Foster, K. v. Frye, J.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 18, 2025
Docket996 MDA 2024
StatusUnpublished

This text of Foster, K. v. Frye, J. (Foster, K. v. Frye, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster, K. v. Frye, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

J-S07017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

KENNETH M. FOSTER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JENNIFER M. FRYE : No. 996 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered June 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Civil Division at No(s): CP-31-CV-4012-2024

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: JUNE 18, 2025

Kenneth M. Foster (“Father”) appeals from the order denying his

exceptions to an interim child support order. Father argues the court erred in

failing to apply Rule 1910.16-4(d)(2) when calculating his award of child

support. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-4(d)(2). We affirm.

Father and Jennifer M. Frye (“Mother”) have three children together:

C.F., G.F., and K.F. Father has full custody of C.F. and G.F., and the parties

share equal custody of K.F.

Father filed a complaint for child support in January 2024. A hearing

officer held a hearing in February 2024 and thereafter submitted a

recommended support order. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(d). The hearing officer

found Father’s monthly net income to be $4,312.46, and Mother’s monthly net

income to be $2,699.87, for a combined monthly net income of $7,012.33. J-S07017-25

Father makes 61.5% of the monthly net income, and Mother makes 38.5%.

See Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/23/24, at 4-5.

The hearing officer then applied Rule 1910.16-4(d)(1), which states,

“When calculating a basic child support obligation and each party owes child

support to the other party as a result of the custodial arrangement, the trier-

of-fact shall offset the parties’ respective basic child support obligations and

award the net difference to the obligee as child support.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-

4(d)(1). Using the table set forth in Rule 1910.16-3, the hearing officer first

found the basic support obligation for the two children who reside with Father

to be $1,841.00. It found that Mother was obligated to pay Father 38.5% of

this amount, or $708.79.

Then, for the third child, again using the table in Rule 1910.6-3, the

hearing officer determined the basic support obligation for one child to be

$1,244.00. The hearing officer reduced Father’s 61.5% share of this amount

by 20%, to 41.5%, based on his having 50% custody of K.F.,1 and found

Father was obligated to pay Mother $514.52.

The hearing officer offset the amount Mother was obligated to pay

Father for his sole custody of C.F. and G.F. ($708.79) with the amount Father ____________________________________________

1 Rule 1910.16-4(c)(1)(ii) directs the court to reduce the obligor’s percentage

of the support obligation according to Rule 1910.16-4(a)(1)(Part D) when a child spends 40% or more overnights with the obligor. Part D reduces the standard percentage of the obligor’s obligation by the difference between the percentage of overnights with the obligor and 30%. In this case, because Father has 50% custody of K.F., the court found this results in a 20% reduction in Father’s basic child support obligation for K.F. (50% - 30% = 20%).

-2- J-S07017-25

was obligated to pay Mother for her 50% custody of K.F. ($514.52), and

calculated Mother’s monthly support obligation to be the remaining $182.09.

The court entered an interim support order on March 26, 2024, based

on the hearing officer’s findings. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(f) (providing court

shall enter interim order following conference, without hearing parties). It was

substantially in the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e). See id. (stating interim

support order shall be “calculated in accordance with the guidelines and

substantially in the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e)”).

Father filed timely exceptions to the order and demanded a de novo

hearing. See id. (providing parties 20 days after receipt of interim order to

file a written demand for a hearing before the court). The court held a de novo

hearing. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(i) (providing for de novo hearing upon

written demand, followed by the entry of a final support order). On June 12,

2024, the court entered an order stating, “AND NOW, June 1[2], 2024, after

[a] hearing de novo and consideration of the arguments of the parties,

[Father’s] appeal is dismissed.” Order, 6/12/24, at 1 (italics added). The

Docket Entry for the order states, “JUDGE SIGNS FINAL ORDER.” See Docket

Entry, 6/12/24.2

____________________________________________

2 The order is dated June 11. However, it was filed on June 12, and states that

Rule 236 notice was provided on that date. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) (stating the date of entry of a civil order is “the date on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that written notice of entry of the order has been given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b)”). We have amended the caption to reflect the order was entered on June 12.

-3- J-S07017-25

Father appealed. He raises one issue: “Whether the trial court erred by

failing to apply the Varied Partial Physical Custodial Schedule analysis found

in Pa.R.C[iv].P. 1910.16-4(d)(2) when calculating the child support obligation

of [Mother].” Father’s Br. at 4.

We must first address whether the order under appeal is a final order.

See Capuano v. Capuano, 823 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa.Super. 2003) (stating the

appealability of an order is a jurisdictional issue which we may raise sua

sponte). A final order is one that disposes of all claims and all parties. See

Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). However, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that where

the court has entered a support order following a support hearing in front of

a hearing officer, and a party demands a hearing de novo before the trial

court, “The court shall hear the case and enter a final order substantially in

the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e).” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(i); see also

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.27(e) (showing form for final support order).

Here, the June 12 order is not in the required form. In its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, the trial court explains that its practice following a de novo hearing

on child support has been for the court to first enter its own “final order”

adopting, rejecting, or modifying the interim order, and then for the Domestic

Relations Section to enter a second “final support order” through the

Pennsylvania Automated Child Support Enforcement System (PACSES) in the

form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e), based on the court’s “final order.” Trial Ct.

Op. at 2. The court states that, because a “final order” entered in this manner

does not comply with the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e), the court has

-4- J-S07017-25

since “modified its de novo hearing procedure to address the identified

defects.” Id.3 The court also states that no “final support order” had been

entered in the instant case using PACSES system, prior to Father’s appeal to

this Court, due to “a breakdown in the judicial process.” Id. at 3. The court

states that it nonetheless specifically intended the June 12 order “to be the

final order determining the child support to be paid by [Mother] to [Father],

pending only memorialization by the Domestic Relations Office using the

appropriate form.” Id. It thus requests we review Father’s appeal on the

merits. Id. at 1.

We find the court’s failure to adhere to Rule 1910.11 in this case, by

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Bluebook (online)
Foster, K. v. Frye, J., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-k-v-frye-j-pasuperct-2025.