Foster v. Findlay

3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 224
CourtHancock Circuit Court
DecidedMarch 15, 1891
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 224 (Foster v. Findlay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hancock Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster v. Findlay, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 224 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1891).

Opinion

SENEY, J.

The petition alleges in substance the following facts:

That the plaintiff is engaged in business in the city, of Findlay, as the Findlay Electric Light & Power Co., and as such is now furnishing, and for more than two years past has been furnishing electric light to the city and the inhabitants thereof, under and by virtue of certain contracts made between said plaintiff and said city by the council thereof.
Thar the city of Findlay is a municipal corporation; that the board of gas works trustees consists of five members, elected by the electors of said city; that about the year 1886 the city of Findlay established and constructed a natural gas plant, and ever since said time has maintained and operated the plant.
That prior to the month of July, 1888, the said city desiring to light its streets, etc., with electricity, invited proposals from various electric light companies for prices and terms of franchise; among the parties so submitting proposals were the Thompson-Huston Electric Light Co., to whom it was represented that the city could and would furnish natural gas to an electric light plant, for the generation of electricity, at a cost of from $150 to $200 per year; that upon the faith of such representation the said electric company proposed to furnish to the city arc lamps of 2000 candle power, at $60.00 per year per light, for a period of five years; but in said proposition it was specified and made a condition that said price so proposed, was based upon the price of natural gas, as fixed and furnished by the city; and that if said company was required to pay a higher price for fuel, the price so proposed per arc light should be increased in proportion to the increased price of fuel; that the council accepted the proposition so made, and on July 9, 1888, passed an ordinance granting to said company and assigns, the right to construct and maintain an electric light plant, and to furnish to the city and people electric lights upon the terms and prices so proposed; that said electric light company sold and transferred to plaintiff said contract; that plaintiff, before making any expenditures, made and entered into a contract with said city, whereby, in consideration of the low price of said electric light, it promised and agreed to furnish natural gas to plaintiff for operating his plant at the price of $20.00 per month; that for over two years plaintiff has, monthly, promptly paid to defendants the agreed price of and for the gas furnished plaintiff by defendants, and for over two years has faithfully, honestly, and in good faith, furnished the defendants and the citizens of said city electric light at the agreed price specified in said ordinance; that, notwithstanding the premises, the defendants, on or about December 1, 1890, raised the price of said gas from $240 to $2,150 per year, and notified plaintiff that if he did not pay defendants such increased price in full to January 1, 1891, they would, on December 31, 1890, shut off the gas from plaintiff’s said works; that plaintiff is now furnishing, under his said contract, about 126 arc lamps and lights to the city, for lighting the streets, and about 250 incandescent lights for lighting the public buildings of.the city, and about no arc lights to private persons for lighting stores, etc., etc.; that if defendants are permitted to cut off said gas as threatened by them, plaintiff would sustain great and irremediable loss, harm and damage, for which he would have no adequate remedy at law.
Plaintiff prays for an injunction to prevent defendants from shutting off said gas from plaintiff’s said plant.

To this petition the city is in default for an answer.

[225]*225The board of gas trustees files a lengthy answer, but in our judgment not'an averment is contained in the answer that constitutes a defense; but we notice it, in part.
That it denies it contracted with or obligated itself to furnish gas to plaintiff for any length of time, or at any price. (The plaintiff avers the contract was made with the council.)
That the board derives all its authority from a special act of the legislature, and the general laws of the state; that the natural gas plant costs a large sum of money; that the city is in debt for it, and that under the rates established by a former board the city will never be able to pay the debt, etc., etc. This is in effect an averment of the answer. What ■of it? What difference does it make, if the city council made the contract alleged in the petition?
That the proposition of the plaintiff, and the parties under whom he claims to furnish electric lights to the city, and all negotiations on the subject were embraced in an ordinance, and a copy of the ordinance in its acceptance by the Thompson-Huston Electric Co. is given.
(This is simply a repetition of the allegations of the petition.)
That the factories of the city, including plaintiff, use nine-tenths of the gas, and do not pay more than one-tenth of the revenue; that some of the gas wells were abandoned as useless — and the city was compelled to drill new wells. (Again, we say, what of it? — if the contract was made.)
That the defendants deny that they or any of them ever made any contract with the plaintiff, or for its benefit. (Probably about all, the board of gas trustees can answer are its own acts — and let the city take care of itself.)
That the natural gas plant is real property; that no memorandum in writing of the pretended contract was set up in the petition or was ever made by the defendants, or any of them, or signed by them or by their authority. (Again, we say, what of it? — if the contract was entered into as alleged in the petition.)
Defendants further aver that the pretended contract in the petition was, if of any force , ■or validity, personal between the parties thereto (there can be no doubt of this); the pleader then draws this conclusion from this averment, viz: “and the same neither binds the present board of trustees, nor said city;” — (this conclusion amounts to nothing.)
As a wind-up, seven different reasons are assigned embracing the same matter pleaded, why the injunction ought to be dissolved. If the matter pleaded,- as we have seen, constitutes no defense — calling it reasons would not improve it.

The reply consists of denials of these immaterial averments.

So that the case, so far as the pleadings are concerned, stands upon the averments of the petition alone. We have heard the case upon these pleadings and the evidence. The evidence introduced supplies or makes clearer some of the averments of the petition. So the question is: What relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to?

First, as to the averments of the petition. It pleads two different contracts.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-findlay-ohcircthancock-1891.