Forsberg v. Snow

22 P.2d 421, 137 Kan. 886, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 352
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJune 10, 1933
DocketNo. 31,187
StatusPublished

This text of 22 P.2d 421 (Forsberg v. Snow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Forsberg v. Snow, 22 P.2d 421, 137 Kan. 886, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 352 (kan 1933).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Burch, J.:

The action was one for damages for injury to person and property sustained by the driver of an automobile when the automobile collided, at the intersection of two city streets, with a motor truck driven by an employee of defendant. The jury returned a general verdict for defendant. The jury also returned special findings of fact, which are appended to this opinion. Judgment was entered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

The accident occurred at the intersection of Armstrong avenue and Thirteenth street in the city of Kansas City. From the intersection Armstrong avenue extends east and west and is thirty feet wide from curb to curb. From the intersection Thirteenth street extends north and south and is forty feet wide from curb to curb. In the center of Thirteenth street is a double-track street railway. Each track is five feet two inches wide, and the space between the inside rails of the two tracks is five feet three inches wide. South of Armstrong avenue is Ann avenue, an east-and-west thoroughfare, twenty-six feet wide, crossing Thirteenth street. The distance from the center of Ann avenue to the center of Armstrong is 344 feet.

The truck entered Thirteenth street from Ann avenue and proceeded northward to the point of collision. From Ann avenue to Armstrong avenue and beyond, it is 6% per cent down grade. The automobile approached Thirteenth street from the west on Armstrong avenue, and proceeded east to the point of collision. Approaching Thirteenth street from the west on Armstrong avenue, it is 2.7 per cent up grade. The collision occurred about twenty-two feet seven inches east and about ten or twelve feet north of the southwest corner of the intersection of Thirteenth street and Armstrong avenue.

Plaintiff's petition alleged the truck was driven down grade at the rate of fifty miles per hour, on the west side of Thirteenth street; that the truck entered the intersection after plaintiff had entered the intersection and while plaintiff was in full view of the truck driver; that the truck driver attempted to turn the truck farther toward the west; that the truck was not under control of the driver; and gen[888]*888erally, that the truck was driven without care or caution. Defendant’s answer contained three defenses, separately stated and1 numbered: First, a general denial; second, a general plea of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff; and third, violation by plaintiff of pleaded city ordinances. One ordinance required plaintiff to stop before she entered Thirteenth street, and another ordinance gave the truck right of way if the truck and automobile reached the intersection at the same time.

The truck driver testified he turned into Thirteenth street from Ann avenue and headed north at a rate of speed of about fifteen miles per hour. From the time he headed north until the collision, his truck was astride the west rail of the east street-car track. As he proceeded northward, he attained a speed of approximately twenty-five miles per hour. When he got toward the intersection, he approached it at a rate of about twenty miles per hour. He entered the intersection at the rate of about fifteen miles per hour. The jury found he entered the intersection at the rate of fifteen to twenty miles per hour. As the truck driver approached the intersection, he looked to the west, the direction from which plaintiff came, and did not see the automobile. He then looked toward the east. He then looked again to the west, and saw plaintiff’s automobile rapidly approaching. There is no finding of rate of speed of the automobile as it approached Thirteenth street. Whatever the previous rate of speed, plaintiff entered the intersection at the rate of four or five miles per hour, and the truck driver testified plaintiff “was just entering the intersection about the same time I was.” Plaintiff did not stop as the city ordinance required her to do, but drove on. The truck driver testified he jammed down his clutch and brake, turned to the right to avoid a collision, and skidded to about the center of the street. Plaintiff turned slightly to the left, and the right side of her car and left side of the truck came together. There was testimony that the shortest distance within which the truck could be stopped, when going down a 6 per cent grade on concrete pavement at the rate of fifteen miles per hour, was twenty feet.

None of the foregoing testimony is opposed to the physical facts of the accident, and all of it must be taken a's true so far as reconcilablé with the special findings.

Plaintiff’s account of the accident was quite different from that of the truck driver, and the jury did not believe the greater portion [889]*889of her testimony. She said she came to a dead stop before entering the intersection. The jury found to the contrary. She said that, seeing the truck at the alley between Ann and Armstrong avenues, she speeded up to avoid a collision. The jury found to the contrary. The jury did find that at the instant of the collision the automobile was going five or six miles per hour, a slight increase at the instant over the rate at which plaintiff entered the intersection. She said the truck came down Thirteenth street east of the street-car tracks, or perhaps astride the east rail of the east track. The jury found to the contrary. Plaintiff illustrated the movement .of the truck just before the accident by means of a miniature motor car. She swerved the truck over into the space between the two street-car tracks to a point touching and covering the east rail of the west track. The truck was then going northwesterly with the left front wheel over the east rail of the west track and the left rear wheel about the center of the space between the two tracks. The jury found to the contrary.

The truck driver did not testify that both vehicles entered the intersection at the same time. He said “about” the same time. The jury found the front wheels of plaintiff’s automobile were nineteen or twenty feet in the intersection when the front wheels of the truck entered the intersection. So plaintiff in fact entered the intersection first, and the front wheels of her automobile were approximately half way across Thirteenth street when the truck entered the intersection. The jury found the truck was going at the rate of about fifteen or twenty miles per hour when it entered the intersection, or from twenty-two to twenty-nine feet per second. The truck, astride the west rail of the east street-car track, was only ten or twelve feet south of the automobile’s course of travel when the front wheels of the automobile were still in the west part of the space between the two street-car tracks. Assuming the truck driver was negligent, the foregoing facts demonstrate that if when plaintiff reáched the intersection she had taken the time necessary to stop and then put her car in motion, the truck would have passed safely in front of her. In any event, it would have been manifestly foolhardy for plaintiff to drive on. Therefore, plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the collision, as a matter of law.

Plaintiff undertakes to relieve herself from consequences of negligence contributing to the accident by an argument which may be summarized as follows: When plaintiff entered the intersection the [890]*890truck was 329 feet south of the center of the intersection and 326 feet south of the point of collision. So the truck traveled about eleven times faster than plaintiff traveled.

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Bluebook (online)
22 P.2d 421, 137 Kan. 886, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/forsberg-v-snow-kan-1933.