First Division May 8, 2006
No. 1-05-1869
FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) Appeal from AMERICAN COUNTRY INSURANCE COMPANY, ) the Circuit Court ) of Cook County Defendant-Appellant and ) Counterdefendant ) 03 CH 15278 ) (Kwaku Dankyi Apau, ) Honorable ) Julia M. Nowicki, Defendant and Counterplaintiff, ) Judge Presiding ) Joseph N. Bingue, and Best Taxi Service, ) Inc., ) ) Defendants). )
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, American Country Insurance Company (American Country), appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, Founders Insurance Company (Founders), and from
the denial of its cross-motion for summary judgment. The main
question on appeal is whether sections 8-101, 8-114 and 8-116 of
the financial responsibility law applicable to Illinois taxicab
companies (625 ILCS 5/8-101, 8-114, 8-116 (West 1998)) prevent a
taxicab company's insurer, in this instance, American Country,
from denying a claim for personal injuries caused by the
negligent operation of a cab that was not specifically endorsed
in the insurance contract. The trial court determined that the
cited sections of the statute preempted contract language 1-05-1869 indicating the cab company would be insured only for the vehicles
it asked to be included in the policy.
The relevant facts are undisputed. American Country, of
Chicago, Illinois, issued a written commercial transportation
insurance policy to Best Taxi Service, Inc., of Evanston,
Illinois (Best Taxi), which stated that under specified
circumstances, American Country would pay for liability resulting
from the ownership, maintenance or use of covered autos. Because
the contract indicated the definition of "covered autos"
applicable to Best Taxi was the seventh in a list of potential
definitions, the coverage is sometimes referred to as symbol 7
coverage. The contract specified that under symbol 7 coverage,
"covered autos" were only those vehicles "specifically described"
in a schedule of vehicles attached to the contract and that
subsequently acquired vehicles would be added to the policy only
if Best Taxi notified American Country within 30 days of their
acquisition. The schedule of vehicles attached to the contract
specified the year, make, model, and unique Vehicle
Identification Number (VIN) of 23 Chevrolets, Fords, and Lincolns
in Best Taxi's fleet, and various endorsements were issued during
the 12-month coverage period beginning January 1, 1999, to add or
delete specific vehicles from the policy.
On February 20, 1999, at approximately 12:45 p.m., a Best
Taxi cab that Joseph N. Bingue was driving northbound on Artesian
Avenue in Chicago collided with a Honda Accord that Kwaku Dankyi
2 1-05-1869 Apau was driving westbound at or near 2425 West Granville Avenue.
A report filed with the local police department includes the
make, model, year and VIN of the cab Bingue was operating. That
cab, a 1991 Chevrolet station wagon, does not appear on the
schedule of vehicles or any of the subsequent endorsements that
added vehicles to the American Country policy.
Apau filed a personal injury suit in the circuit court of
Cook County, was referred for arbitration, and obtained a default
judgment against Best Taxi in the amount of $4,500 plus costs.
When Apau contacted American Country about the judgment, American
Country told him that it never endorsed the 1991 Chevrolet
station wagon that was involved in the collision and that it was
not liable for his judicially determined loss. Apau then
submitted a claim for uninsured motorist benefits from his
insurer, Founders, of Des Plaines, Illinois. Founders, however,
wrote to the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) seeking
confirmation that the cab was insured on the accident date and
was notified by the Department, "Taxi's [sic] are required to
maintain an insurance filing with the Office of the Secretary of
State before a license may be issued. Therefore, Joseph Bingue,
operator and Best Taxi, owner of the vehicle are considered in
compliance with the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Law."
Next, Founders filed this declaratory judgment action
against the two drivers, the taxicab company, and the taxicab
company's insurer. Founders sought a determination that Apau was
3 1-05-1869 not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits from Founders because
the American Country policy was in effect and Apau was not
involved with an "uninsured motorist" within the meaning of the
Founders policy. The insurance companies' cross-motions for
summary judgment focused on whether American Country was
attempting to enforce a contractual definition of "covered autos"
that conflicted with sections 8-101 and 8-114 of the financial
responsibility law that is applicable to taxicab companies. 625
ILCS 5/8-101, 8-114 (West 1998). Founders tendered a copy of the
letter from IDOT indicating Bingue and Best Taxi "are considered
in compliance with the provisions of the Safety Responsibility
Law," and American Country provided the court with an affidavit
from William J. Weiss, assistant vice president and general
claims counsel of American Country, attesting that neither Best
Taxi nor anyone acting on its behalf ever notified American
Country that it wanted coverage for the 1991 Chevrolet station
wagon.
