Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith

146 So. 225, 108 Fla. 313, 1933 Fla. LEXIS 1433
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedFebruary 17, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 146 So. 225 (Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith, 146 So. 225, 108 Fla. 313, 1933 Fla. LEXIS 1433 (Fla. 1933).

Opinion

Barns, C. J.

This is an action by E. E. Smith against the Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”), upon a promissory note made by Mr. Moody to the Bank, and by said Bank negotiated to the plaintiff before maturity. The note was secured by a mortgage upon the land of Moody.

After the note was considerably past due and with Moody unable to pay, negotiations between Smith and Moody began. It is admitted that Moody made, executed and delivered a warranty deed of the mortgaged property to Smith, the deed containing the following:

• “Subject to taxes and improvement liens. Also subject ■to mortgage given to Fort Pierce Bank and Trust Company.”

The declaration was in the regular form, and pleas were filed setting forth the mortgage as security to the note and the assignment of same to the plaintiff, and

■ “That afterwards, but prior to the commencement of this suit, the said Troy E. Moody and Maigaret P. Moody, his wife, who at the time were the owners in fee simple of said mortgaged real estate, conveyed said mortgaged real estate to E. E. Smith, the plaintiff, in full satisfaction of the amount due by virtue of said note and mortgage, and the said E. E. Smith accepted said deed in full satisfaction of said indebtedness. Wherefore, this defendant says that the amount of indebtedness evidenced by said promissory note has- been fully paid, and this defendant has been released and discharged of and from all liability on said promissory note as indorser thereof or otherwise.”

*315 To this plea the plaintiff filed his replication setting forth the date of the note, its maturity, the payments thereon and the default of the maker, and that

“Said mortgagors expressed a desire to pay same if it were possible at all and offered to give Plaintiff a deed to said premises, in order that he could attempt to find a purchaser for the same and in that way get what he could out of the premises and in case he should find a purchaser for the same, he would then be in a position to make a ready conveyance and in turn apply whatever he might realize out of said sale on the mortgage indebtedness and said mortgagors would pay the balance; that in accord with such offer said mortgagors on the 9th day of September, A. D. 1929, executed a warranty deed covering said premises to the Plaintiff, such deed containing an express provision that it was made subject to said mortgage and the physical possession of said deed was given to the Plaintiff and has been held by him for the purpose for which it was given, as above stated; that the said deed has never been recorded in the Public Records of St. Lucie County, Florida; that the Plaintiff never intended that said mortgage indebtedness owned by him should be merged upon the making o.f such deed and that he has never expressed any such intention in any manner or means; that he continues to hold' said note and mortgage and the same have not been cancelled and delivered to said mortgagors and satisfied of record, but that the same remains unpaid as stated in the Declaration; that the Plaintiff has never exercised any acts of possession over said premises or received any benefit of any kind whatsoever from the same and the Plaintiff has been unable to effect a sale of the same.

“Wherefore, the Plaintiff says that the indebtedness evidenced by said note and mortgage has not been paid and *316 that the Defendant and said mortgagors have not been released and discharged from liability on same.”

Such were the issues and the verdict was for the plaintiff. Substantial portions of Moody’s testimony are that:

“Mr. Smith asked me if I would give him the title to the property he would see if he could sell it and I told him I would. It rocked on and for some reason I overlooked it and Mr. Smith asked me the second time if I had it fixed up and I told him no, but I would fix it up, which I did, and Mr. Smith came back and I delivered the deed to him, which, in itself, was conveying the title to Mr. Smith who was holding the mortgage on this property.

“Q. Did you ever have any agreement with Mr. Smith as a reason for giving him that deed ?

“A. Certainly. I was giving him the deed because I couldn’t pay him for the property, and I was giving him the title to it to save him the trouble of foreclosing the mortgage and spending that much money on it * * *.

“A. Mr. Smith came to me and made the statement that he was badly in need of money and that he would be willing to accept half of this mortgage price for the note and I told him I didn’t have it, but that I thought the property was worth it and he could possibly get that for it and maybe more, and he saidi if he had it he would see if he could sell tjie lot and asked if I would give him a deed to it, and I said I would. As I stated a minute ago I overlooked it for some reason and Mr. Smith asked me the second time if I had the deed ready. I told him I didn’t have it ready, but I would fix it up immediately, and Mr. Smith came back and I delivered the deed to him *. * *.

“We had an understanding — the understanding was that Mr. Smith was badly in need of funds and he was willing to accept fifty per cent, of this amount for his indebtedness *317 ■and thought he could get it out of the property if he had title, and I conveyed him the title, and in the deed reciting subject to all encumbrances on the date that Mr. Smith ac•cepted it, with the understanding that I was released from my obligation * * *.

“My office was at Vero at that time; the same office in which I still do business. It is an abstract company. That ¡has been my business for some time, and it was at that time; that’s where I work, if that’s what you mean. I testified on direct examination that it was my understanding that I was being relieved of all liability on that note, and I based that understanding on the conversation that I had with Mr. Smith, and certainly I felt that he could take title to the lot and regardless of the amount he got out of it I ■certainly wouldn’t be further interested in it.”

It is further evident that Mr. Smith tried to sell the property and in negotiating with other parties referred to it as his own, and collected payments from the Bank after the ■delivery of the deed and that the Bank knew nothing about the deed from Moody to Smith. The substantial portions -of Smith’s testimony are that

“As to whether Mr. Moody said anything to me regarding the payment of the interest and the note, that is, expressed .a desire to pay — when the first payment became due why he said that he couldn’t meet it just at that time, but that he hoped to shortly, and kept on saying that he expected to pay it for some little time and finally merged into the ■statement that he was simply unable to pay; that he didn’t .have the money. As to whether Mr. Moody stated any way that I might be able to realize some actual money on the •deal — a considerable time after that the interest payment and such was discussed for some length of time and in the meantime the principal became due also and I kept seeing him at different times, and then he — of course the natural. *318

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Related

Yates v. St. Johns Beach Development Co.
165 So. 384 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1935)

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Bluebook (online)
146 So. 225, 108 Fla. 313, 1933 Fla. LEXIS 1433, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fort-pierce-bank-trust-co-v-smith-fla-1933.