Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight Bros.

4 La. App. 307, 1926 La. App. LEXIS 411
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 10, 1926
DocketNo. 2155
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 4 La. App. 307 (Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight Bros.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight Bros., 4 La. App. 307, 1926 La. App. LEXIS 411 (La. Ct. App. 1926).

Opinion

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REYNOLDS, J.

Plaintiff, Foster & Glassell Co., Ltd., sued defendants, Knight Brothers, to recover the sum of $650.00 with legal interest on $537.40 thereof from August 3, 1920, until paid, and with legal interest on the balance from judicial demand until paid, for injuries negligently inflicted on its employee, Pink Morris, by an employee of defendants and for compensation for which injuries its employee had obtained judgment against it under the Employers’ Liability Act (Act 20 of 1914 as amended by Act 38 of 1918) and in satisfaction of which judgment it had paid its employee $537.40 on August 3, 1920.

The suit was commenced November 16, 1920.

Defendants tendered a plea of prescription of one year which plea was sustained by the court and plaintiff’s suit dismissed.

Plaintiff applied for a new trial which was dénied and it appealed to this court which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff having been denied a rehearing by this court applied for and was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court where the judgment of the district court and of this court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. Said the Supreme Court:

“Our conclusion, therefore, is that insofar as the demand exceeds the sum alleged to have been paid by plaintiff to its employee, the plea of prescription was properly sustained; but as to the claim for $537.40, as for money paid because of the fault of defendant, it should have been overruled'. For the reasons assigned the judgments of the District Court and Court of Appeal are set aside insofar as the demand for reimbursement for money paid to the extent of $537.40 is concerned, and this cause is hereby remanded to the trial court to be proceeded with according to [309]*309law and the views herein expressed. Defendant to pay costs of the Court of Appeal and of this court, all other costs to await final judgment.”

On the return of the case to the District Court the defendants answered denying negligence on the part of the driver of their truck and alleging that the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff’s employee was his own negligence.

On these issues the case was tried and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants for the sum of $650.00 with legal interest on $537.40 thereof from August 3, 1920, until paid, and with legal interest on the balance thereof from November 10, 1920, until paid, together with the costs of the suit.

A new trial having been applied for by defendants and denied by the court; defendants appealed to this court.

OPINION

It is conceded by both plaintiff and defendants that the only question to be decided is whether the alleged negligence of the driver of defendants’ truck or the alleged negligence of plaintiff’s employee was the proximate cause of the accident.

The evidence shows that there was a zone thirty feet wide marked off around the compress where the accident occurred generally used by employees of the compress as a passageway in going to and coming and going about the compress.

This zone was marked off by a chalk line and the rules of the city fire department and of the compress company forbid the unloading of cotton on it.

Pinkney Morris, an employee of plaintiff was at work near the compress, and while walking on the reserved zone, returning from dinner, defendants’ truck driver lifted a bale of cotton as high as his knees from the truck and yelling “lookout” toppled it to the ground — all at one time. The bale fell upon Pinkney Morris causing injuries to him for which he obtained judgment against plaintiff under the employers’ liability act as stated.

We are of the opinion' that Pinkney Morris was not guilty of negligence.

The evidence shows that the thirty-foot zone was generally used by those employed by or having business at the compress as a passageway.

George Slaughter testified, pages 10 and 20:

“Q. Now, what was Pink Morris doing?
“A. Well, he was just coming in from dinner, going to his work.
“Q. Which way was he coming from?
“A. Right up the side of the warehouse like, like he come every day.
“Q. Was that generally the way he come in?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Now Pink Morris worked for who?
“A. Poster & Glassell.
“Q. What was his object in coming up that way?
“A. Well, that was generally the way he come every day, all of us come that way, by the side of the warehouse.
“Q. It was at dinner time?
“A. Yes, sir, after dinner.
“Q. He was coming there for the purpose of going to work?
“A. Yes, sir, Tom Rochelle was calling for him.
“Q. What did Tom do then?
“A. He was foreman, there.
* * *
“Q. Now, was this the general pathway for employees of Poster & Glassell to go to work?
“A. Yes, sir, every one in that place come in there and the hands going to dinner passed along that wall there down to the compress and to the compress room.
[310]*310“Q. Now, was that the proper place for Pink Morris to come on his way back to work?
“A. Yes, sir, along that passageway.
“Q. Now, where is the door to Poster & Glassell’s warehouse, how close was he to the door?
“A. Well, a space — he was about ten or fifteen feet from the door.
* * %
“Q. Now, you say you saw this cotton fall?
“A. Yes, sir, now there was a trailer behind the truck and the trailer was unloaded before Pink Morris got there and the young man, we call him young man, whoever he was, he had managed to move the trailer back and he commenced to unload the truck, he got on top, I was satisfied he didn’t see him because he was not where he could have seen him; he was hot and straining himself to raise the cotton up and Pink Morris being on the opposite side and of course he threw the cotton off and it caught Pink.
‘‘Q. Now, when he threw the bale of cotton off did you hear him holler ‘look out’?
“A. No, sir, I didn’t hear that.
“Q. Would you have heard it if he had hollered ?
“A. Well, if he had hollered loud enough.
“Q. Is it customary to holler ‘look out'?
“A. It was customary to notify or to see if anyone, was in danger.
“Q. Do you know anything about that thirty-foot fire line?
"A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What is the reason for it?

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Bluebook (online)
4 La. App. 307, 1926 La. App. LEXIS 411, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foster-glassell-co-v-knight-bros-lactapp-1926.