Fort Worth & Denver City Railway Co. v. Measles

17 S.W. 124, 81 Tex. 474, 1891 Tex. LEXIS 1390
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJune 23, 1891
DocketNo. 6837.
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 17 S.W. 124 (Fort Worth & Denver City Railway Co. v. Measles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fort Worth & Denver City Railway Co. v. Measles, 17 S.W. 124, 81 Tex. 474, 1891 Tex. LEXIS 1390 (Tex. 1891).

Opinion

TARLTON, Judge, Section B.

This suit was instituted in the District Court of Wichita County by Boena Bobertson, now Boena Measles, against the defendant, on the 5th day of October, 1887. After the institution of the suit the plaintiff intermarried with James Measles, and on the 26th day of April, 1888, by leave of the court, amended her original petition and joined the said James L. Measles with, her as plaintiff. The suit Avas then prosecuted by appellees, plaintiffs below, against appellant, defendant below. By their amended petition plaintiffs sought to recoArer of appellant damages alleged to haAre been sustained by them by reason of injuries receiAred by John Bobertson, a minor aged 7 years, and son of Boena Measles, on the 24th day of July, 1887, while playing on a turntable situated at Wichita Falls, in Wichita County, and owned and' used by appellant in operating its railway through Wichita County; said injuries, having been received by the said John Bobertson by- reason of the negligence of appellant in permitting said turntable, a dangerous machine and easily set in motion, to remain unfastened and unguarded, in an exposed place in the town, easy of access, on a much-used pathway, and near a public street, or alley. Plaintiffs alleged that the turntable was an attraction to children to play upon it, which the children of the toAvn did and had done for a long time prior to the date in question, as defendant, its agents, and servants knew or might haAre known by the use of proper diligence; that the child John Bobertson, being too young to appreciate and aATjid the danger, on July 24,1887, without the knowledge and consent of his mother, was playing on said roundtable with other children of tender years, and while so playing his person, in the revolutions of the table, was caught between the portion in motion and that not in motion, and he was so injured that it became necessary to amputate his right leg, and his left leg was rendered permanently useless; that the boy Avas an obedient child and before the injuries stated was healthy, and that he would have been of great service to his mother up to the time of his maturity. Plaintiffs claimed damages in the sum of $10,000, and alleged special damages as follows: $5000 for loss by Boena Measles of the services of John Bobertson; $500 expenses incurred for medical attention; $500 for medical services in the future required by the condition of John Bobertson; $100 for nursing, and $100 for future nursing necessitated by the injuries complained of, and $50 for extra food.

Defendant answered by general demurrer, special exceptions, and general denial; and on April 28, 1888, the jury by whom the case was tried returned a Amrdict itemized as follows:

*476 “Doctor’s bills incurred during sickness of child.........$500.00 “Drug bills incurred during sickness of child............. 38.00 “Lost labor of parent during sickness of child............ 200.00 “Extra food for child during sickness of child............ 200.00 “Diminished value of child’s services to parent (caused by accident) until he is 21.................'.............. 1062.00 “Total amount of damages assessed..................$2000.00”

From the judgment entered on this verdict defendant appeals to this court/

Guy Holman, a witness for the plaintiffs, was permitted to testify, over the objection of the defendant, that on one occasion a year and a half before the trial he and other boys were on the turntable pushing it around, and that it was not fastened.

Defendant assigns as error the action of the court in admitting this evidence, which it alleges was irrelevant to any issue in the case. In connection with this- testimony the witness further stated that he was injured on the occasion referred to, and it appears elsewhere from the evidence that suit had been brought in the District Court of Wichita County by the witness Holman on account of this injury. We think /the evidence tended to support the allegation of plaintiff’s petition to the effect that children had before played upon the turntable, which averment, in connection with the further allegation that the defendant knew this fact and knew the condition of the turntable, was relevant and material on the issue of negligence. The objection was properly overruled. Facts relating to relevant facts are themselves relevant and admissible.

Another witness, C. E. Reid, clerk of the District Court, testified over objection by defendant, that a suit had been brought in that court against the defendant by Guy Holman, the boy who had previously testified, and that as shown by the appearance docket the suit was filed April 19,1887. This is the suit above referred to. This evidence was offered by plaintiff for the purpose of showing notice to the defendant company of the condition of the turntable and the danger of leaving it in that situation. It was objected to on the ground that there is no allegation of notice in plaintiff’s petition; and further, that it is incompetent to prove notice by such means. We think that the allegations heretofore set out aver notice in the defendant of the condition of the turntable and the danger thereto incident, and that it was competent to prove these allegations by showing the institution of the suit referred to, which involved notice of the conditions referred to.

J. A. Bradley, a witness for the plaintiffs, testifying as to the value of the services of boys at an age from 8 to 21 years, had stated that the services of some boys are worth a great deal and the services of others nothing, when plaintiffs’ attorney asked him “to strike an average, *477 somewhere along there, of a boy’s services.” To this the witness replied, over the objection of defendant, that “he hardly knew whereto place the average of a common laborer; he supposed about $10 a month.” The objection urged was that the evidence “furnished an improper measure of damages in the case,” and appellant complains that the court erred in overruling the objection.

In a case like the present it is proper for the jury to consider, in arriving at a just estimate of the damages, the extent to which the capacity of the injured party to earn money has been impaired. Gereke v. Railway, 22 Am. and Eng. By. Cases, 556. This naturally involves an inquiry into the value of the person’s services. If, therefore, there was evidence showing that the boy John Bobertson possessed the qualities for work of an average boy, the testimony complained of woxxlcl seem to have reference to the proper measure of damages. It had been shown that the boy was obedient and healthy; that he was therefore both willing and able to woi*k; and hence that his services would be as valxxable at least as those of an average boy.

It is extremely difficult, in fact impossible, in this class of cases to procure expert testimony as to the value of a child’s services. As the case is one involving injury to a child of undeveloped faculties, it woxxld seem to be only necessary to prove the willingness and the capacity of the child, his age, and his relatioxxship to the next of kin, and the extent to which he has been injxxred, leaving to the jury, as “nxexx of knowledge and experience in relation to matters of common observation,” the task of assessing the pecuniary damages upon the facts proved. Brunswig v. White, 70 Texas, 504, and authorities cited. While the evidence complained of may have been unnecessary, it was nevertheless neither impertinent nor improper.

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17 S.W. 124, 81 Tex. 474, 1891 Tex. LEXIS 1390, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fort-worth-denver-city-railway-co-v-measles-tex-1891.