Section 8-101 of the Illinois Vehicle Code states in
relevant part:
"Proof of financial responsibility --
Persons who operate motor vehicles in
transportation of passengers for hire. It is
unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
to operate any motor vehicle along or upon
any public street or highway in any
4 1-05-1869 incorporated city, town or village in this
State for the carriage of passengers for
hire, accepting and discharging all such
persons as may offer themselves for
transportation unless such person, firm or
corporation has given, and there is in full
force and effect and on file with the
Secretary of State of Illinois, proof of
financial responsibility provided in this
Act. ***" 625 ILCS 5/8-101 (West 1998).
Section 8-114 of the Illinois Vehicle Code states:
"Issuance of license upon proof of
financial responsibility. The Secretary of
State shall issue to each [taxicab company]
who has in effect proof of financial
responsibility as required by Section 8-101
***, a certificate for each motor vehicle
operated by such [taxicab company] and
included within the proof of financial
responsibility. Each certificate shall
specify the Illinois registration plate and
registration sticker number of the vehicle, a
statement that proof of financial
responsibility has been filed, and the period
for which the certificate was issued." 625
5 1-05-1869 ILCS 5/8-114 (West 1998).
In addition, section 8-116 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides:
"Any person who fails to comply with the
provisions of this Chapter, or who fails to
obey, observe or comply with any order of the
Secretary of State or any law enforcement
agency issued in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter is guilty of a
Class A misdemeanor." 625 ILCS 5/8-116 (West
1998).
As indicated above, the trial court resolved the cross-
motions in Founders' favor, stating:
"Absent [sections 8-101, 8-114 and 8-116 of]
the financial responsibility statute, there
would be no question that since the 1991
Chevy [taxicab] is not a covered auto under
the American Country policy, the loss would
not be covered by the American Country
policy. However, when courts are faced with
similar compulsory insurance statutes,
conditions in the contract that would
typically defeat a claim for coverage,
'although effective as between insurer and
insured, cannot be asserted against third-
6 1-05-1869 party claims' since the claimants are
'statutory beneficiaries whose rights cannot
be defeated by the terms of the contract to
which they are not parties.' Great American
Ins. Co. v. Brad Movers, 65 Ill. App. 3d 357,
362 (1st Dist. 1978) [(Brad Movers)]. Thus,
this Court finds that [the insurer] American
Country is liable for the loss as to [the
third-party claimant] Apau pursuant to the
statute and [the insurer] must enforce its
rights under the policy against the insured
rather than the third-party claimant. Id.;
see also [American Country Insurance Co. v.]
Wilcoxon, [127 Ill. 2d 230, 239 (1989)
(Wilcoxon II).]"
The court also denied American Country's subsequent motion to
reconsider, emphasizing its conclusion that the purpose of the
financial responsibility statute "is to 'insure that members of
the public, injured through the negligence of cabdrivers driving
cabs owned by others, are not left uncompensated for their
injuries.' [Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill. 2d at 239]."
Neither court order, however, resolved a counterclaim Apau
filed against American Country, in which he contended that if
Founders prevailed in its declaratory judgment action, American
Country should be held liable for the unsatisfied $4,500 judgment
7 1-05-1869 he obtained against Best Taxi. Accordingly, the court entered a
Rule 304(a) finding so that immediate appeal could be taken. 155
Ill. 2d R. 304(a).
American Country now argues the summary judgment ruling
should be reversed because the clear and unambiguous terms of its
written policy indicated Best Taxi was insured only for vehicles
specifically described in the contract, it is undisputed that the
1991 Chevrolet station wagon was never made part of the contract,
and the terms of the contract are not in conflict with the cited
sections of the financial responsibility statute and must be
enforced as written. Founders responds in part that the trial
court's ruling was well reasoned and that Wilcoxon II, Brad
Movers, and the cited statutory sections are not the only
authorities supporting the decision. Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill. 2d
230, Brad Movers, 65 Ill. App. 3d 357. Thus, this appeal asks us
to construe certain sections of the financial responsibility
statute applicable to taxicab companies and relevant parts of the
parties' insurance contract, in order to determine whether
summary judgment was proper.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Solich v.
