Foundation Auto Holdings, LLC v. Weber Motors, Fresno, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 6, 2025
Docket1:21-cv-00970
StatusUnknown

This text of Foundation Auto Holdings, LLC v. Weber Motors, Fresno, Inc. (Foundation Auto Holdings, LLC v. Weber Motors, Fresno, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foundation Auto Holdings, LLC v. Weber Motors, Fresno, Inc., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 FOUNDATION AUTO HOLDINGS, Case No. 1:21-cv-00970-JLT-EPG LLC., 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES v. 13 (ECF No. 102) WEBER MOTORS, FRESNO, INC., et al., 14 PAYMENT FROM DEFENDANTS TO Defendants. PLAINTIFF DUE IN 60 DAYS 15

16 TEMPLETON MARSH, LTD., 17 Intervenor Plaintiff, 18 v. 19 WEBER MOTORS, FRESNO, INC., et al., 20 Defendants. 21 In this civil action, Plaintiff Foundation Auto Holdings, LLC. (“Plaintiff”), and Intervenor 22 Plaintiff Templeton Marsh, LTD., assert claims for breach of contract against Defendants Weber 23 Motors, Fresno, Inc., CJ’s Road to Lemans Corp., and Christopher John Wilson. (ECF Nos. 27, 24 42). The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel, ordering the Defendants to 25 produce various documents, and granting Plaintiff’s request for sanctions. (ECF Nos. 91, 101). 26 The Court’s order requested Plaintiff to file a statement identifying reasonable expenses, 27 including attorneys’ fees, that it incurred in filing the motion to compel no later than November 7, 28 1 2024. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff submitted a Declaration stating that its total attorneys’ fees sought for 2 its motion to compel are $29,129.50. (ECF No. 102 at 2). 3 For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of 4 $12,463.13. Defendants shall pay sanctions in that amount no later than 60 days from the date of this order. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 A. The Court’s Order 7 On October 29, 2024, the Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to compel in full, “except 8 insofar as Defendants ha[d] not waived objections based on attorney client privilege or work 9 product regarding any documents filed since the commencement of this action on June 18, 2021.” 10 (ECF No. 101 at 4). The Defendants were ordered that “[b]y no later than thirty (30) days from 11 the date of [the] order, [they] must produce: (1) the requested documents, and (2) a privilege log, 12 if any, reflecting privileged document post-dating the commencement of this action on June 18, 13 2021.” (Id.). Plaintiff was ordered to “file a statement identifying reasonable expenses, including 14 attorney fees, that they incurred in filing the motion to compel” no later than November 7, 2024. 15 (Id.). It was also notified that “[the] statement should not include fees and costs related to Rule 16 30(b)(6) depositions or meet and confer efforts, such as discussions leading to the stipulation at 17 ECF No. 81, but it may include fees and costs related to the October 24, 2024, hearing.” (Id.). 18 Defendants were told that they may “file any objections to Plaintiff’s statement of expenses 19 within seven (7) days of the filing of Plaintiff’s statement. Objections are limited only to the 20 amount(s) claimed by Plaintiff and/or to specific line items [they] believe are unrelated to the 21 motion to compel.” (Id. at 4-5). 22 The amount of fees is now ripe and before the Court. 23 B. Declaration On November 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Declaration stating that it “originally sought 24 $32,502.00 in estimated fees and costs associated with preparing for and bringing its Motion. 25 After review of [its] legal invoices, [it] has incurred $29,129.50 in attorneys’ fees relating to the 26 Motion to Compel Production of Documents.” (ECF No. 102 at 2) (emphasis in original). 27 Plaintiff says that it paid the following invoices for attorneys’ fees related to the motion to 28 1 compel: 2 • Exhibit 1 - August 5, 2024, Invoice 33439089: $24,536.00 3 • Exhibit 2 - September 6, 2024, Invoice 33461928: $2,338.50 4 • Exhibit 3 – October 3, 2024, Invoice 33483660: $2,255.00 (Id. at 3).1 5 Plaintiff further states that: 6 This amount is conservative and does not include the time Holland & Knight spent 7 preparing for and attending the hearing on October 24, 2024. Foundation also does not seek fees for split time entries. Several entries, in the attached invoices, include 8 work for matters both related and unrelated to the Motion to Compel Production. In strict compliance with the Court’s Order, Foundation does not seek any fees for 9 these split entries and the below entries are not included in Foundation’s request for 10 sanctions: • July 9, 2024, David I. Holtzman totaling $1,640.00 - Exhibit 1. 11 • July 13, 2024, David I. Holtzman totaling $1,537.50 - Exhibit 1. 12 • July 23, 2024, David I. Holtzman totaling $512.50 - Exhibit 1. 13 (Id. at 2) (emphasis in original). 14 The Declaration also provides that “[t]he hourly rates of the [five] attorneys who worked 15 on this matter are: 16 • Associate Isabella Granucci: $630.00 17 • Associate Ana Dragojevic: $725.00 18 • Associate Andrew Klair: $775.00 19 • Partner Daniel P. Kappes: $1,025.00 20 • Partner David I. Holtzman: $1,025.00 21 (Id. at 3). 22 C. Opposition 23 On November 11, 2024, Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Declaration. 24 (ECF No. 103). They argue that “Plaintiff has submitted three heavily redacted invoices totaling 25 an astronomical $29,129.50 – for what amounts to nothing more than a boilerplate motion to 26 compel document production. The sheer extravagance of deploying three associates and two

