Foster v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 28, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00290
StatusUnknown

This text of Foster v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Foster v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ruth Foster, No. CV-22-00290-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Ruth Foster’s appeal from the Commissioner 16 of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her application for Disability 17 Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 1). This appeal is fully briefed (Doc. 11, Doc. 15, Doc. 18 18), and the Court will now rule. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 The issues presented on appeal are whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 21 met her burden of proving transferability of work skills, whether the ALJ considered 22 mental limitations when finding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC), and whether 23 the ALJ was properly appointed. (See Doc. 11 at 1–2). Because the third issue is 24 controlling, the Court will address it first. This Court finds that the ALJ in this case was 25 not properly appointed. But, because there is no nexus between the Commissioner of the 26 Social Security Administration’s unlawful service and any harm suffered by Plaintiff, 27 remand is not appropriate. This Court also finds that the ALJ made no error in making a 28 transferability determination or in finding Plaintiff’s RFC. 1 a. Factual overview 2 Plaintiff alleges that her disability began in August of 2018. (Doc. 11 at 3). In April 3 2019, she filed for DIB, but was denied at both the initial and reconsideration levels. (See 4 id. at 2). She claims to suffer from degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, radiculopathy, 5 obesity, and obstructive sleep apnea. (Id. at 3). In March of 2021 she had a hearing before 6 an ALJ who denied her claim. (See id.). The Appeals Council subsequently denied her 7 request for review. And the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 8 She now appeals that decision. 9 b. The Appointments Clause 10 The Constitution divides the power to appoint officers of the United States between 11 the President and the Senate. See U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President nominates a 12 candidate, and the Senate provides advice and consent. See id. Through this mechanism, 13 the Constitution recognizes that although the President alone wields the executive power, 14 there are certain circumstances in which that power must be delegated so that it can be 15 exercised efficiently. See United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S.Ct. 1970, 1978–79 (2021). 16 He must be able to appoint officials to oversee executive agencies. But it also ensures that 17 this power to delegate is moderated by the influence of the Senate. The Appointments 18 clause states: 19 [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 20 Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are 21 not otherwise herein provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the 22 Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 23 Departments. 24 U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 25 It thus creates a two-step system that splits power between the President and the Senate in 26 the appointments process. The framers did this to ensure accountability for the appointee’s 27 actions. See Arthrex, 141 S.Ct. at 1979. When the people know that a certain official was 28 nominated by the President, blame for that official’s bad actions will “fall upon the 1 president singly and absolutely.” See id. (quoting The Federalist No. 77, p. 517 (J. Cooke 2 ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). The Appointments clause also places a degree of that 3 responsibility on the Senate “for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection 4 of a good one.” Id. 5 The Clause also divides officers into different classes. The highest class are the so 6 called “principal officers.” These officers must be nominated by the President and 7 approved by the Senate. The second class are the so called “inferior officers.” While the 8 default rule for their appointment is the same, Congress can vest their appointment in the 9 President, the Courts, or in department heads. See Art. II, §2, cl. 2. This reflects a concern 10 for “administrative convenience,” as it would be difficult to keep those offices staffed if 11 they had to be filled through the formal advice and consent process. See Arthrex, 141 S.Ct. 12 at 1979. 13 c. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act 14 In 1998, Congress set out to completely overhaul the then one-hundred-and-thirty- 15 year-old Vacancies Act to ensure efficient staffing of the executive branch, and to ensure 16 that the President was only appointing officials to vacant positions through the system set 17 forth by Congress. See M. Rosenberg, Congressional Research Service Report for 18 Congress, The New Vacancies Act: Congress Acts To Protect the Senate's Confirmation 19 Prerogative 2–4 (1998) [hereinafter Rosenberg]. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act 20 (“FVRA”) grants the President the power to fill vacant offices with acting officers who can 21 serve, subject to certain time constraints, before and during the pendency of a formal 22 nomination to that office. See 5 U.S.C. § 3345–3346. It was designed to provide “optimal 23 flexibility and administrative continuity ....” Rosenberg at 9. Ultimately, it gives the 24 President the sole authority to appoint acting officers, while constraining the types of 25 people he can place in temporary power. 26 The FVRA gives the President three options when appointing acting officers. The 27 default is that “the first assistant to the office of such officer shall perform the functions 28 and duties of the office temporarily and in an acting capacity ....” 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a). The 1 President can select others to fill the role, however. Id § 3345(b)–(c). He can direct another 2 officer who has already gone through the advice and consent process (a “PAS” officer), to 3 temporarily take the post. See id. § 3345(b). And he can also direct an employee of that 4 agency to take over the role under certain circumstances. See id. § 3345(c). 5 All of these options are subject to time constraints set forth in the FVRA. Section 6 3346 states: 7 “(a) Except in the case of a vacancy caused by sickness, the person serving as an acting 8 officer as described under section 3345 may serve in the office-- 9 (1) for no longer than 210 days beginning on the date the vacancy occurs; or 10 (2) subject to subsection (b), once a first or second nomination for the office is 11 submitted to the Senate, from the date of such nomination for the period that the nomination 12 is pending in the Senate. 13 (b)(1) If the first nomination for the office is rejected by the Senate, withdrawn, or 14 returned to the President by the Senate, the person may continue to serve as the acting 15 officer for no more than 210 days after the date of such rejection, withdrawal, or return. 16 (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if a second nomination for the office is submitted 17 to the Senate after the rejection, withdrawal, or return of the first nomination, the person 18 serving as the acting officer may continue to serve-- 19 (A) until the second nomination is confirmed; or 20 (B) for no more than 210 days after the second nomination is rejected, withdrawn, 21 or returned. 22 (c) If a vacancy occurs during an adjournment of the Congress sine die, the 210-day 23 period under subsection (a) shall begin on the date that the Senate first reconvenes.” Id. § 24 3346.

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Foster v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-v-commissioner-of-social-security-administration-azd-2023.