MEMORANDUM OPINION
HARRIS, District Judge.
The instant case is a civil action for recovery of federal income taxes in the amount of $16,307.09, plus interest, for the calendar year 1961, arising as the result of the disallowance of a change in plaintiff’s annual accounting period.
This case was submitted upon stipulation of facts and briefs of the parties. This memorandum opinion incorporates the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The stipulation of facts is as follows: The Forrest City Production Credit Association, hereinafter referred to as [610]*610the plaintiff, was organized in 1933 under Section 2 of the Farm Credit Act of 1933, c. 98, 48 Stat. 257 (12 U.S.C.1964 ed., Sec. 1134).
Until the last of its stock owned by the United States was retired on or about December 31, 1960, the plaintiff was an “exempt organization” within the meaning of Section 501(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
For all years of its existence through December 31,1960, the books and records of plaintiff were kept on a calendar year basis; that is, from January 1 through December 31.
Plaintiff was required by Section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to file, and did file on a calendar year basis, annual returns for information purposes only. Through December 31, 1960, plaintiff had never paid nor was required to pay any income tax.
On September 14, 1961, the board of directors of the plaintiff adopted a fiscal year ending September 30, and amended its- bylaws accordingly. From September 30, 1961, forward, plaintiff’s books were kept and its reports prepared on the basis of a fiscal year ending September 30. Plaintiff filed its first return of taxable income for the period January 1, 1961, through September 30, 1961. On December 13, 1962, plaintiff filed its return of taxable income for the fiscal year ending September 30,1962.
At no time prior to adopting on its first return of taxable income a fiscal year ended September 30 as its annual accounting period, did plaintiff file an application with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue requesting approval to do so. (End of Stip.)
As pointed out in the excellent briefs filed by the parties in this proceeding, the questions for determination by the Court are (1) was the plaintiff, Forrest City Production Credit Association, a taxpayer during the years up to and including December 31,1960, at which time it was no longer an exempt business, and (2) was there a change in the plaintiff’s “annual accounting period” requiring approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Upon auditing plaintiff’s return filed for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1961, the District Director of Internal Revenue determined that the plaintiff had changed to a fiscal year period of reporting without permission of the Commissioner; that permission was required; and accordingly recomputed plaintiff’s income on a calendar year basis for 1961, which resulted in the deficiency in taxes sought to be recovered in this action.
Stated briefly, plaintiff argues that from its inception through December 31, 1960, it was an organization exempt from taxation under the Farm Credit Act of 1933, c. 98, 48 Stat. 257,1 and [611]*611that its exemption from taxation did not stem from Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,2 or its predecessor;3 that until January 1, 1961, it was not a taxpayer; that it became a taxpayer only after retirement of all stock owned by the United States on or about December 31,1960; that consequently its tax return for the period of January 1, 1961, through September 30, 1961, was the first return of a new taxpayer; and that as a new taxpayer it was entitled to adopt any taxable year it chose without obtaining approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The Government maintains that it matters not whether plaintiff’s exemption from taxation arose from Section 501(a) or the Farm Credit Act of 1933; that in either event plaintiff was a “taxpayer” prior to January 1, 1961; that plaintiff changed its annual accounting period from a calendar year to a fiscal year basis; that sueh change was not permitted without the express approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that no such approval was sought or obtained.
As to the first question on the plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer, it should be pointed out that in order to complete plaintiff’s changeover from a calendar year basis to a fiscal year, plaintiff filed a tax return for the short period January 1, 1961, through September 30, 1961, and then thereafter filed its returns for the fiscal years ending September 30. Although Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.442-1 (c),4 provide [612]*612that under certain circumstances a taxpayer may change its annual accounting period without prior approval of the Commissioner, one of the requirements is that if the association was an exempt organization either in the year immediately preceding the short period or in the short period “it must have the same special status for both the short period and such taxable year.”5 *In the instant case it is admitted that for the period January 1, 1960, through December 31, 1960, plaintiff was an exempt organization, but that plaintiff lost its exemption as of January 1, 1961. Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 1.442- 1 (c) does not apply so as to allow plaintiff to change its annual accounting period without approval of the Commissioner. There is no merit to plaintiff’s contention that through December 31, 1960, it was never a “taxpayer”; that, therefore, as of January 1, 1961, when it lost its exemption, it became a new taxpayer; that the return filed for the period January 1, 1961, through September 30, 1961, was the first return of a new taxpayer; and that, therefore, it came within the provisions of Section 1.442- 1 (a).
