Foster, K. v. Frye, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided June 18, 2025·No. 996 MDA 2024·Unpublished

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

KENNETH M. FOSTER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

JENNIFER M. FRYE : No. 996 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered June 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Civil Division at No(s): CP-31-CV-4012-2024

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: JUNE 18, 2025 Kenneth M. Foster (“Father”) appeals from the order denying his exceptions to an interim child support order. Father argues the court erred in failing to apply Rule 1910.16-4(d)(2) when calculating his award of child support. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-4(d)(2). We affirm.

Father and Jennifer M. Frye (“Mother”) have three children together:

C.F., G.F., and K.F. Father has full custody of C.F. and G.F., and the parties share equal custody of K.F.

Father filed a complaint for child support in January 2024. A hearing officer held a hearing in February 2024 and thereafter submitted a recommended support order. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(d). The hearing officer found Father’s monthly net income to be $4,312.46, and Mother’s monthly net income to be $2,699.87, for a combined monthly net income of $7,012.33.

Father makes 61.5% of the monthly net income, and Mother makes 38.5%. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/23/24, at 4-5.

The hearing officer then applied Rule 1910.16-4(d)(1), which states, “When calculating a basic child support obligation and each party owes child support to the other party as a result of the custodial arrangement, the trier- of-fact shall offset the parties’ respective basic child support obligations and award the net difference to the obligee as child support.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16- 4(d)(1). Using the table set forth in Rule 1910.16-3, the hearing officer first found the basic support obligation for the two children who reside with Father to be $1,841.00. It found that Mother was obligated to pay Father 38.5% of this amount, or $708.79.

Then, for the third child, again using the table in Rule 1910.6-3, the hearing officer determined the basic support obligation for one child to be $1,244.00. The hearing officer reduced Father’s 61.5% share of this amount by 20%, to 41.5%, based on his having 50% custody of K.F.,1 and found Father was obligated to pay Mother $514.52.

The hearing officer offset the amount Mother was obligated to pay

Father for his sole custody of C.F. and G.F. ($708.79) with the amount Father

1 Rule 1910.16-4(c)(1)(ii) directs the court to reduce the obligor’s percentage

of the support obligation according to Rule 1910.16-4(a)(1)(Part D) when a child spends 40% or more overnights with the obligor. Part D reduces the standard percentage of the obligor’s obligation by the difference between the percentage of overnights with the obligor and 30%. In this case, because Father has 50% custody of K.F., the court found this results in a 20% reduction in Father’s basic child support obligation for K.F. (50% - 30% = 20%).

was obligated to pay Mother for her 50% custody of K.F. ($514.52), and calculated Mother’s monthly support obligation to be the remaining $182.09.

The court entered an interim support order on March 26, 2024, based on the hearing officer’s findings. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(f) (providing court shall enter interim order following conference, without hearing parties). It was substantially in the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e). See id. (stating interim support order shall be “calculated in accordance with the guidelines and substantially in the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e)”).

Father filed timely exceptions to the order and demanded a de novo hearing. See id. (providing parties 20 days after receipt of interim order to file a written demand for a hearing before the court). The court held a de novo hearing. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(i) (providing for de novo hearing upon written demand, followed by the entry of a final support order). On June 12, 2024, the court entered an order stating, “AND NOW, June 1[2], 2024, after [a] hearing de novo and consideration of the arguments of the parties, [Father’s] appeal is dismissed.” Order, 6/12/24, at 1 (italics added). The Docket Entry for the order states, “JUDGE SIGNS FINAL ORDER.” See Docket Entry, 6/12/24.2

2 The order is dated June 11. However, it was filed on June 12, and states that

Rule 236 notice was provided on that date. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) (stating the date of entry of a civil order is “the date on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that written notice of entry of the order has been given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b)”). We have amended the caption to reflect the order was entered on June 12.

Father appealed. He raises one issue: “Whether the trial court erred by failing to apply the Varied Partial Physical Custodial Schedule analysis found in Pa.R.C[iv].P. 1910.16-4(d)(2) when calculating the child support obligation of [Mother].” Father’s Br. at 4.

We must first address whether the order under appeal is a final order.

See Capuano v. Capuano, 823 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa.Super. 2003) (stating the appealability of an order is a jurisdictional issue which we may raise sua sponte). A final order is one that disposes of all claims and all parties. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). However, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that where the court has entered a support order following a support hearing in front of a hearing officer, and a party demands a hearing de novo before the trial court, “The court shall hear the case and enter a final order substantially in the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e).” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(i); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.27(e) (showing form for final support order).

Here, the June 12 order is not in the required form. In its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, the trial court explains that its practice following a de novo hearing on child support has been for the court to first enter its own “final order” adopting, rejecting, or modifying the interim order, and then for the Domestic Relations Section to enter a second “final support order” through the Pennsylvania Automated Child Support Enforcement System (PACSES) in the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e), based on the court’s “final order.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. The court states that, because a “final order” entered in this manner does not comply with the form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e), the court has

since “modified its de novo hearing procedure to address the identified defects.” Id.3 The court also states that no “final support order” had been entered in the instant case using PACSES system, prior to Father’s appeal to this Court, due to “a breakdown in the judicial process.” Id. at 3. The court states that it nonetheless specifically intended the June 12 order “to be the final order determining the child support to be paid by [Mother] to [Father], pending only memorialization by the Domestic Relations Office using the appropriate form.” Id. It thus requests we review Father’s appeal on the merits. Id. at 1.

We find the court’s failure to adhere to Rule 1910.11 in this case, by failing to enter its final order in the form prescribed by Rule 1910.27(e), does not affect the finality or appealability of the June 12 order. The Rules contemplate that the order entered by the court following the hearing de novo is a final order. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11(i);4 see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1930.2(a) (prohibiting motions for post-trial relief in domestic relations matters). The Rules do not anticipate the entry of any additional order, such as the entry of judgment, or a divorce decree, during the normal course of child support proceedings to finalize those proceedings. See, e.g., Syno v. Syno, 567 A.2d

717, 718 (Pa.Super. 1989) (finding order dismissing exceptions to master’s

3 The court also notes its misstatement in the June 12 order in referring to the

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Foster, K. v. Frye, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Foster, K. v. Frye, J. (Foster, K. v. Frye, J.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Silver v. Pinskey
981 A.2d 284 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Krakovsky v. Krakovsky
583 A.2d 485 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1990)
Deasy v. Deasy
730 A.2d 500 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1999)
Capuano v. Capuano
823 A.2d 995 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)
Syno v. Syno
567 A.2d 717 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)