Foster v. Gayle

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Foster v. Gayle

89 A.D.3d 981, 933 N.Y.2d 572

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 22, 2011

StatusPublished

This text of 89 A.D.3d 981 (Foster v. Gayle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Foster v. Gayle, 89 A.D.3d 981, 933 N.Y.2d 572 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

Pincite

Opinion

[982]*982The defendants met their respective prima facie burdens of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that as a result of the subject accident, the cervical and lumbosacral regions of her spine, and shoulders, sustained certain injuries. However, the defendants provided competent medical evidence establishing, among other things, that those alleged injuries did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Jackson v Colvert, 24 AD3d 420, 420-421 [2005]; Lentini v Melina, 287 AD2d 550 [2001]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. Dillon, J.E, Dickerson, Leventhal, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2010 NY Slip Op 31735(U).]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

[982]*982The defendants met their respective prima facie burdens of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that as a result of the subject accident, the cervical and lumbosacral regions of her spine, and shoulders, sustained certain injuries. However, the defendants provided competent medical evidence establishing, among other things, that those alleged injuries did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Jackson v Colvert, 24 AD3d 420, 420-421 [2005]; Lentini v Melina, 287 AD2d 550 [2001]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. Dillon, J.E, Dickerson, Leventhal, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2010 NY Slip Op 31735(U).]

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

89 A.D.3d 981, 933 N.Y.2d 572, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-gayle-nyappdiv-2011.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack