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (per curiam); see Reddy v. O’Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 130 (D.D.C. 2007) (actions

consisting of the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari and the deputy clerk’s refusal to file

documents concerning a subsequent petition “are quintessentially ‘judicial’ in nature because they

are ‘an integral part of the judicial process’”) (quoting Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1460-61)). And an

“in forma pauperis complaint is properly dismissed as frivolous . . . if it is clear from the face of

the pleading that the named defendant is absolutely immune from suit on the claims asserted.”

Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Consequently, this case will be

dismissed with prejudice. See Fletcher v. Harris, 790 F. App’x 220 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (affirming

dismissal with prejudice of claim against the Clerk of the Supreme Court); see also Firestone v.

Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“A dismissal with prejudice is

warranted when a trial court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.”) (cleaned up)). A separate order

accompanies this opinion.

______________________ CARL J. NICHOLS Date: October 18, 2024 United States District Judge