In the opinion of the Court the plaintiff is not a “new taxpayer” within the meaning of Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.442-1 (a), which provides that “a new taxpayer who adopts an annual accounting period * * * need not secure the permission of the Commissioner * * Nor is it a “new taxpayer” within the meaning of Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.441-1 (b) (3),6 wherein it is stated that “a new taxpayer in his first return may adopt any taxable year * * without prior approval.”
Contrary to plaintiff’s position is Rev. Rul. 67-173, 1967-1 Cum.Bull. 101, wherein a corporation (designated as “X”) exempt from tax under Section 401(a) lost its exemption and thereafter desired to change its annual accounting period from a calendar year to a fiscal year basis without obtaining approval of the Commissioner. It was held that corporation “X” was not a “new taxpayer” even though it was required for the first time to file a Form 1120 return of taxable income. The Court is not bound by the ruling and neither is this decision in any way dependent thereon although it is analogous to the instant situation.
Morever, Section 501(a) exempts qualifying organizations from income taxes only.7 The fact that plaintiff may have derived its exemption under Section 501 (a) does not mean that it was not a “taxpayer” as defined in the Code.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
HARRIS, District Judge.
The instant case is a civil action for recovery of federal income taxes in the amount of $16,307.09, plus interest, for the calendar year 1961, arising as the result of the disallowance of a change in plaintiff’s annual accounting period.
This case was submitted upon stipulation of facts and briefs of the parties. This memorandum opinion incorporates the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The stipulation of facts is as follows: The Forrest City Production Credit Association, hereinafter referred to as [610]*610the plaintiff, was organized in 1933 under Section 2 of the Farm Credit Act of 1933, c. 98, 48 Stat. 257 (12 U.S.C.1964 ed., Sec. 1134).
Until the last of its stock owned by the United States was retired on or about December 31, 1960, the plaintiff was an “exempt organization” within the meaning of Section 501(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
For all years of its existence through December 31,1960, the books and records of plaintiff were kept on a calendar year basis; that is, from January 1 through December 31.
Plaintiff was required by Section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to file, and did file on a calendar year basis, annual returns for information purposes only. Through December 31, 1960, plaintiff had never paid nor was required to pay any income tax.
On September 14, 1961, the board of directors of the plaintiff adopted a fiscal year ending September 30, and amended its- bylaws accordingly. From September 30, 1961, forward, plaintiff’s books were kept and its reports prepared on the basis of a fiscal year ending September 30. Plaintiff filed its first return of taxable income for the period January 1, 1961, through September 30, 1961. On December 13, 1962, plaintiff filed its return of taxable income for the fiscal year ending September 30,1962.
At no time prior to adopting on its first return of taxable income a fiscal year ended September 30 as its annual accounting period, did plaintiff file an application with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue requesting approval to do so. (End of Stip.)
As pointed out in the excellent briefs filed by the parties in this proceeding, the questions for determination by the Court are (1) was the plaintiff, Forrest City Production Credit Association, a taxpayer during the years up to and including December 31,1960, at which time it was no longer an exempt business, and (2) was there a change in the plaintiff’s “annual accounting period” requiring approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Upon auditing plaintiff’s return filed for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1961, the District Director of Internal Revenue determined that the plaintiff had changed to a fiscal year period of reporting without permission of the Commissioner; that permission was required; and accordingly recomputed plaintiff’s income on a calendar year basis for 1961, which resulted in the deficiency in taxes sought to be recovered in this action.
