Forestal v. National Surety Co.

182 S.W. 614, 168 Ky. 552, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 579
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedFebruary 17, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 182 S.W. 614 (Forestal v. National Surety Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Forestal v. National Surety Co., 182 S.W. 614, 168 Ky. 552, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1916).

Opinion

OpinioN op the Court by

Chief Justice Miller—

Affirming.

The appellant, Thomas Forestal, brought this action against the appellee, Wm. Henry Malone and the National Surety Company, surety upon Malone’s bond as a policeman of the city of Princeton, seeking to recover damages for an assault committed by Malone in shooting Forestal through his left thigh, breaking the large bone of his leg.

Malone traversed the petition; and, in the second paragraph of his answer, he admitted the shooting, but alleged it was done in self-defense and after Forestal had assaulted him by throwing rocks at him, and had advanced upon him in the dark in a menacing and threatening manner; that he had in good faith, while believing he was in great and imminent danger, shot only in self-defense to repel the assault upon him by Forestal, and that he did no more than what seemed to him to be necessary in defending himself.

The surety company joined in the answer of Malone, but subsequently filed a separate answer, alleging that its joinder in Malone’s answer was by mistake.

[554]*554In its separate answer, the surety company traversed the petition, and further alleged that if Malone shot and wounded Forestal, he was not doing* so in his official capacity, but as an individual and in his necessary self-defense, having* reasonable grounds to believe, and believing, that Forestal was then and there about to inflict great bodily injury upon him.

The trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, and Forestal appeals.

The proof shows that Forestal had worked for a short time during the summer in South Dakota; that he then went to Chicago and remained there about a week; that from Chicago he went to Ft. Wayne, Indiana, and remained there a few days; that from Ft. Wayne he went to Centrada, Illinois, where he remained one day, and thence to Evansville, Indiana, where he remained a like period; that from Evansville he went to Louisville, where he remained two or three days, and thence to Princeton, where he arrived in September, on a passenger train that reached Princeton about five o’clock in the evening.

During most of the travels above spoken of, Forestal “beat his way.” At Evansville he fell in with John Ward, who accompanied him on his travels from that point to Princeton.

About seven o ’clock in the evening* after Forestal and Ward had arrived at Princeton, they went to the yards of the Illinois Central Railroad Company and entered an empty box car, where they proposed to spend the night. After removing his shoes and coat, Forestal says he and Ward retired and went to sleep immediately, leaving the sliding door in the side of the car open about two inches. Later in the night, according to Forestal’s story, he was awakened by some one knocking on the door, and a light flashing in his face. The man with the light was Malone. He told Forestal and Ward to get out of the car, and be quick about it.

■ Forestal says that when he and Ward started to get out of the car, Malone had stepped back about ten or twelve feet from the car and across the main track; that when Ward left the car and went up to Malone, Malone kicked him in the pit of the stomach and told him to “beat it” — to get out and run, and that Ward immediately ran down the track.

From what he had seen pass between Malone and Ward, Forestal says he concluded that Malone also [555]*555wanted Mm to leave, so lie jumped out of 'the ear and started to run, but before he got very far away, Malone shot him in the thigh, as above indicated. Forestal fell to the ground, and wa§ shortly thereafter carried to the freight office, and thence to the hotel, where he remained for several weeks.

Forestal says that when Malone came up to where he was lying on the ground, after he was shot, Malone admitted he had shot Forestal, and said Forestal had been throwing rocks at him, exhibiting one of the rocks which he held in his hand.

According to Malone’s version, when he approached the box car he saw a man standing in the car door, who jumped out of the car and ran up to Malone; that he shoved the man back, put his light in his pocket, and pulled his pistol, whereupon the man (Ward) ran away. Malone says that' immediately after Ward ran away a rock brushed by his head and shoulder, and that Fore-stal then jumped from the car door towards Malone, and as he sprung down he was in a reaching position like he was going for a rock, whereupon Malone shot him. Malone says he fired the shot because he thought he was in danger of great bodily harm, and for the purpose of repelling the assault which was being made upon him.

Malone admits he kicked Ward, or kicked at him, and shoved him back when Ward approached him, and he does not claim that Forestal threw the rock that struck him on the shoulder. Presumably, the rock was thrown by Ward. And, it does not appear precisely where Fore-stal fell when he was shot — whether he was near the, door of the car, as he would have been if Malone’s story is true, or whether he was further down the track running away, as he states. Ward did not testify.

1. In the. first place, we are urged to reverse the judgment of the lower court'upon the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, which it is claimed shows, beyond a doubt, that Malone was not acting in self-defense at the time he shot the appellant. That, however, was a question for the jury, under the conflicting testimony. If Ward and Forestal were assaulting Malone, and he believed he was in great bodily danger, he had the right to protect himself from the assault, and the jury had the right to believe his story rather than the story of Forestal. It being the province' of the [556]*556jury to pass upon the disputed facts of a case, its verdict will not be disturbed unless it is flagrantly against the evidence. Where there are only two witnesses to the fact in issue, each flatly contradicting the other, it can hardly be said that the verdict is flagrantly against the evidence.

2. It is nest insisted that the trial court erred in permitting the defendants to contradict the statement of their witness Winternheimer, in'a material portion of his testimony. Winternheimer had walked down to the place where Forestal lay after he was shot, and testified that Malone said: “Here is what they threw at me;” that he had a rock in his hand, and said: “One threw it at him, and started to run.”

Malone was recalled for the purpose of contradicting Winternheimer’s testimony to the effect, as shown by the avowal, that Malone had said he shot Forestal while he was running; but the court sustained the objection and did not permit Malone to contradict his own witness. But it is claimed that the court did permit Jennings and Throgmorton, other witnesses for the defendants, to contradict Winternheimer in this respect, and that in permitting this to be done, the trial court erred.

A careful reading of the testimony shows, however, that there was no contradiction of Winternheimer.

The avowal as to what Malone would testify, erroneously states that Winternheimer testified that Malone had said he shot Forestal while he was running away. But Winternheimer’s testimony only shows that one of the boys (which one is not stated) threw a rock at him and then ran; and that nothing was said by Malone about having shot him.

This also appears from Jennings’ testimony, which reads as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
182 S.W. 614, 168 Ky. 552, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 579, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/forestal-v-national-surety-co-kyctapp-1916.