Fortier v. Delgado & Co.

122 F. 604, 59 C.C.A. 180, 1903 U.S. App. LEXIS 3910
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMarch 24, 1903
DocketNo. 1,190
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 122 F. 604 (Fortier v. Delgado & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fortier v. Delgado & Co., 122 F. 604, 59 C.C.A. 180, 1903 U.S. App. LEXIS 3910 (5th Cir. 1903).

Opinion

NEWMAN, District Judge.

The case entitled as above, being an appeal from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, brings to this court in one record the action of the Circuit Court on five intervening petitions filed in the case of Alfred H. Morris against the Caffery Sugar Refinery Company, which action of the Circuit Court was adverse to all the petitioners, the court having confirmed the report of the special master finding against the claims of each of the interveners. Four of these intervening petitioners, whose claims were of the same character, were Florian Fortier, Henri Jullien, A. & L. Delcambre, and Spencer B. Roane. The Caffery Company, which was called, in Louisiana, a “central refinery,” was placed in the hands of a receiver on the i8th of January, 1902. The business of this company was to raise cane to some extent; also the purchasing of cane from the surrounding plantations, and the grinding and manufacturing the same into sugar and molasses.

[605]*605The record shows that these several parties had contracts with-the Caffery Company to weigh and load cane on railroad cars for transportation and delivery to the refinery. The scales, derricks, and" machinery used for the purpose of weighing and loading the cane were furnished by the company, and the interveners operating them with laborers employed and paid by them, and for this they received '•a fixed compensation of from 5 to 25 cents for each ton of cane handled. The special master found that all these parties were independent contractors, and were not workmen and laborers employed in working the plantations of the Caffery Company, and whose wages,, under the laws of Bouisiana, would have a special privilege on the crop. The special master also found against the contention that they were clerks, secretaries, or agents, whose salaries are privileged under the laws of that state, as to both the movables and immovables of the debtor. The conclusions of the special master were, on exceptions thereto, confirmed by the Circuit Court, and we see no error in the action of the court as to either of these claims. The evidence seems to sustain the findings of the court as to these interveners. The action of the Circuit Court confirming a report of the same special master, which was against an intervening petition filed by the State Bank of New Iberia, is brought to this court in the same record.

The Caffery Company operated three plantations, and among them one known as the “Peeples Plantation.” It further appears from the record that the money for the operation of this refinery was furnished by Delgado & Co., a New Orleans firm. It is shown that,, in order to pay small bills, laborers’ wages, etc., money was deposited from time to time in the St. Mary Bank, at Franklin, Ba. This money was placed in the St. Mary Bank by Hewitt Chapman, who was the general manager of the refinery company, to be used by Bucius Forsyth, Jr., who was superintendent and local manager for the company.. On the afternoon of January 17th the State Bank of New Iberia cashed for Mr. Forsyth two checks, aggregating $3,550, drawn on the St. Mary Bank. The money was drawn to be used, and it was used, to pay laborers on the Peeples plantation.

The intervening petition of the State Bank of New Iberia set up-substantially the above facts, and then claimed that the money in the St. Mary Bank was a special and particular fund, and that the drawing of the checks and their transfer operated as a legal and equitable assignment of the amount of money represented on the face of the checks on deposit to the credit of the refinery company in the St. Mary Bank. The prayer of the intervening petition was that out of the money on deposit in the St. Mary Bank the receiver be required to pay the petitioner’s claim in preference to all other-claims against the corporation, and that it have a decree that there had been an equitable assignment of so much of the fund on deposit as was necessary to pay the checks, and that the sum withdrawn from the payee bank by the receiver be declared subject to said checks, and that the receiver be ordered to apply said sum to their payment and extinguishment. This intervening petition was by the Circuit Court referred to a special master. The report of the special mas[606]*606ter embraces other matters, but so much of it as refers to this particular claim is as follows:

“The claim of the State Bank of New -Iberia for $3,550 has been established by the proofs, and it is allowed as an ordinary unsecured debt of the Caffery Company. The facts with regard to this claim are as follows: It appears from the proof that Lucius Forsyth, Jr., in his capacity as assistant manager of the Caffery Company, drew two checks, dated January 17, 1902, aggregating $3,550, on the St. Mary Bank of Franklin, payable to his own order, for the purpose of obtaining money to pay laborers on the Peeples plantation, which were cashed by the State Bank of New Iberia the same day, and the proceeds used by Forsyth to pay the laborers. At the time the checks were drawn there was a sufficient amount of money in the St. Mary Bank to the credit of the Caffery Company, and subject to the check of said manager, to pay the same in full. But before the checks were presented for payment by the State Bank of New Iberia the receiver was appointed in this case, who obtained possession of the whole fund, leaving nothing in the bank to pay them when presented on the 20th of January, 1902. It is alleged in the petition of intervention of the New Iberia Bank that the fund in the St. Mary Bank against which the checks were drawn was a special fund placed there for the purpose of paying the wages of laborers and other current expense of working the defendant’s plantations. Such averment, it seems, would be necessary to bring the intervener’s case within the rule established by some of the proofs. Mr. Chapman, the principal and best-informed witness examined on the point, says the money was placed in the St. Mary Bank ‘to pay any expenses that would come, in the way of any small minor bills,’ and, further testifying in answer to direct question on the point, he said': ‘There was nothing special about it [the bank account]. It was for whatever might come up in small bills, and so on, not labor particularly.’ If the checks had been presented to the St. Mary Bank while the fund was in its possession, it would, no doubt, have operated as an assignment of the fund to the State Bank to the amount of the checks, under the peculiar provisions of the state law, although the fund was not a special one. Gordon & Gomila v. Muchler, 34 La. Ann. 605. At the common law a cheek drawn against a particular fund, specially appropriated to its payment, would also operate as an assignment of the fund. Citizens’ Bank of Louisiana v. First National Bank, L. R. 6 H. L. 352; 7 Moak, Eng. R. 56. But I find no case in this country or in England, and none in the decisions of the Supreme Court of this state, which holds that a check drawn against a general credit operates as an assignment of the credit, unless notified to the debtor of the credit. The general rule outside of Louisiana is that the holder of a check or order or a draft has not even an action against the bank until after acceptance. Bank v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152, 19 L. Ed. 897; St. Louis & S. R. R. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 574, 10 Sup. Ct. 890, 33 L. Ed. 683. I have read the very able brief of Mr. Mentz, filed in support of the claim of the bank for equitable lien, with great care, and, while it appeals most strongly to my sense of natural justice, I am unable to adopt his views, under the state of the law as I find it.

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Bluebook (online)
122 F. 604, 59 C.C.A. 180, 1903 U.S. App. LEXIS 3910, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fortier-v-delgado-co-ca5-1903.