Foster v. Peters

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided December 16, 2024·No. 3:24-cv-00556·Unknown

Opinion

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BRENDEN ALEXANDER FOSTER, Case No. 3:24-cv-00556-MMD-CLB

Petitioner, ORDER v. GREGORY PETERS, et al., Respondents. Pro se Petitioner Brenden Alexander Foster has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1 (“Petition”).) The Court finds good cause exists to grant Foster’s IFP application. This Court now reviews the Petition under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”).1 For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that the Petition is unexhausted and federal abstention is required. Foster is a pretrial detainee in custody at the Humboldt County Detention Center in Winnemucca, Nevada, awaiting trial on his state criminal charges before the Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) In his Petition, Foster requests that the Court “release [him] from Humboldt County Detention Center until [his] pretrial on March 1, 2025.” (Id. at 7.) According to Foster, he has been in custody since his arrest on April 7, 2024, his pretrial hearing has been continued numerous times, and his trial has yet to be set. (Id. at 2.) Foster alleges that his prolonged pretrial detention violates his

1This Court exercises its discretion to apply the rules governing § 2254 petitions to Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. (Id. at 2, 6.) Habeas Rule 4 requires federal district courts to examine a habeas petition and order a response unless it “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. This rule allows courts to screen and dismiss petitions that are patently frivolous, vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, false, or plagued by procedural defects. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). Because a federal habeas petitioner incarcerated by a state must give state courts a fair opportunity to act on each of his claims before he presents them in a federal habeas petition, federal courts will not consider his petition for habeas relief until he has properly exhausted his available state remedies for all claims raised. See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). A claim remains unexhausted until the petitioner has given the highest available state court the opportunity to consider the claim through direct appeal or state collateral-review proceedings. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999); Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The federal constitutional implications of a claim, not just issues of state law, must have been raised in the state court to achieve exhaustion. See Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (fair presentation requires both the operative facts and federal legal theory upon which a claim is based). Although it is not clear what, if anything, Foster has filed before the state district court challenging his pretrial detention on the grounds he raises in his instant Petition,2 Foster has not filed any case with the Nevada appellate courts.3 As such, Foster has not 2Notably, the Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada does not have online docket records.

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