Fortunato Martinez-Garcia v. Todd Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: May 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-3879
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0217n.06

Case No. 25-3879

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED May 18, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk FORTUNATO MARTINEZ-GARCIA, ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM ) THE UNITED STATES BOARD OF ) TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting U.S. IMMIGRATION APPEALS ) Attorney General ) OPINION Respondent. ) )

Before: GIBBONS, MURPHY, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Fortunato Martinez-Garcia seeks

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “the Board”) order affirming the judgment

of the immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his application for cancellation of removal from the United

States. Martinez-Garcia contends that both the IJ and BIA committed legal error by determining

that he did not present evidence demonstrating that his deportation would cause his qualifying

relatives to suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. For the reasons discussed below,

we deny the petition for review and affirm the BIA.

I.

After multiple failed attempts, Martinez-Garcia successfully entered the United States from

Mexico without inspection in 1999. He traveled here seeking economic opportunities for his

family, as he was newly married and his wife, Rosa, was pregnant. A few years later, Rosa joined

Martinez-Garcia in America with their then-infant daughter, Heidi. The couple had two more No. 25-3879, Martinez-Garcia v. Blanche

children together following their entrance into the states, both of whom were born in Ohio: J.A.M.

(2008) and J.E.M. (2010).

On May 13, 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal

proceedings against Martinez-Garcia by filing a Notice to Appear with the Cleveland, Ohio

immigration court. Martinez-Garcia admitted to the allegations made in the Notice to Appear and

conceded his removability.

However, on January 29, 2010, Martinez-Garcia filed for cancellation of removal. Under

the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Attorney General may cancel the removal of a

deportable noncitizen if the noncitizen demonstrates that they have: (1) been physically,

continuously present in the U.S. for a minimum of 10 years prior to their cancellation application;

(2) “been a person of good moral character during [that] period”; (3) no convictions of a

disqualifying offense; and (4) “establishe[d] that removal would result in exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship to the [noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child” who is a U.S. citizen or

lawfully admitted permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). Martinez-Garcia

claimed that his deportation would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his

American-born children, warranting relief under the INA. At the time of his removal hearing,

Martinez-Garcia and his wife had been separated for about nine years and his wife retained custody

of the children.

The IJ found Martinez-Garcia to be credible and of good moral character, and DHS

stipulated that he satisfied the ten-year continuous physical presence requirement, had the requisite

qualifying relatives, and lacked any disqualifying offenses, as mandated by the INA. However,

the IJ ultimately concluded that Martinez-Garcia failed to establish that his qualifying relatives,

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his children J.A.M. and J.E.M., would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as the

result of his deportation.

In its decision, the IJ discussed at length the evidence presented at the removal hearing

through Martinez-Garcia’s testimony, the only testimony offered. The judge noted that the

children lived with their mother and Martinez-Garcia visited daily, but the children would remain

in the U.S. should he be removed. Despite this, the IJ recognized that Martinez-Garcia’s departure

would impact the children both economically and emotionally due to their dependence on their

father. The IJ confirmed that Martinez-Garcia’s mother and sister still lived in the family home in

Mexico where he also lived before traveling to the U.S. And the IJ determined that there was no

evidence offered that demonstrated Martinez-Garcia “would be unable to return to this home” after

being removed. AR 56, IJ Oral Decision. The IJ also noted that both Martinez-Garcia and his

wife were able to work, and no evidence pointed to any serious medical conditions suffered by

him, his wife, or the children. Indeed, the IJ found that Martinez-Garcia provided evidence that

he could earn money once removed to Mexico and send it to his children. Ultimately, while the IJ

recognized that Martinez-Garcia’s removal would have a “negative impact,” it determined “that

this hardship is not distinguishable from the hardship that all families in [Martinez-Garcia’s]

family situation ordinarily experience” and did “not rise to the level required by the [INA].” Id.

at 59.

Martinez-Garcia appealed to the BIA, and the Board adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.

The Board specifically upheld the IJ’s determination that Martinez-Garcia failed to demonstrate

that his removal to Mexico would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his

qualifying children. The Board further recognized that Martinez-Garcia did not identify any clear

errors of fact or law within the IJ’s decision.

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Martinez-Garcia submitted a timely petition to our court requesting review of the BIA’s

order.

II.

The parties dispute which standard of review we should apply in analyzing Martinez-

Garcia’s petition. Martinez-Garcia asserts that we review the IJ’s application of the hardship

standard to the underlying facts de novo because Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.

369 (2024), requires that we review the Board’s order without deference to the agency’s

interpretation of the statute. On the other hand, the government asks us to apply the “substantial

evidence” standard of review. CA6 R. 12, Resp’t Br., at 24. Because of recent developments in

the jurisprudence of both our circuit and the Supreme Court, we find that the government’s

proffered standard governs Martinez-Garcia’s claim.

Generally, we may review final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Galvez-Bravo

v. Garland, 119 F.4th 1038, 1040 (6th Cir. 2024). Where “the BIA issues its own decision rather

than summarily affirming the IJ,” we review the BIA decision as the final agency determination,

and the IJ decision to the extent the BIA adopted it. Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d 728, 732 (6th

Cir. 2014). Regarding cancellation of removal applications, we may review “certain legal

questions” contained within the agency’s denial. Hernandez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 762, 767 (6th

Cir. 2023). The Supreme Court has recognized that a petition challenging the application of the

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts presents a

“quintessential mixed question of law and fact,” and is therefore reviewable by our court under

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) as a question of law. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212 (2024); see also

Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1150 (6th Cir. 2021).

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Previously, we simply applied a “more deferential standard of review” to this mixed

question. See, e.g., Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Wilkinson,

601 U.S. at 222). As recently as last month, however, we clarified the precise “metric” by which

we review the Board’s application of the hardship standard under the INA. See Baltazar Us v.

