Foster v. Po Folks, Inc.

674 So. 2d 843, 1996 WL 257085
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMay 17, 1996
Docket95-327
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 674 So. 2d 843 (Foster v. Po Folks, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster v. Po Folks, Inc., 674 So. 2d 843, 1996 WL 257085 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

674 So.2d 843 (1996)

Nancy FOSTER and William Foster, Appellants,
v.
PO FOLKS, INC., etc., Appellee.

No. 95-327.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

May 17, 1996.

Thomas M. Farrell, IV and Daniel P. Faherty of Cianfrogna, Telfer, Reda & Faherty, P.A., Titusville, for Appellants.

Mark Hektner of Behan, Hektner, Miller, Palm Beach Gardens, for Appellee.

W. SHARP, Judge.

Nancy and William Foster appeal from a final summary judgment entered against them, denying them any recovery against Po Folks, Inc., in a negligence suit. Nancy was injured in a 1992 robbery and assault on her, which took place in appellee restaurant's parking lot, in the evening. The trial judge granted summary judgment on the ground that there had been only one other crime against persons on the property, which occurred when a prior owner (Perkins) was operating the property in 1991. We reverse because we think there is a material factual issue posed by the record in this case, as to whether appellee could and should have reasonably foreseen that a criminal attack would be made on a customer, and therefore should have taken some security measures to forestall such an occurrence.

In November of 1992, Nancy and a friend stopped for tea at Po Folks, a restaurant located in Titusville, Florida, owned by the appellee. They left the restaurant at approximately 10:00 p.m. and walked to their cars located in the restaurant's parking lot. As they began to enter their cars, a man ran towards them, grabbed their purses, knocked Nancy to the ground and took her jewelry. In her complaint, Nancy also alleged that the restaurant was located in a high crime area, that appellee knew or should have known of the dangerous nature of the neighborhood, *844 that the premises owned and operated as a restaurant facility had been the site of previous criminal assaults similar to the one involving Nancy, that appellee failed to undertake any security measures to ensure the safety of its patrons, and that appellee should have known the area posed an unreasonable risk of harm to its patrons.

In ruling on the propriety of a summary judgment order in a negligence case such as this one, the appellate court must read the record in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff or nonmoving party. Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666 (Fla.1985); Nicholls v. Durst, 579 So.2d 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Only if the appellate court determines there is no basis to conclude the criminal attack on a patron was foreseeable, should it affirm.

The owner or occupier of property has a duty to protect an invitee on his premises from a criminal attack that is reasonably foreseeable. Ameijeiras v. Metropolitan Dade County, 534 So.2d 812 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1989). See also Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So.2d 491 (Fla.1983), receded from on other grounds, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So.2d 119 (Fla.1995) (an innkeeper owes the duty of reasonable care for the safety of his guests); Reichenbach v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 401 So.2d 1366 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 412 So.2d 469 (Fla.1982) (an innkeeper may be liable if he fails to take reasonable precautions to deter the type of criminal activity which results in a guest's injury).

In Ameijeiras, the third district held that this duty arises only when the property owner or occupier has actual or constructive knowledge of prior similar criminal acts committed on his premises. In that case, Ameijeiras had been shot during an attempted robbery while jogging on a nature trail maintained by the county. There had been no violent crimes reported to the county in the two years prior to the attack on Ameijeiras and Ameijeiras had introduced no evidence that the county knew of the existence of any violent criminal activity on the nature trail. In these circumstances, the third district held that the attack on Ameijeiras was not reasonably foreseeable, as a matter of law. See also Relyea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), disapproved on other grounds, Avallone v. Board of County Commissioners of Citrus County, 493 So.2d 1002 (Fla.1986) (to impose a duty upon a landowner to protect an invitee from criminal acts, the plaintiffs must allege and prove that the landowner had actual or constructive knowledge of prior, similar criminal acts committed upon invitees).[1]

In Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So.2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), dismissed, 589 So.2d 291 (Fla.1991), and disapproved on other grounds, Angrand v. Key, 657 So.2d 1146 (Fla.1995), the fourth district held that foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances of the case rather than by a rigid application of the mechanical rule requiring evidence of prior similar criminal acts against invitees on the property. In that case, the plaintiff's injuries resulted from a fight between two groups of individuals who had been drinking at a bar. The fourth district held that evidence of the bar's inadequate security and 58 police incident reports of problems at the bar, including crimes against persons, within the past 18 months, provided a basis for a finding of foreseeability and precluded a directed verdict in favor of the bar. In so doing, the fourth district noted that cases (such as Relyea), which hold that the defendant must have knowledge of prior, similar criminal acts in order to impose the duty to protect invitees from criminal acts of a third person, are not in accord with cases from the Florida Supreme Court such as Hall v. Billy Jack's, Inc., 458 So.2d 760 (Fla.1984), Allen v. Babrab, Inc., 438 So.2d 356 (Fla.1983) and Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So.2d 33 (Fla.1983).

*845 In Hall, the plaintiff, a patron of a bar, was injured by another patron. The plaintiff sued both the patron and the bar and obtained a judgment against both. The second district affirmed as to the assailant but reversed the judgment against the bar. On review, the Florida Supreme Court held that the bar was required to protect its invitees from those risks which are reasonably foreseeable. The court noted that foreseeability may be established by proving that the proprietor of the bar had actual or constructive knowledge of a particular assailant's inclination towards violence or by proving that the proprietor had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition on his premises that was likely to cause harm to a patron:

A dangerous condition may be indicated if, according to past experience (i.e., reputation of the tavern), there is a likelihood of disorderly conduct by third persons in general which might endanger the safety of patrons or if security staffing is inadequate. These indicia are not exhaustive. If the lounge management knew or should have known of a general specific risk to Hall and failed to take reasonable steps to guard against that risk and if, because of that failure, Hall was injured, Billy Jack's may be shown to have breached its duty and may be held financially responsible for Hall's injuries. The question of foreseeability is for the trier of fact. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, 386 So.2d 520 (Fla.1980).

458 So.2d at 762. See also Allen (specific knowledge of an individual's dangerous propensities is not the exclusive method of proving foreseeability); Stevens

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
674 So. 2d 843, 1996 WL 257085, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-po-folks-inc-fladistctapp-1996.