Foster v. United States

2 Cl. Ct. 426, 1983 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1789
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 7, 1983
DocketNo. 34-75
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 2 Cl. Ct. 426 (Foster v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 426, 1983 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1789 (cc 1983).

Opinion

OPINION

HARKINS, Judge.

Previous proceedings, in the United States Court of Claims, determined that the Government is liable for a permanent taking of plaintiffs’ property, represented by the right to extract and remove dolomite rock from two deposits on Tract 83 on Van-denberg Air Force Base, and that the taking occurred on November 18, 1971. The property taken is part of the mineral interest reserved by plaintiffs’ predessors-in-in-terest when they sold Tract 83 for $22,750 to the Government on October 29, 1941, in connection with the activation of Camp Cooke, an Army installation to train armored and infantry divisions. On the tak[428]*428ing date, plaintiffs were lessees, through a lease dated July 8, 1971, with the right to extract and remove all riprap rock. The lease did not include sand, gravel, diatoma-ceous material or petroleum products. The term was for 5 years, commencing June 1, 1971, with an option to renew for a period of 5 years on expiration of the original term; at an annual rental of $300 payable on June 1 of each succeeding calendar year, supplemented by monthly payments of 25 cents per ton of rock removed.

On November 18, 1971, plaintiffs were denied permission to survey and drill test a dolomite deposit for riprap rock. Thereafter, on May 2, 1972, plaintiffs for $5,000 purchased all of the reserved mineral interest in Tract 83, including the reversionary interest in the lease retained by the original owners-lessors.

After trial in 1977, the October 18, 1978, trial judge’s opinion stated that there had been a temporary taking of plaintiffs’ right to extract and remove dolomite, that the date of taking was November 18,1971, and that just compensation for the property right temporarily taken was $23,250, with interest from November 18, 1971, to the date of payment. The October 17, 1979, opinion1 of the Court of Claims determined that plaintiffs’ mineral rights had been permanently abrogated by defendant, and remanded the case to the trial division for ascertainment of plaintiffs’ damages. The court specifically refrained from any “intimation that any one method employed by any of plaintiffs’ or defendant’s experts for the.purpose of determining just compensation has been adopted or approved by the court.” The court also stated that “the value of plaintiffs’ entire mineral interest was, in the absence of comparable sales, the fair market value of the minerals in place on the date of the taking.”

The property interest that was taken on November 18, 1971, and which is to be valued in these proceedings on remand, is plaintiffs’ leasehold interest, sometimes termed “operator’s interest” or “working interest”. Defendant has not contested plaintiffs’ right to explore for and remove, under the 1941 and 1972 deeds, all oil, gas, asphaltum and other hydrocarbon substances, and other minerals including diato-maceous earth (except dolomite at a specific site on Tract 83). The value of plaintiffs’ total reserved mineral interest on Tract 83 is not in issue. The property to be valued is the entire mineral interest in the right to extract and remove dolomite from a specific site. This value, the court stated, was to be determined on the basis of evidence already produced by the parties, plus any relevant, non-cumulative additional evidence which either party may desire to offer.

In further proceedings, plaintiffs argued that additional valuation evidence was needed to overcome deficiencies in the record that had been criticized in the trial judge’s October 18,1978, opinion. New evidence, it was claimed, would address credibility questions that resulted from a proliferation of expert witnesses, and the wide variation shown in the record in factors considered, techniques utilized and values ultimately advanced by the experts. Pursuant to plaintiffs’ request, a second trial was held in January 1981; plaintiffs called nine witnesses and defendant called four witnesses. Posttrial briefing was completed January 15, 1982. On October 1, 1982, the case was transferred to the United States Claims Court pursuant to section 403(d) of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.2

Evidence relevant to valuation of plaintiffs’ property interest in Tract 83 is contained in the records of both trial sessions.3 In both trials, the parties’ evidence was [429]*429based on the concept that the taking had been permanent. Notwithstanding the supplemental second trial, the parties’ estimates of the value of the property taken continue to vary widely.

After the first trial, plaintiffs’ final valuation of defendant’s taking of a right of access to the Tract 83 deposits was $4,293,-500; and defendant conceded that the denial of the right to extract and remove dolomite had a value of $23,250. After the second trial, plaintiffs’ final claim is $5,029,-532. During the second trial, defendant’s appraisal expert, at different times, presented three values based on changing volume estimates: $126,000 (8,400,000 tons), $27,000 (1,800,000 tons), and $40-53,000 (2,650,000 tons). Defendant’s final contention is that the property taken has a value of $23,250.

The findings of fact, and the final valuation of $28,000 for plaintiffs’ property that was taken, is based upon the record compiled in both trial sessions.

FACTS

I. The following findings of fact were incorporated in the October 18, 1978, opinion of the trial judge, and were not ruled upon by the United States Court of Claims in its October 17,1979, opinion. These findings are consistent with the evidence adduced in the second trial and are adopted in this court.

1. Tract 83 contains approximately 876.-26 acres; the dolomite deposit in issue on Tract 83 occupies approximately 22.54 acres. The deposit in issue appears on the surface as two bodies — an eastern body and a western body (hereinafter sometimes the “eastern deposit” and the “western deposit”).

2. (a) Plaintiffs’ geologist (Weaver), by interpretative mapping techniques, plotted the eastern deposit and the western deposit as single, unified masses. Defendant’s geologist (Merrill), utilizing outcrop mapping techniques, plotted nine groups of deposits: groups A and B in the eastern body and groups C, D, E, F, G, H, and I in the western body. Group C was a collection of five separately delineated outcroppings. Defendant’s geologist acknowledged that groups A and B very probably were connected at depth and that group C possibly could be connected beneath the surface.

(b) The eastern deposit is approximately 1,800 feet along its southern boundary and approximately the same distance, although irregular or jagged, along its northern boundary. The eastern deposit varies from a maximum of 384 feet to a minimum of 180 feet in width, with an average width of approximately 300 feet. The eastern deposit probably has a depth of more than 100 feet and possibly may go down several hundred feet. Plaintiffs’ geologist asserted that the western body was one continuous mass, approximately 2,400 feet long, and varying in width from 200 to 300 feet. Plaintiffs’ expert estimated that the western deposit would extend at least to a 100-foot depth and probably to a much greater depth. Plaintiffs’ geologist estimated that the eastern deposit encompassed an area of 444.000 square feet (or 10.19 acres) and, at a depth of 100 feet, contained a volume of 1.644.000 cubic yards; at a depth of 150 feet, the volume would be 2,467,000 cubic yards. The western deposit encompassed 538.000 square feet (or 12.35 acres).

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Bluebook (online)
2 Cl. Ct. 426, 1983 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1789, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-united-states-cc-1983.