Stated briefly, plaintiff argues that from its inception through December 31, 1960, it was an organization exempt from taxation under the Farm Credit Act of 1933, c. 98, 48 Stat. 257,1 and [611]*611that its exemption from taxation did not stem from Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,2 or its predecessor;3 that until January 1, 1961, it was not a taxpayer; that it became a taxpayer only after retirement of all stock owned by the United States on or about December 31,1960; that consequently its tax return for the period of January 1, 1961, through September 30, 1961, was the first return of a new taxpayer; and that as a new taxpayer it was entitled to adopt any taxable year it chose without obtaining approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The Government maintains that it matters not whether plaintiff’s exemption from taxation arose from Section 501(a) or the Farm Credit Act of 1933; that in either event plaintiff was a “taxpayer” prior to January 1, 1961; that plaintiff changed its annual accounting period from a calendar year to a fiscal year basis; that sueh change was not permitted without the express approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that no such approval was sought or obtained.
As to the first question on the plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer, it should be pointed out that in order to complete plaintiff’s changeover from a calendar year basis to a fiscal year, plaintiff filed a tax return for the short period January 1, 1961, through September 30, 1961, and then thereafter filed its returns for the fiscal years ending September 30. Although Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.442-1 (c),4 provide [612]*612that under certain circumstances a taxpayer may change its annual accounting period without prior approval of the Commissioner, one of the requirements is that if the association was an exempt organization either in the year immediately preceding the short period or in the short period “it must have the same special status for both the short period and such taxable year.”5 *In the instant case it is admitted that for the period January 1, 1960, through December 31, 1960, plaintiff was an exempt organization, but that plaintiff lost its exemption as of January 1, 1961. Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 1.442- 1 (c) does not apply so as to allow plaintiff to change its annual accounting period without approval of the Commissioner. There is no merit to plaintiff’s contention that through December 31, 1960, it was never a “taxpayer”; that, therefore, as of January 1, 1961, when it lost its exemption, it became a new taxpayer; that the return filed for the period January 1, 1961, through September 30, 1961, was the first return of a new taxpayer; and that, therefore, it came within the provisions of Section 1.442- 1 (a).
In the opinion of the Court the plaintiff is not a “new taxpayer” within the meaning of Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.442-1 (a), which provides that “a new taxpayer who adopts an annual accounting period * * * need not secure the permission of the Commissioner * * Nor is it a “new taxpayer” within the meaning of Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.441-1 (b) (3),6 wherein it is stated that “a new taxpayer in his first return may adopt any taxable year * * without prior approval.”
Contrary to plaintiff’s position is Rev. Rul. 67-173, 1967-1 Cum.Bull. 101, wherein a corporation (designated as “X”) exempt from tax under Section 401(a) lost its exemption and thereafter desired to change its annual accounting period from a calendar year to a fiscal year basis without obtaining approval of the Commissioner. It was held that corporation “X” was not a “new taxpayer” even though it was required for the first time to file a Form 1120 return of taxable income. The Court is not bound by the ruling and neither is this decision in any way dependent thereon although it is analogous to the instant situation.
Morever, Section 501(a) exempts qualifying organizations from income taxes only.7 The fact that plaintiff may have derived its exemption under Section 501 (a) does not mean that it was not a “taxpayer” as defined in the Code.
The term “taxpayer” is broadly defined by the Code itself. Section 7701 (a) (14),8 in pertinent part, provides [613]*613that the “term ‘taxpayer’ means any person subject to any internal revenue tax.” Section 7701(a) (l)9 defines the term “person” to include, an “association.” Section 7701(a)10 specifically makes applicable the foregoing definitions “when used in this title.”
Since Section 7701 is contained in Chapter 79, Subtitle F, of the 1954 Code and its definitions are made applicable to such terms when used in any part of the Code, these definitions apply to all subtitles, including Subtitle C of the Code, relating to employment taxes. Included, among others, as employment taxes under Subtitle C are Federal Insurance Contributions Act (F.I.C.A.) taxes set forth under Chapter 21 (Sections 3101 through 3126). Obviously, Section 501 does not provide an exemption from F.I.C.A. taxes.
Thus, if through December 31, 1960, taxpayer’s exemption from taxation did in fact stem from Section 501, it is an exemption from income taxes only. Therefore, since plaintiff was not exempted from F.I.C.A. taxes, it was a “taxpayer” prior to January 1, 1961, and cannot thus be said to be a “new taxpayer” as of that date.