George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc.,
158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). The statutory language is the best
indication of the legislature's intent, and when the language of
a statutory provision is clear, a court must give it effect
8 1-05-1869 without resorting to other aids for construction. Solich, 158
Ill. 2d at 81. Statutes are read as a whole and the words used
are given their plain and ordinary meaning. Country Mutual
Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 339
Ill. App. 3d 78, 82 (2003). Similarly, when construing an
insurance contract, the court's primary objective is to give
effect to the intent of the parties at the time of contracting.
Continental Casualty Co. v. McDowell & Colantoni, Ltd., 282 Ill.
App. 3d 236, 241 (1996). To ascertain the intent of the parties
and the meaning of their insurance policy, the court construes
the contract as a whole, with due regard to the risk undertaken,
the subject matter that is insured, and the purposes of the
entire contract. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108 (1992). If the words used in
the policy are unambiguous, they must be given their plain,
ordinary and popular meaning. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at
108. The interpretation of a statute, the interpretation of an
insurance contract, and the entry of summary judgment are all
questions of law that are reviewed de novo without any deference
to the trial court's interpretation. O'Connor v. County of Cook,
337 Ill. App. 3d 902, 906 (2003) (reviewing grant of summary
judgment based upon interpretation of statute); Continental
Casualty, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 241 (reviewing grant of summary
judgment based upon interpretation of insurance contract).
Summary judgment is to be granted "without delay if the
9 1-05-1869 pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002); accord
Continental Casualty, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 241; Outboard Marine,
154 Ill. 2d at 102. Summary judgment is considered a drastic
measure but is an appropriate means of expeditiously disposing of
a lawsuit in which the right of the moving party is clear and
free from doubt. O'Connor, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 906; Outboard
Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 102. Where reasonable persons could draw
divergent inferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment must
be denied. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 102.
The trial court's ruling began with the premise that the
sections of the financial responsibility law quoted above were
intended to protect the public by securing payment for their
damages. In an instance where liability coverage was in force
despite contract language to the contrary, the supreme court
stated as follows:
"It is axiomatic that a statute that exists
for protection of the public cannot be
rewritten through a private limiting
agreement. One reason for that rule is that
'the members of the public to be protected
are not and, of course, could not be made
parties to any such contract.' [Wilcoxon II,
10 1-05-1869 127 Ill. 2d at 241]. In accordance with
these principles, a statute's requirements
cannot be avoided through contractual
provisions. Where liability coverage is
mandated by the state's financial
responsibility law, a provision in an
insurance policy that conflicts with the law
will be deemed void. The statute will
continue to control. [Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill.
2d at 241.]
In evaluating whether statutory
provisions override contractual terms, courts
must remain mindful of principles of freedom
of contract. The freedom of parties to make
their own agreements, on the one hand, and
their obligation to honor statutory
requirements, on the other, may sometimes
conflict. These values, however, are not
antithetical. Both serve the interests of
the public. Just as public policy demands
adherence to statutory requirements, it is in
the public's interest that persons not be
unnecessarily restricted in their freedom to
make their own contracts. The power to
declare a private contract void as against
11 1-05-1869 public policy is therefore exercised
sparingly. [Citation.] An agreement will
not be invalidated on public policy grounds
unless it is clearly contrary to what the
constitution, the statutes or the decisions
of the courts have declared to be the public
policy or unless it is manifestly injurious
to the public welfare. Whether an agreement
is contrary to public policy depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of the
case. [Citation.]" Progressive Universal
Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual
Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 129-30
(2005).
In this instance, however, although Best Taxi had a
mandatory statutory obligation to obtain liability insurance for
the vehicle Bingue was driving on February 20, 1999, the record
does not show that Best Taxi complied with that obligation by
first contacting and then contracting with an insurer for the
coverage. More importantly, there is no statute or case law
obligating American Country to cover a vehicle that its client
did not ask to be covered. There is no Illinois statute or case
law prohibiting the policy language that indicated "covered
autos" were only those "specifically described" in the schedule
of vehicles attached to the American Country policy and those
12 1-05-1869 subsequently acquired vehicles that the insured had asked to be
added to its policy.
