Forrest v. Durnell

26 S.W. 481, 86 Tex. 647, 1894 Tex. LEXIS 436
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedMay 7, 1894
DocketNo. 136.
StatusPublished
Cited by53 cases

This text of 26 S.W. 481 (Forrest v. Durnell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Forrest v. Durnell, 26 S.W. 481, 86 Tex. 647, 1894 Tex. LEXIS 436 (Tex. 1894).

Opinion

STAYTON, Chief Justice.

Forrest rented to Durnell, for the year 1891, 87 acres of land, for which the latter agreed to pay $4 per acre.

Afterwards Durnell, for the same term, rented to Harrison 50 acres of the land at $4 per acre for so much as he cultivated in grain, and for that cultivated in cotton to pay one-fourth of the cotton raised on the land so used. To the other defendants Durnell rented the residue of the land for the year, they agreeing to pay him as rent one-fourth of the cotton and. one-third of the grain raised.

*649 On this state of facts the Court of Civil Appeals has certified seven questions for decision; and without considering them seriatim, the legal questions arising upon them will be considered in so far as they bear upon the rights of the parties.

The statute provides: “ If lands or tenements are rented by the landlord to any person or persons, such person or persons renting said lands or tenements shall not rent or lease said lands or tenements during the term of said lease to any other person without first obtaining the consent of the landlord, his agent or attorney.” Sayles’ Civ. Stats., art. 3121.

This statute has application to sublettings as well as assignments by lessees, and was doubtless enacted to secure to the owners of lands the selection of persons to occupy and care for them, as well as to secure them the right to have none occupy their lands whose ability or willingness to pay the rents contracted for was not satisfactory.

Under the statute, persons renting lands or tenements stand as would they, in the absence of such a statute, under contracts containing covenants against sublettings or assignments; and on violation of the statute, the rights and remedies of parties are the same as would they be under such covenants, for under the statute they are implied.

Such remedies, however, a landlord may waive; and when he does so, his rights and remedies for collection of rent, as well as the rights and liabilities of the lessee and of persons to whom he may assign or sublet, must rest as at common law, except as controlled by statute.

At common law, in the absence of covenant forbidding, a lessee had the right to assign or sublet.

The relation of landlord and tenant strictly does not exist unless there be a reversionary interest in the former; and out of this arises the distinction between assignments and underleases. If a lessee parts with his whole term in all the rented premises, no reversionary interest remains in him, and a person taking through him is an assignee, liable to payment to the landlord as the original lessee contracted to pay. If he rents parts of it to different persons for the entire term, then such persons, to the extent of their several holdings, are also assignees, and in so far liable to the lessor just as was the original lessee. Railway v. Settegast, 79 Texas, 262; Tayl. on Landl. and Ten., 443.

A subtenant is one who leases all or a part of rented premises from the original lessee for a term less than that held by the latter, and in that case the lessee retains a reversionary interest. In such cases at common law a subtenant’s property was subject to distress, while he was not liable on the contract between lessor and lessee.

At common law, however, the landlord had no lien on his tenant’s property until distrained; while under the statute of this State he has a preference lien on all the crops raised on his rented premises, unless the *650 ■words “property of the tenant” are to be so restricted as to embrace only the property of the original lessee. Sayles’ Civ. Stats., art. 3107.

There may be some confusion in the decisions of the courts of this State -as to the liability of the property of a subtenant for rent due by the lessee.

It was held, that a subtenant who occupied premises for the first two years of a term for three, and had paid to the lessee the rent due therefor, was not liable to the lessor on the contract between him and the lessee; and further, that a crop raised by him during the third year, he having become the lessee for that year by express agreement of all parties, was not subject to distress to secure payment of rent to the landlord for the two preceding years during which he occupied the land as a subtenant; but no question arose whether crops raised by him during the time he held as subtenant would have been affected by lien to secure the rent due to the lessor for those years. Harvey v. McGrew, 44 Texas, 412.

It was again held, that a subtenant, in the absence of contract made by him, was not liable to a landlord. Giddings v. Felker, 70 Texas, 176.

These cases have no immediate bearing on the questions certified.

In Gibson v. Mullican, 58 Texas, 433, it seems to have been the opinion of the court, that crops raised on rented land by a subtenant were not subject to distress, unless there was contract between the subtenant and landlord, whereby the former obligated himself to pay the rent; but that decision was made under the law in force prior to the statute herein before copied, and the opinion intimates that under the law now in force a lien •on the crop raised by the subtenant would exist.

The same ruling was made by the Court of Appeals. Lea v. Hogue, 1 W. & W. C. C., sec. 607; Knight v. Old, 2 Willson’s C. C., sec. 79.

These cases proceed on the theory that there was no contract between ■the landlord and the subtenant; but the first of these cases seems to concede that such a rule could not be sustained if the contract between the lessor and lessee contained a stipulation against subletting or that crop ■of a subtenant should be subject to payment of rent.

In the more recent case of Stokes v. Burney, 3 Texas Civil Appeals, 219, it was held by a Court of Civil Appeals, that under the statute prohibiting a lessee to rent or lease lands without consent of his landlord, the crops of a subtenant were subject to the landlord’s lien in the absence of such consent.

“A tenant is one who occupies the lands or premises of another, in subordination to that other’s title, and with his consent, express or implied.” Wood on Landl. and Ten., 1.

We are of opinion that any person who sustains such a relation to property and its owner is, within the meaning of the statute, a “ tenant” upon whose property it gives a lien to secure rent, whether such person be a lessee, an assignee, or only a subtenant.

*651 No assignee of a lease or subtenant can be heard to say that he was ignorant of the terms on which the lessee held possession; nor can he be heard to say that it was his intention, without the landlord’s consent, to deprive him of any right he would have had in or to the products of the rented premises if he had not entered upon and used the land. The .statute informs them that they can acquire no right to use the premises without the landlord’s consent, and of the further fact that the law gives him a lien on all the products of the land to secure the rent.

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26 S.W. 481, 86 Tex. 647, 1894 Tex. LEXIS 436, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/forrest-v-durnell-tex-1894.