27 1 Plaintiff also says that “[i]nvoices have not been issued for work done after September 24, 2024, and those costs are not sought here, like the fees incurred attending the Motion hearing.” (ECF No. 2 at 28 3). 1 partners to prepare what should have been a straightforward motion defies logic and reason.” 2 (Id. at 5). They further argue that “[t]he requested fees are patently excessive, blatantly 3 duplicative, critically lacking in detail within their billing descriptions, and fundamentally 4 unreasonable under the Court’s clear directive.” (Id.). Defendants also assert “[t]he use of block billing alone raises serious concerns, but when 5 combined with the unnecessary staffing of five attorneys – three associates and two partners – for 6 a routine motion to compel, it reveals a pattern of systematic inefficiency and egregious 7 overbilling at Defendants’ expense.” (Id. at 5-6). Defendants ask that the Court “to subject these 8 invoices to the most exacting scrutiny possible” and “to exercise its discretion by dramatically 9 reducing these inflated fees to ensure strict compliance with both established legal standards and 10 the Court's previous order.” (Id. at 6). 11 Furthermore, Defendants point out that “the actual sum of these invoices . . . amounts to 12 $32,819.50 – an unexplained discrepancy.” (Id. at 8). 13 Additionally, Defendants make several specific objections to Plaintiff’s various billing 14 entries. Defendants object to Plaintiff’s billing entries that relate to conversations regarding 15 settlement with the Intervenor Plaintiff. (Id. at 9-11). Defendants also point out that a portion of 16 Isabella Granucci’s 7/10/24 billable entry pertains to research on the issue of damages, which is 17 not related to the motion to compel. (Id. at 11). They further argue that certain portions of the 18 bill are redacted, making the entries vague. (Id. at 12). Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff 19 wrongfully submitted the bill of its counsels’ meet and confer efforts. (Id. at 13). 20 D. Reply 21 On November 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 104). Plaintiff first asserts that 22 the discrepancy between the total amount of the invoices ($32,819.50) versus the total amount 23 requested ($29,129.50) “is neither unexplained nor egregious.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff explains that it “does not seek fees for split time entries” and that “[i]n strict compliance with the Court’s 24 Order, Foundation does not seek any fees for these split entries.” (Id. at 2 (citing ECF No. 102 at 25 4)). 26 Plaintiff also replies that its “legal team relating to this motion consisted of only two 27 partners and two associates (one of whom has only a single time entry) Ms.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Blum v. Stenson
465 U.S. 886 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger
608 F.3d 446 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Ingram v. Oroudjian
647 F.3d 925 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
480 F.3d 942 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Martin Gonzalez, Sr. v. City of Maywood
729 F.3d 1196 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc.
523 F.3d 973 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Rukhsana Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles
751 F.3d 1096 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Victoria Ryan v. Editions Limited West, Inc.
786 F.3d 754 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Gates v. Deukmejian
987 F.2d 1392 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Foundation Auto Holdings, LLC v. Weber Motors, Fresno, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foundation-auto-holdings-llc-v-weber-motors-fresno-inc-caed-2025.