Furthermore, the case the trial court primarily relied upon,
Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill. 2d 230, addressed a section of the
financial responsibility law that is not pertinent to the parties
at issue or their contractual relationship. The case addressed
section 8-104 of Illinois' financial responsibility law, rather
than any of the three sections cited in the court's summary
judgment order, which were sections 8-101, 8-114, and 8-116 of
the financial responsibility law. See Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill. 2d
at 234-43; see also American Country Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxon,
159 Ill. App. 3d 884 (1987) (Wilcoxon I).
Prior opinions have indicated that section 8-104 is the
legislature's codification of the common law initial permission
rule. Wilcoxon I, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 891; Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill.
2d at 238. Under the initial permission rule, which is referred
to as omnibus clause coverage when incorporated into an insurance
contract, once the named insured of an automobile insurance
policy has given permission to another to use the car, any
subsequent driver is covered as long as that driver did not
engage in theft or tortious conversion to gain access to the car.
Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill. 2d at 236, quoting Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co., 54 Ill. 2d 333, 342
(1973). The rule applies even if the first permittee exceeds the
scope of permission by allowing a second permittee to drive the
13 1-05-1869 insured car. Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill. 2d at 236.
An illustrative case is Maryland Casualty, in which the
named insured, Smythe, gave his son permission to drive the
insured vehicle, and the son allowed a friend to drive it,
despite his father's admonition that only family members were to
drive the vehicle. Maryland Casualty, 54 Ill. 2d at 337-38.
While driving the Smythe car, the friend was involved in an
accident in which two other people were injured. Maryland
Casualty, 54 Ill. 2d at 337. The court found that the friend was
covered under the Smythe insurance policy, due to the initial
permission rule. Maryland Casualty, 54 Ill. 2d at 342-43. In
effect, permitting the son to drive the vehicle gave the son
implied authority to permit another to use the insured vehicle.
See Maryland Casualty, 54 Ill. 2d at 339-40. According to
Maryland Casualty, the initial permission rule is " 'based on the
theory that the insurance contract is as much for the benefit of
the public as for the insured, and that it is undesirable to
permit litigation as to the details of the permission and use.' "
Maryland Casualty, 54 Ill. 2d at 342, quoting Konrad v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 11 Ill. App. 2d 503, 514-15 (1956).
Section 8-104 incorporates the initial permission rule into
certain situations by indicating that when a real estate bond has
been obtained in lieu of automobile liability insurance, the
"bond shall provide for the payment of each judgment by the owner
of the motor vehicle *** provided each judgment shall have been
14 1-05-1869 rendered against such owner or any person operating the motor
vehicle with the owner's express or implied consent." (Emphasis
added.) 625 ILCS 5/8-104 (West 1998). The insurer in Wilcoxon
had nevertheless attempted to negate section 8-104 by stating in
its contract with the Checker Taxi Company (Checker) that the
taxicab company could give express or implied consent only to its
employees or lessees and that " 'the doctrine known as the
Initial Permission Doctrine shall not apply.' " Wilcoxon II, 127
Ill. 2d at 233. After the policy was issued, one of Checker's
drivers gave his friend permission to drive the cab, and the
friend struck and injured a pedestrian with the vehicle.
Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill. 2d at 233. Litigation ensued, and:
"The court found that the initial permission
doctrine applied *** because the 'protection
of the public under financial responsibility
statutes transcends the private agreement
between the parties, where the agreement runs
counter to sound public policy.' [Citation.]
The court held that Checker, therefore, had
given its constructive consent to [its
driver] to permit [his friend] to operate the
cab. The court further held that the
Illinois legislature had codified the initial
permission doctrine in section 8-104 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1983,
15 1-05-1869 ch. 95 1/2, par. 8-104), and that Checker and
its surety *** 'cannot, in a private
agreement allegedly included in the bond
rider, repeal or diminish the effect of the
Illinois statute designed to protect the
public' [citation]." Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill.
2d at 234-35.
Thus, the scope of Wilcoxon II was limited to the initial
permission rule and section 8-104. 625 ILCS 5/8-104 (West 1998).
