Fortman v. Debt Assistance Network LLC

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided June 21, 2021·No. 3:20-cv-05019·Unknown

Opinion

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6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 COREY FORTMAN, CASE NO. 20-5019 RJB 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 13 DEBT ASSISTANCE NETWORK, LLC, 14 Defendant. 15

16 THIS MATTER comes before the Court the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and 17 Costs. Dkt. 26. The Court has considered the pleadings filed regarding the motion and the 18 remaining file. 19 On January 9, 2020, the Plaintiff filed this case, asserting claims against the Defendant 20 for violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679, et. seq. (“CROA”), the 21 Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86, et. seq. (“CPA”), negligence, breach of 22 contract, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. Dkt. 1. This case arises 23 24 1 from the Defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct and unfair business practices as a credit repair 2 organization hired by the Plaintiff. Id. 3 On May 10, 2021, the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Defendant’s liability 4 on the Plaintiff’s CROA, CPA, negligence and breach of contract claims (Dkt. 23) was granted. 5 Dkt. 25. The Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 23) to award him $11,268.79 was granted. Id. The

6 Plaintiff’s motion to award him $5,000 in emotional distress damages, $2,500 in “credit 7 damages,” and treble and/or punitive damages (Dkt. 23) were denied without prejudice for lack 8 of supporting evidence. Id. The Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs 9 (Dkt. 23) was granted; but the Plaintiff did not request a particular amount. Id. The May 10, 10 2021 Order further provided: 11 By May 28, 2021, the Plaintiff should supplement the record, if possible, by filings under oath, providing the evidence and explaining the grounds for the 12 claims for $5,000 in emotional distress damages, $2,500 in “credit damages,” and for treble and/or punitive damages. By that same date, the Plaintiff’s attorney 13 should supplement the record with a costs and attorney’s fee petition. Further, by May 28, 2021, the Plaintiff should inform the Court, in writing, what remains in 14 the case or if the case can be dismissed and closed after entry of final judgment.

15 Dkt. 25. The facts and procedural history are in that May 10, 2021 Order (Dkt. 25) and are 16 adopted here. The Defendant did not respond to the Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and 17 costs and has not participated in the case for months. 18 On May 28, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion for an award of attorneys’ fees 19 and costs. Dkt. 26. The Plaintiff also notified the Court that he wished to voluntarily dismiss his 20 claims for intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation and damage claims for 21 $5,000 in emotional distress damages, $2,500 in “credit damages,” and for treble and/or punitive 22 damages. Dkt. 27. Those claims were dismissed without prejudice. Dkt. 28. 23 24 1 The Court has already determined that the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable 2 attorneys’ fees and costs. This opinion will now turn to whether the requested amount - 3 $40,848.13 is reasonable. 4 DISCUSSION 5 In determining what attorney’s fee is reasonable in a particular case, the court arrives at the

6 “lodestar amount,” that is, multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable 7 hourly rate. Jordan v. Multnomah County, 799 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting 8 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). “While in most cases the lodestar figure is 9 presumptively reasonable, in rare cases, a district court may make upward or downward 10 adjustments to the presumptively reasonable lodestar on the basis of those factors set out in Kerr 11 v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526, F.2d 67, 69–70 (9th Cir.1975), that have not been subsumed in 12 the lodestar calculation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) 13 (internal and quotations citations omitted). 14 Under Kerr, the court considers the following factors: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the

15 novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal 16 service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the 17 case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations 18 imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) 19 the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the 'undesirability' of the case, (11) 20 the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar 21 cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 22 U.S. 951 (1976). These considerations are consistent with Washington Rules of Professional 23 Conduct 1.5. 24 1 A. LODESTAR AMOUNT 2 In determining hourly rates, the Court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the 3 relevant community.” Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 868 (9th Cir. 2003). The rates 4 of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 5 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992). In making its calculation, the Court should consider the

6 experience, skill, and reputation of the attorneys requesting fees. Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & 7 Human Serv., 73 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court is further allowed to rely on its own 8 knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. Ingram v. 9 Oroudjiam, 647 F.3d 955, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). 10 The hourly rates requested by Plaintiff’s attorney is $375 for Ryan McBride. His rate is 11 reasonable for the community and should be used to calculate fees. This opinion will now turn to 12 the number of hours billed by Mr. McBride. 13 In the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he number of hours to be compensated is calculated by 14 considering whether, in light of the circumstances, the time could reasonably have been billed to

15 a private client.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008). A district 16 court should exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Gonzalez 17 v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013)(citing McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 18 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir.2008)). 19 The Plaintiff claims his lawyer spent 98.7 hours on the case, which includes prevailing on his 20 motion for summary judgement. Overall, the hours claimed are not “excessive, redundant, or 21 otherwise unnecessary.” Gonzalez, at 1203. The lodestar figure, then, is calculated as follows: 22 98.7 hours x $375 = $37,012.50. Based on a review of the time records submitted, $37,012.50 is 23 a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees in this case. 24 1 After making the lodestar computation, the court must assess whether it is necessary to adjust 2 the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the factors announced in Kerr.

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