Foster v. Fulton County, Georgia

223 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 2002 WL 1813101
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedApril 18, 2002
DocketCIV.A.1:99-CV-900-MHS
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 223 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (Foster v. Fulton County, Georgia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster v. Fulton County, Georgia, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 2002 WL 1813101 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

Opinion

ORDER

SHOOB, Senior District Judge.

On November 5, 2001, the Court ordered the parties to respond to Dr. Grei-finger’s October 30, 2001, Report and to “set forth specific recommendations for addressing” each of ten areas that Dr. Grei-finger identified as “far from compliance” with the Final Settlement Agreement. 1 The parties filed their responses on December 5, 2001. On January 15, 2002, the Court toured the jail with Dr. Greifinger, and after a follow-up visit on February 25-26, 2002, Dr. Greifinger submitted his latest Report on March 2, 2002.

The Court has reviewed the parties’ responses, Dr. Greifinger’s latest report and plaintiffs’ response to that Report filed March 21, 2002, as well as defendants’ most recent updates on jail population, filed March 1 and April 1, 2002. It is clear from these submissions that, despite significant progress, much remains to be done to achieve full compliance with the Final *1294 Settlement Agreement and to assure that all plaintiff class members receive constitutionally adequate medical care. It is also clear that these goals will not be realized without continued monitoring by Dr. Grei-finger and active supervision by this Court.

The following additional steps are needed to enforce the terms of the Final Settlement Agreement and to correct violations of plaintiffs’ federal rights to minimally adequate conditions of confinement and receipt of adequate medical care. The Court finds that this relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct violations of federal rights arising from defendants’ failure to comply with the Final Settlement Agreement, and is the least intrusive means to correct these violations. The areas where additional relief is needed, the relevant provisions of the Final Settlement Agreement, and the specific remedial actions required are set out below.

I. Overcrowding

The County shall identify mechanisms for accommodating current and anticipated jail population.

Final Settlement Agreement ¶ V.D.

Inmate population at the Rice Street facility continues to exceed physical capacity by a significant number. After reaching a low of 2,266 on September 30, 2000, the population rose to 2,544 as of February 15, 2002, and was 2,526 on March 15, 2002. Although the population declined to 2,362 on March 31, 2002, even this figure is more than 100 over the facility’s capacity of 2,250, and recent fluctuations suggest that it is likely to rise again. Clearly, the programs implemented by defendants to reduce the jail population to at or below capacity have not succeeded. Something more must be done.

As Dr. Greifinger has repeatedly stated, overcrowding causes a myriad of problems that increase the likelihood of disease and interfere with the delivery of adequate medical care. The conditions described in Dr. Greifinger’s latest Report are totally unacceptable. These conditions include lack of adequate heat, water, ventilation, and sanitation, all caused, at least in part, by the strain of chronic overcrowding on the facility’s physical plant.

Defendants argue that, despite the overcrowding, the conditions of confinement and the provision of medical care still satisfy constitutional requirements. The Court rejects this argument. The Constitution prohibits depriving inmates of “basic human needs” or “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Adequate heat, water, fresh air, and sanitation are basic human needs, which inmates may not be denied without violating minimal constitutional requirements.

Defendants report that they have undertaken the following additional steps designed to reduce the jail population: (1) regular review of misdemeanor inmates for possible release, (2) expansion of the number and type of cases handled through the Complaint Room, (3) increased efforts to place convicted inmates in the state system, (4) possible reinstitution of the home arrest program, and (5) appointment of a new full-time magistrate judge to handle primarily criminal cases. While these are all steps in the right direction, there is no evidence, nor does the Court believe, that these steps alone will be sufficient to solve the problem.

Plaintiffs have proposed a number of measures that defendants have not yet undertaken, which are designed to correct systemic problems that result in unnecessary incarceration and thus contribute to jail overcrowding. Plaintiffs’ principal proposal is that defendants be required to *1295 provide counsel within 72 hours of arrest to all persons accused of minor offenses who cannot make bail. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that this proposal should be implemented immediately.

Much of the overcrowding at the jail is the result of persons charged with relatively minor offenses who cannot make bail and must remain in jail for weeks or even months waiting for the State Court Solicitor General to file an accusation. 2 Only after an accusation is filed are these inmates’ cases placed on a calendar, and only after these inmates are finally brought to court are they provided counsel. By this time,, they have often spent far more time in jail than they would ever receive as a sentence for their offenses. Under these circumstances, counsel can serve little purpose other than to handle the entering of a plea so that the inmate can finally get out of jail.

If these inmates are appointed counsel promptly after their arrest, they will have the opportunity to file bond review motions, to negotiate pleas, or simply to' demand prompt attention to their cases. As a result, many of these inmates will spend only a few days in jail rather than weeks or months before their cases are even heard. This will not only help to alleviate the overcrowding at the jail; it will also save the County money spent in housing these inmates unnecessarily. 3

Not only does the current treatment of individuals charged with minor offenses contribute to the serious overcrowding problem at the jail, it also constitutes a ■ clear denial of these individuals’ constitutional right to counsel. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) (no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless represented by counsel). The Solicitor General contends that “[cjounsel has always been appointed in Fulton County in cases where a defendant is sentenced to jail time.” 4 This argument apparently refers to Fulton County’s practice of appointing counsel at the time of arraignment. At this point, however, it is too late for an attorney to provide any real representation, since his client has likely already served more time than he or she would if found guilty.

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Bluebook (online)
223 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 2002 WL 1813101, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-fulton-county-georgia-gand-2002.