The case is not a basis for finding that an automobile liability
insurer must pay for damages caused by a vehicle that the insurer
knew nothing about and never agreed to cover.
The supreme court revisited Wilcoxon II in a case we quoted
extensively above regarding the judiciary's reluctance to
interfere with the freedom to contract, Progressive Universal.
In Progressive Universal, a mother allowed her son to use her
insured minivan at his pizza delivery job, and the son struck and
severely injured a pedestrian while making a delivery.
Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 124. The insurance policy
expressly stated there would be no coverage for damages caused in
the course of delivering food or any other products. Progressive
Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 125. Like the trial court in this
instance, the appellate court found that the policy language was
unambiguous, but that it conflicted with this state's mandatory
16 1-05-1869 insurance laws, violated the public policy principles expressed
in prior case law, and was, therefore, void and unenforceable.
Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 126-27. On further appeal,
however, the supreme court suggested that public policy should
not have been used so readily to void a clear contract. The
supreme court emphasized that "whether a contractual agreement is
void as against public policy ultimately depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case." Progressive
Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 133. The supreme court differentiated
between contracts that were enforceable even though they would
not provide compensation for the facts and circumstances before
the court, and contracts that were unenforceable because they
conflicted with the initial permission rule or its statutory
equivalent. Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 134. The
supreme court pointed out that there was no difference in the
scope of coverage for the mother that owned the minivan or the
son that drove the minivan with her permission: "The exclusion
applies with equal force to Ronald's mother, who is the named
insured, and to anyone using her van with her permission.
Accordingly, if Ronald's mother used the van to deliver pizzas,
she would have no more right to insist that [the insurer] defend
and indemnify her than Ronald has. The policy would provide no
coverage." Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 134.
Therefore, the contract did not conflict with the statutory
codification of the initial permission rule and "cannot be said
17 1-05-1869 to be void as against public policy." Progressive Universal, 215
Ill. 2d at 134. The supreme court also emphasized:
"Had the General Assembly wished to bar
insurers from excluding certain risks from
motor vehicle liability policies, it could
easily have so provided in the pertinent
statutes. It did not do so. To the
contrary, the Illinois Safety and Family
Financial Responsibility Law clearly
contemplates that exclusions may be included
in policies and that those exclusions will be
upheld. That is why section 7-602 of the
statute (625 ILCS 5/7-602 (West 2000)
requires insurance cards to contain a
disclaimer admonishing policyholders to
'[e]xamine policy exclusions carefully.' "
Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 138.
The supreme court went on to point out that although the
exclusion before it would shield the insurance company that
issued the policy, "that does not mean that no insurer will be
liable." Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 139. "Under the
mandatory insurance law enacted by our General Assembly, the
effects of policy exclusions are substantially offset by the
requirement of uninsured-motorist coverage." Progressive
Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 139. Thus, although the injured
18 1-05-1869 pedestrian would not be able to "avail himself of the driver's
liability coverage," he would "be entitled to seek payment under
the uninsured-motorist provisions of his own motor vehicle
policy." Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 139-40. "In this
way, the goal of protecting the public by securing the payment of
its damages [is] fully achieved." Progressive Universal, 215
Ill. 2d at 140.
The supreme court further acknowledged that there will be
instances in which neither driver complies with mandatory
insurance laws and "injured parties will be left without coverage
of any kind." Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 140, n.3.
Again, however, "[w]hether such 'gaps' in coverage should be
addressed by the legislature and, if so, how they should be
remedied, present important questions of public policy" to be
addressed by the legislature, not the courts. Progressive
Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 140, n.3.
Although the specific statutory section cited in Progressive
Universal is not applicable to the taxicab company that brought
the instant appeal, there is an analogous statutory section that
does apply. In section 8-114 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which
concerns those "who operate motor vehicles in transportation of
passengers for hire" (625 ILCS 5/8-101 (West 1998)), the
legislature signaled its expectation that not every vehicle in a
taxicab fleet would be covered. The legislature did so by
stating that the Secretary of State must issue a certificate to
19 1-05-1869 each company that has shown proof of its compliance with
financial responsibility law, and "[e]ach certificate shall
specify the Illinois registration plate and registration sticker
number of the vehicle, a statement that proof of financial
responsibility has been filed, and the period for which the
certificate was issued." 625 ILCS 5/8-114 (West 1998). Further,
the certificate must be "displayed upon a window of the motor
vehicle for which it was issued, in such manner as to be visible
to the passengers carried therein." 625 ILCS 5/8-115 (West
1998). Therefore, American Country's requirement that "covered
autos" be specifically listed either in the schedule of vehicles
attached to the initial insurance contract or in endorsements
issued during the coverage period is consistent with the
legislature's expectations, and appears to be a prudent means of
describing the scope of the insurer's liability.
