Foster v. Saratoga Springs City School District

16 A.D.3d 824, 790 N.Y.S.2d 748, 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2433
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 10, 2005
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 16 A.D.3d 824 (Foster v. Saratoga Springs City School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster v. Saratoga Springs City School District, 16 A.D.3d 824, 790 N.Y.S.2d 748, 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2433 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

Carpinello, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), entered December 12, 2003 in Saratoga County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondents which terminated petitioner’s employment.

Following separate hearings on two separate sets of charges against petitioner, a mechanic employed by respondent Saratoga Springs City School District, a Hearing Officer found him guilty of all five specifications outlined in the first set and one of the two specifications outlined in the second set of charges. The Hearing Officer recommended a two-month suspension with respect to the first set of charges and a written reprimand with respect to the second. Although accepting all of the Hearing Officer’s factual findings with respect to the first set of charges and some of his findings, as well as the penalty, with respect to the second, respondent Saratoga Springs School District Board of Education rejected the recommended penalty of suspension and instead ordered termination. Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding, which was dismissed by Supreme Court. He now appeals.

We affirm. Based upon our review of the record, and contrary to petitioner’s contentions, the Hearing Officer’s factual findings are supported by proof which satisfies the substantial evidence test (see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180-181 [1978]). Each specification of misconduct in the nature of incompetence and insubordination is supported by testimony and/or documentary evidence establishing that petitioner (1) refused to follow a work order even after reasonable steps were taken by his supervisors to accommodate concerns about the task, (2) disrupted office operations when he appeared unannounced at the District office in a tirade over the pending work order and got in a heated debate with a supervisor outside of his chain of command (the District’s Director of Facilities and Operations), (3) complained to yet another supervisor outside his chain of command (the District’s Superintendent) about the pending work order despite prior instructions to the contrary and (4) failed to timely return a table saw to the District despite a directive to all maintenance mechanics that all borrowed tools be returned. Each specifica[826]*826tion of misconduct in the nature of lying and dishonesty is supported by testimony and/or documentary evidence that petitioner threatened “to get” the Director of Facilities and Operations by falsely claiming that he had tape-recorded their altercation at the District office and that petitioner intentionally eavesdropped on a meeting of his supervisors concerning his conduct by secreting himself in an unoccupied, unlit adjoining room. To the extent that each of these findings was based on the Hearing Officer’s resolution of credibility issues, we have no basis to disturb such resolutions (see Matter of Brey v Board of Educ. of Jeffersonville-Youngsville Cent. School Dist., 245 AD2d 613, 615 [1997]).

Next, there is no support in the record for petitioner’s claim that the second set of charges was brought for the sole purpose of imposing multiple suspensions (see Matter of Figueroa v New York Thruway Auth., 251 AD2d 773, 773 [1998]). The record reveals that petitioner’s direct supervisor did not become aware of petitioner’s improper retention of the table saw until the evening of December 10, 2002. By this time, the first set of charges had already been prepared by the Board of Education and were mailed to petitioner the following day.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Matter of Moon v. County of Columbia
2025 NY Slip Op 06233 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2025)
Matter of Blamah v. New York Off. of the State Comptroller
207 A.D.3d 905 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2022)
Matter of Wales v. City of Saratoga Springs
2021 NY Slip Op 06900 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2021)
Bermel v. Walcott
112 A.D.3d 619 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
16 A.D.3d 824, 790 N.Y.S.2d 748, 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2433, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-saratoga-springs-city-school-district-nyappdiv-2005.