Forsythe v. State

6 Ohio 19
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 15, 1833
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 6 Ohio 19 (Forsythe v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Forsythe v. State, 6 Ohio 19 (Ohio 1833).

Opinion

Judge Wright

delivered the opinion of the court:

It is difficult gravely to respond to such an assignment of errors as is made on this record, or to grope one’s way along the labyrinth of the many bills of exception it presents. I must, therefore, try to generalize.

The first objections taken in the court below were to the array. These were made after challenges for cause had been interposed and decided, and the jurymen had taken their seats. They were :

1. That the venire only contained the names of the petit jury, when it should have contained the names of the grand jury also. This was overruled. The defendant then moved to set aside the venire, and offered to prove, in support of his motion:

1. That the apportionment of jurors by the clerk was not in the ratio of the number of free white males in each township, as required by law.

2. That the clerk did not make a written statement of his doings, and give it to the sheriff.

3. That the apportionment was not made on the first Monday of September.

The court refused to hear the motion, and overruled the evidence offered in support of it.

What is erroneous in this proceeding ? The venire should not have included the grand jury. They are distinct bodies, and should be separately summoned. The statute, as we understand it does not require the two juries to be included in *the same [21 [22]*22writ. The other objections to the jury, if all the party offered to prove be admitted as true, have no better foundation. The clerk is required by law, the first Monday of September, annually, to proportion the jurors for the year, among the free white males of twenty-one years old, in the respective townships, and give the ■same to the sheriff in writing, who, when he proclaims the October elections, is required to annex a notification to the trustees of townships of the number of jurors apportioned to each township. The trustees are, on the day of the election, to select good, judicious men, to the number required, and transmit their names to the •clerk. The names of the jurors thus selected, are written upon separate pieces of paper, and put into a box, from which the clerk, in the presence of the sheriff, thirty days before each court, draws ■out twenty-seven ballots, the first fifteen of whom are to be summoned as grand jurors, and the remaining twelve as petit jurors. This statutory direction to the officers should be substantially followed, yet we are not prepared to say that unessential variations would be regarded as affecting the array. We have never known, ■in this state, an objection of this kind before. The profession, by universal consent, refuse to notice such matters, as this in no way ■endangers a fair trial. The objection at best was a mere technical one, and, in the opinion of the court below, was not made in technical time. Technicality is never more appropriately resorted to, than to meet and put down technical objections.

The record shows that, during the trial, it was proven that the ■defendant, about noon, hired Mason to go with his team about twelve miles, for a load of merchandise, and gave him money to pay his expenses for the night. Mason went for the load, but instead of staying over night, returned about dusk, came home the back way to avoid observation, and early went to bed with his wife. About ten o’clock, footsteps were heard approaching. The ■defendant came on to the porch, tried to enter by each of two doors, but finding both fastened, he approached the window and passed it. He soon turned again, raised the window six or eight inches, and let it down again. He again raised it, and fastened it up; then, partly entering, the blind hit his back, and he withdrew, stood erect a short time, and then slowly and gently crept through the window into the house. When in, he seized the bed •clothes on Mrs. Mason’s shoulder, and pulled'them down. At this 22] instant, *Mason sprung from the bed, seized the defendant by [23]*23the hair of his head, threw him down, and held him until he begged for quarter. He was then let up, and having got his hat and shoes from the porch, was taken into another room, and detained for a time.

The. legal questions presented by the counsel for the defendant, for the decision of the court during the progress of the trial, as we gather them from the record, may be resolved into two propositions :

1. Whether, in case the defendant entered the house with intent to commit adultery, and is foiled in effecting his object, he can be convicted, under the indictment, of breaking and entering and. perpetrating any other unlawful act.

2. Whether in such case, it is competent for the defendant to prove that he was in the habit of visiting the wife, in her husband’s absence, for criminal intercourse, as a fact from which the jury may infer that he broke and entered the house, and laid hands ■on the wife, with such intent only, at the time complained of?

The statute, 29 Ohio L. 144, prescribes the punishment for breaking and entering a mansion-house in the night season, in which any person shall reside or dwell, and committing, or attempting to commit, any personal violence or abuse. The intent with which the party enters forms no ingredient of the offense. The inquiries presented by the statute are.: Did the accused break and enter the house in the night season? If so, did he commit, or attempt to commit, any personal abuse or violence? In this case, there was no question before the common pleas as to the breaking and entering .the house with an illegal design — that of committing adultery. While prosecuting this unlawful purpose, the defendant rudely laid hands upon Mrs. Mason, and thus committed an act of violence or abuse, though of a less heinous character than he intended. Is he not answerable? If one strike another with intent to kill or maim, but fails of his object, that failure does not excuse him from liability for the assault and battery. If, then, the laying hold of Mrs. Mason was an attempt to commit adultery, it was an attempt at abuse of her; an attempt to do just what in fact was done, though not carried out to the full fruition of his hopes. What principle of law is violated in such case, by describing the act done in legal language? The first and third counts in the indictment charge the actual commission of an assault *and battery; the second, an attempt [23 [24]*24•to commit one, and otherwise to ill-treat and abuse Mrs. Mason. The court, in resolving the propositions in the affirmative, in our opinion fell into no substantial error. The party is liable for the act done, if it be one of personal violence or abuse. The law does not require that those precise words should be inserted in the indictment, but only that some act shall be charged to have been done or attempted of that character. If the terms were less general, and limited the offense to a breaking and entering, and the-committing or attempting to commit an assault and battery, that particular act would be essential to the offense, and would have to be described.

The second general proposition, which conducts to the inquiries, how far the defendant had a right to protect himself, by reason of the consent of Mrs. Mason to his visiting her for criminal purposes, remains to be considered. The case made does not, in our opinion, require a very critical examination of this general proposition.

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Bluebook (online)
6 Ohio 19, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/forsythe-v-state-ohio-1833.