The other case cited in the trial court's summary judgment
order was Great American Insurance Co. v. Brad Movers, Inc., 65
Ill. App. 3d 357, 362 (1978). Since Brad Movers concerned a
statutory scheme applicable only to warehouse operators, it has
no relevance here and does not warrant any discussion. See Brad
Movers, 65 Ill. App.3d at 358-59 (court indicated the statute
before it "requires a bond or insurance as a prerequisite to
doing business as a public warehouseman in Illinois").
We have also disregarded Founders' reliance on Illinois
Casualty Co. v. Krol, 324 Ill. App. 478 (1944), as that case
20 1-05-1869 expressly concerns compulsory liability insurance required under
the Illinois Truck Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, ch. 95 1/2, par.
253), which has no application here.
Founders urges this court to use section 18c-4903 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code as a basis for affirming the trial court's
summary judgment ruling, however that statute actually
demonstrates the soundness of reversing the decision. Section
18c-4903 states:
"Implied Terms of Insurance Coverage.
Each certificate or other proof of insurance
or surety coverage shall have, as an implied
term, that the insurance or surety coverage
will remain in effect continuously until
notice of cancellation is filed in accordance
with Commission regulations, and that all
motor vehicles operated by or under authority
of the carrier will be covered, whether or
not such vehicles have been reported to the
insurance, surety, or other company."
Emphasis added. 625 ILCS 5/18c-4903 (West
Founders argues that because section 18c-4903 was in force and
American Country "admittedly filed a certificate of insurance
with the Illinois Secretary of State [citation], it is wholly
irrelevant that the vehicle driven by Bingue, Best Taxi's agent,
21 1-05-1869 may not have been 'reported' to American Country." See 625 ILCS
5/18c-4903 (West 2002). However, as the statute itself suggests,
it concerns certificates and notices of cancellation filed with
the Illinois Commerce Commission, not certificates such as the
one issued to Best Taxi by the Secretary of State. Furthermore,
section 18c-4903 applies to "motor carrier[s] of property," such
as trucking companies (see Chambers v. Palaggi, 88 Ill. App. 2d
221 (1967)), and it does not apply to taxicab companies "who
operate motor vehicles in transportation of passengers for hire"
(625 ILCS 5/8-101 (West 1998)). Therefore, section 18c-4903 is
inapplicable to the present facts. The statute nevertheless is
an indirect indication that the trial court's reasoning was
flawed, because the statute is an example of what the legislature
would have said if it wanted to obligate a taxicab company's
insurer to cover all the vehicles in a fleet "whether or not such
vehicles have been reported" to the insurer. 625 ILCS 5/18c-4903
(West 1998). Had the General Assembly wished to include implied
terms of coverage in policies such as the present policy, it
"could easily have so provided in the pertinent statutes. It did
not do so." Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 138. In fact,
the General Assembly expressly requires that a multi-vehicle
policy such as the present one "shall contain a description of
each [covered] motor vehicle, giving the manufacturer's name and
number and state license number." 625 ILCS 6/8-109 (West 1998).
For all these reasons, we now find that the clear,
22 1-05-1869 unambiguous contract language put at issue by this appeal does
not conflict with any statute or public policy grounds argued by
the parties. Instead, due to "the mandatory insurance law
enacted by our General Assembly[,] the effects of [the contract
language] are substantially offset by the requirement of
uninsured-motorist coverage." Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d
at 139. Due to the availability of Apau's mandatory uninsured
motorist coverage within Founders, "the goal of protecting the
public by securing the payment of its damages [will be] fully
achieved." Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 140.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's entry of summary
judgment for Founders and denial of American Country's cross-
motion for summary judgment, and remand this cause for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion as to Apau's cross-claim
against Founders regarding his uninsured motorist coverage.
Reversed and remanded.
CAHILL, P.J., and GORDON, J., concur.