Foremsky v. United States Steel Corp.

297 F. Supp. 1094, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2602, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12476
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedAugust 27, 1968
DocketCiv. No. 66-843
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 297 F. Supp. 1094 (Foremsky v. United States Steel Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foremsky v. United States Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1094, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2602, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12476 (W.D. Pa. 1968).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT

SORG, District Judge.

1. Plaintiff, Robert M. Foremsky, hereinafter referred to as Foremsky, is an individual residing in Duquesne, Pa.

2. Defendant, United States Steel Corporation, hereinafter referred to as U.S. Steel, is a corporation which maintains a place of business at Homestead, Pa.

3. The defendants, United Steelworkers of America, hereinafter referred to as United Steelworkers, and its Local Union No. 3063, are national and local collective bargaining units which represent plaintiff in his capacity as an employee of U.S. Steel.

4. Foremsky entered the employ of U.S. Steel in March of 1956, as messenger, after having taken the standard preemployment qualifying tests.

5. ' He progressed in orderly fashion through the ranks and, on June 6, 1959, acquired a non-temporary position as an Offset Printing Machine Operator at defendant U.S. Steel’s Homestead plant.

6. Foremsky held this job classification at the time of his induction into the Armed Services of the United States on August 31,1961.

7. On September 5, 1963, plaintiff was honorably discharged from the Armed Forces, receiving a certificate to that effect which he presented to the company on September 10, 1963, when he applied for restoration of employment.

8. On September 17, 1963, Foremsky was reemployed as an Offset Printing Machine Operator (hourly), with seniority dating from June 6, 1959.

9. On September 11, 1963, a notice of job opening for Order Coding Clerk was posted for bidding.

10. On October 7, 1963, plaintiff filed two bids for this position and on October 25, 1963, was assigned to this position effective October 13, 1963.

11. It is not disputed that Foremsky’s promotion, as well as those of other employees involved in the issue presented here, was made in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect among the above named defendants.

12. During the period of Foremsky’s military service, eight other employees, junior to Foremsky in length of service as Offset Printing Machine Operators, had been similarly promoted to the Order Coding Clerk classification, six of whom are presently listed as prior in seniority to Foremsky in the Order Coding Clerk classification.

[1096]*109613. It is admitted that at the time of the aforesaid promotions, Foremsky was qualified for such promotion from the standpoint of ability and physical fitness, and it is further not disputed that had he bid for a promotion to the Order Coding Clerk classification which became effective for another on April 12, 1962, he would have been qualified therefor under the terms of the relevant collective bargaining agreement among the above named defendants (T.174) which read as follows:

“The parties recognize that'promotion opportunity and job security in event of promotions * * * should increase in proportion to length of continuous service, and that in the administration of this Section the intent will be that wherever practicable full consideration shall be given continuous service in such cases.
“In recognition, however, of the responsibility of Management for the efficient operation of the works, it is understood and agreed that in all eases of:
“1. Promotion * * * the following factors as listed below shall be considered; however, only where factors ‘a’ and ‘b’ are relatively equal shall length of continuous service be the determining factors;
a. Ability to perform the work,
b. Physical fitness,
c. Continuous service.”
“A. DEFINITIONS:
1. Job Seniority
“ * * * an employee first placed regularly on a given job in the promotional sequence in the unit shall be the first employee promoted from that job in that promotional sequence in the unit, provided, of course, that the factors of ability and physical fitness are relatively equal * * * ”
(Offset Printing Machine Operators and. Order Coding Clerks are within one unit in which promotional sequence is established.)

14. It is assumed that given the opportunity, Foremsky would have bid for the promotion to Order Coding Clerk which became effective April 12, 1962, and that U.S. Steel, after properly applying the pertinent provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which covered Foremsky, would have given him the promotion on that date.

QUESTION

U.S. Steel contends that Foremsky’s seniority as an Order Coding Clerk properly began on October 13, 1963, the date on which he was actually promoted to that job classification. Foremsky asks that his seniority as Order Coding Clerk be dated from April 12, 1962, the date upon which the first of the above mentioned Offset Printing Machine Operators, junior in seniority to him as such, was promoted to the job of Order Coding Clerk. The United Steelworkers take no position in the matter.

U.S. Steel asserts that the applicable provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act afford the same reemployment rights to a returning veteran as to an employee who has been on furlough or leave of absence for reasons other than military service and that the act of bidding and the exercise of managerial discretion are conditions precedent to a promotion and are not automatic with respect to persons on leave of absence. Foremsky, on the other hand, maintains that he is entitled to the same seniority benefits that he would have acquired had he remained in his employment continuously from the time of his entering the Armed Forces to the time of his restoration.

The sole question, therefore, is Foremsky’s entitlement vel non of a retroactive seniority status by virtue of his veteran’s reemployment rights as distinguished from the rights of an employee returning from a leave of absence other than for military service.

The pertinent provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act [1097]*1097pertaining to the reemployment rights of veterans, 50 U.S.C.A.App. § 459, are as follows:

“Sec. 9. (b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and service, has left or leaves a position (other than a temporary position) in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate, and (2) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such training and service or from hospitali2iation continuing after discharge for a period of not more than one year—
(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such person shall—
(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored by such employer or his successor in interest to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay; * * *

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
297 F. Supp. 1094, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2602, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foremsky-v-united-states-steel-corp-pawd-1968.