Assuming that plaintiff derived its exemption from taxation not under Section 501, but from the Farm Credit Act of 1933, it was still a “taxpayer” prior to January 1,1961. Section 63 of the Farm Credit Act of 1933, as amended (12 U.S.C. Sec. 1138c),11 provides in pertinent part that production credit associations organized thereunder “shall be deemed to be instrumentalities of the United States” and that such associations “shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States.”12
However, Congress specifically overrode the broad exemption from taxation under Section 63 of the Farm Credit Act of 1933, when it created Section 1412 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,13 which provided:
SEC. 1412. INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE UNITED STATES.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (whether enacted before or after the enactment of this section) which grants to any instrumentality of the United States an exemption from taxation, such instrumentality shall not be exempt from the tax imposed by section 1410 unless such other provision of law grants a specific exemption, by reference to section 1410, from the tax imposed by such section.
The Farm Credit Act of 1933 has never been amended to exempt such as[614]*614sociations from the tax imposed by Section 1410 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.14
Production credit associations are therefore liable for internal revenue taxes in the form of F.I.C.A. taxes. Since Section 7701(a) (14), defines a “taxpayer” as any person (including an association) subject to any internal revenue tax, it is my conclusion that plaintiff was a “taxpayer” on and prior to December 31, 1960. Consequently, plaintiff cannot be said to have become a “new taxpayer” on January 1, 1961, for the purposes of applying Sections 1.441-1(b) (3) and 1.442-1 (a) of the Regulations.
Furthermore, in the stipulation by the parties it is stated as a fact that the plaintiff was required by 26 U.S.C. § 6033, to file annual returns for information purposes only. It should be pointed out that 26 U.S.C. § 6033 required the plaintiff to file an annual return to in-elude certain information for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of Subtitle A as the secretary or his delegate may by forms or regulations prescribe, etc.15 Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 §§ 1 to 2000, inclusive, have to do with “income taxes”.
Having determined the plaintiff was a taxpayer within the applicable provisions of the code, I turn to the additional question of whether there was a change in the plaintiff’s “annual accounting period.” In the opinion of the Court the answer is in the affirmative.
Section 441(c) of the Code16 provides that the term “annual accounting period” means “the annual period on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.” It was stipulated that plaintiff kept his books and records on a calendar year basis; that is, January 1 through December 31. Thus, I find that under Section 441(c), the annual accounting [615]*615period of plaintiff prior to January 1, 1961, was the calendar year.
Under Section 441 (b) 17 the annual accounting period is deemed to be taxpayer’s taxable year. Therefore, I find that prior to January 1, 1961, the calendar year was also plaintiff’s taxable year. Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.441-l(b) (4),18 require that a taxpayer must continue to use its adopted taxable year for all subsequent years unless prior approval is obtained from the Commissioner to make the change or unless the change is otherwise permitted.
Subsequent to January 1, 1961, taxpayer, without obtaining approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, changed its annual accounting period from a calendar year basis to a fiscal year basis by adopting' as its new annual accounting period a fiscal year ended September 30. After adoption of the new annual accounting period, all books and reports of taxpayer were maintained on the fiscal year basis ended September 30.
Section 442,19 plainly and unequivocally states:
If a taxpayer changes his annual accounting period, the new accounting period shall become the taxpayer’s taxable year only if the change is approved by the Secretary or his delegate. * * *
Similarly, Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.442-1 (a), 20 provide that if a taxpayer wishes to change his annual accounting period and adopt a new taxable year, “he must obtain prior approval from the Commissioner, by application, as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, or the change must be authorized under the Income Tax Regulations.”
Therefore, plaintiff was required to obtain approval of the Commissioner in accordance with Section 1.442-1 (b) of the Regulations before changing its annual accounting period from a calendar year basis to a fiscal year basis ending September 30. Until approval was obtained, plaintiff was required to maintain its annual accounting period and report taxable income on a calendar year basis. Accordingly, the District Director was correct in recomputing plaintiff’s income on the calendar year basis, and the resulting deficiency in taxes was properly assessed and collected. Judgment will be entered accordingly.