Forts v. Ward

471 F. Supp. 1095
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 11, 1979
Docket77 Civ. 1560
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 471 F. Supp. 1095 (Forts v. Ward) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

Opinion

OPINION

OWEN, District Judge.

Prior to 1976, only women had been allowed to serve as guards 1 in the living and sleeping corridors of the state prison for women in Bedford, New York. 2 In 1976, *1097 the State, in perceived compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, opened the posts to any qualified applicant regardless of sex. 3 Those men who thereafter successfully bid for these posts under their union’s collective bargaining agreement with the State began their duties in February 1977. Within months this action for injunctive relief and monetary damages was commenced by certain inmates, complaining of a violation of their constitutional right to privacy. 4 Named as defendants are the State, certain unions, and certain involved officials of each. A trial of the issues was held before me, sitting without a jury, in December 1977 and January 1978.

The prison involved, the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, is a state prison for women convicted of serious felonies, including homicide, armed robbery, and drug trafficking. In the housing units, each of some 400 inmates is assigned a solid-walled cell measuring 7' x 10'. Each corridor has 30 cells, 15 on a side. Each cell has a solid door which slides in place and is controlled from a control center at the end of the corridor called “the bubble. Each cell door has a clear glass window measuring 6" x 9". The entire interior of a cell, including the bed and the toilet, is visible to one standing outside at the window.

The plaintiffs charge that the male guards, sometimes in the performance of their jobs — and sometimes not 5 — have observed and can observe them in their cells in states of partial or total nudity during their dressing and undressing, 6 and while sleeping. Plaintiffs also assert that the males not only can but have had occasion to observe certain of them while using the cell’s toilet facilities. Finally, plaintiffs complain that since certain of the central showers have partitions only to roughly shoulder height, the requirement that male guards keep them under direct observation while showering creates an impermissibly embarrassing situation. 7

From the plethora of evidence received on the trial, I conclude that a certain amount of viewing of which the plaintiffs complain has in fact occurred, and that given the physical set-up and the prison’s *1098 rules, it is certain to occur again with some frequency.

The court is thus required to make an accommodation as between two substantial principles: (1) the right of a prison inmate to some minimum of privacy; and (2) the right of equal job opportunity regardless of sex. 8

The ultimate resolution of the issues presented to the court requires first, an assessment of the right of privacy of a female prison inmate, difficult as that may be in today’s fluid climate, as well as a determination of the extent to which that right is constitutionally protected, and second, a reconciliation of that right with the right of a man to equal job opportunity, balanced in such manner as to minimize the extent to which either right must be curtailed by reason of its conflict with the other.

It is perfectly clear that men and women, from the beginning of recorded history, have had an innate need for privacy in certain areas of living. Virtually all societies^ — -even those which have little requirement of clothing for adults and none for children — have rules for the concealing of female genitals. 9 And while societies such as the Samoan have “ma[d]e use of the beach as a latrine,” there being “no privacy and no sense of shame,” 10 the norm in today’s western world is to have enclosed toilet facilities in the home and segregated toilet facilities in public places which children are early taught to use. Even small children in the western world are expected to clothe themselves and keep their private parts covered. These societal rules become mand tory as one approaches adult status. The fact that a need for privacy is the product of social conditioning makes it no less embarrassing or occasions no less feeling of shame when the privacy is invaded. 11 The extent to which privacy may justifiably be limited or invaded when one becomes a prison inmate is a question as to which opinions vary, as was evidenced in this case by the testimony of various penologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and medical doctors. Obviously, an individual’s normal right of privacy must necessarily be abridged upon incarceration in the interest of security of the institution. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 439 U.S. 816, 99 S.Ct. 76, 58 L.Ed.2d 107 (1978). Inmates must be kept track of constantly and, on occasion, unexpectedly observed to be sure that plotting is not under way nor is the fashioning of crude but effective weapons, such as pieces of metal sharpened to razor quality to use against either guards or other inmates. Suspected contraband must be searched out and confiscated. Thus, the normal right to close the front door of one’s home and be free from observing eyes must give way to the need for a guard to look within.

However, regardless of how limited an inmate’s right to privacy is, as viewed by penologists and others, all agree on one thing — that there is such a thing as a right of privacy. All agree that it is an invasion of a female inmate’s right of privacy for her to be viewed by a male guard while she is using the toilet — even if he is acting in the normal course of his duties. Penologists differ, however, as to the permissibility of invading the right of privacy. Feder *1099 al prison authorities, it appears, deny protection to female inmates from such invasions of privacy regardless of the time of day or night or the circumstances. 12 Connecticut authorities, on the other hand, permit complete protection at all times under normal circumstances. 13 The Bedford officials here involved permit no protection from approximately 10:00 p. m. until almost 7:00 a. m. the next morning; however, following the morning count and for the balance of the day, Bedford’s rules permit an inmate to cover her window up to 15 minutes to use the toilet or change clothes. 14

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Bluebook (online)
471 F. Supp. 1095, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/forts-v-ward-nysd-1979.