Blanche, No. 25-3504, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 1162684, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2026). Citing the

Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845 (2026), we held that a

hardship finding is appropriately analyzed under the “substantial-evidence” standard outlined in

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Id.; see also Urias-Orellana, 146 S. Ct. at 851. Under this substantial evidence

standard, the “Board’s determination that a given set of undisputed facts does not rise to the level

of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Baltazar Us, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 1162684,

at *2 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). We evaluate Martinez-Garcia’s petition under this

standard.

III.

Martinez-Garcia argues that “[t]he IJ and BIA committed multiple legal errors in applying

the ‘exceptional and extremely unusual standard’ under [the INA].” CA6 R. 11, Pet. Br., at 20

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(D)). The error, according to him, arose when “[t]he IJ failed to

conduct a cumulative and aggregate analysis of the hardship factors” as required by BIA precedent.

Id. at 21. Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision regarding the application of the exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship standard, we review the IJ’s decision for error. See Harmon, 758

F.3d at 732. Finding no such error, we affirm the IJ’s denial of Martinez-Garcia’s removal

cancellation as conclusive because no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary. Baltazar Us, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 1162684, at *2.

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To evaluate whether the IJ properly analyzed Martinez-Garcia’s claim of hardship, we first

confirm which legal standards form the structure of the hardship inquiry. We have previously

held that the BIA’s articulation of the hardship inquiry—which requires a petitioner to “‘establish

that his qualifying relatives would suffer hardship that is substantially different from, or beyond,

that which would normally be expected from the deportation of [a noncitizen] with close family

members here’”—is consistent with “our independent assessment of the statute’s meaning.”

Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting In re Monreal-

Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001)); see also Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 222 (same).

“[T]he IJ must ‘consider the ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying . . . United States citizen

relatives,’ including ‘family ties in the United States and abroad[.]’” Montanez-Gonzalez v.

Holder, 780 F.3d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63).

When evaluating hardship, “all hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate.” Monreal-

Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 64; see also In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 472 (B.I.A.

2002) (“[The hardship analysis] requires the assessment of hardship factors in their totality, often

termed a ‘cumulative’ analysis.”); Diaz-Roblero v. Garland, No. 23-3873, 2024 WL 3596873, at

*2 (6th Cir. July 31, 2024) (similar).

We are satisfied that the IJ correctly identified the applicable law in its analysis of

Martinez-Garcia’s application for cancellation of his removal. In the addendum to its opinion, the

IJ cited BIA precedent requiring the IJ to consider all hardship factors in the aggregate, including

the petitioner’s age, health, length of residence in the U.S., and family and community ties in the

U.S. and abroad. Moreover, the IJ confirmed that it considered all of the evidence presented by

Martinez-Garcia in support of his cancellation application. The IJ therefore recognized the proper

analysis to undertake when deciding Martinez-Garcia’s application. See Diaz-Roblero v. Garland,

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2024 WL 3596873, at *2 (IJ conducted the correct legal analysis because “[t]he addendum of

governing law that the judge incorporated into her opinion noted that she had to consider all the

evidence in the ‘aggregate’” and noted that she considered all evidence); Pablo-Ventura v. Bondi,

No. 25-3071, 2025 WL 3459588, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) (confirming IJ properly analyzed

the hardship factors in the aggregate because it explicitly stated that it had done so).

The IJ also clearly analyzed the proper law correctly. In its opinion, the IJ noted Martinez-

Garcia’s age, his lack of any medical conditions, and considered his ties to both the United States

and Mexico, with careful attention to his connections to family members in both countries. See

Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63; see also Baltazar Us, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 1162684,

at *2. The IJ examined the financial impact that Martinez-Garcia’s removal would have on his

children and specifically noted the role he plays in the children’s health insurance and their weekly

food expenses. See Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64. Indeed, the IJ acknowledged

that Martinez-Garcia’s “departure would impact the kids economically, and it would be emotional

due to the separation because the qualifying relatives are dependent on the respondent.” AR 56,

IJ Oral Decision. And after considering all these facts, the IJ concluded that the hardship that

would be suffered by Martinez-Garcia’s qualifying relatives “[was] not distinguishable from the

hardship that all families in [Martinez-Garcia’s] family situation ordinarily experience.” Id. at 59.

The IJ therefore conducted the correct analysis. See Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 25-3226, 2025 WL

3541837, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025) (the IJ “applied the proper test” because it “relied on

Monreal-Aguinaga and [other BIA precedent] and expressly evaluated hardship ‘in the

aggregate’”).

We thus conclude that the IJ’s decision shows that it considered the relevant hardship

factors in the aggregate, and the BIA did not deny Martinez-Garcia’s removal cancellation

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application “without engaging in a cumulative analysis,” by affirming that decision, as Martinez-

Garcia claims in his petition for review. CA6 R. 11, Pet. Br., at 23. We further disagree with his

contention that the IJ “focused on the factors individually and failed to engage in a cumulative

analysis of all [the] relevant factors” when analyzing the hardship requirement. Id. Nothing in the

IJ’s decision leads us to conclude that the judge isolated certain factors such that it failed to engage

in the requisite cumulative analysis of all relevant factors. Instead, we find that the IJ appropriately

considered the relevant factors in the aggregate and ultimately determined that they did not evince

a hardship suffered at the level required by the INA. Indeed, we have recognized that cancellation

of removal “is to be limited to truly exceptional and very uncommon situations.” Araujo-Padilla

v. Garland, 854 F. App’x 646, 650 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec.

at 59, 62) (citation modified). We uphold the agency’s determination that Martinez-Garcia did not

present such circumstances.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we find Martinez-Garcia statutorily ineligible for cancellation

of removal and therefore deny his petition for review.

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