Foreman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

416 So. 2d 258, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 7510
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 26, 1982
Docket8802
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 416 So. 2d 258 (Foreman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foreman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 416 So. 2d 258, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 7510 (La. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinion

416 So.2d 258 (1982)

Ronnie L. FOREMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 8802.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

May 26, 1982.

*259 Hunt, Godwin, Painter & Roddy, Ernest C. Hunt, Jr., Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellant.

Stockwell, Sievert, Viccellio, Clements & Shaddock, John S. Bradford, Lake Charles, for defendants-appellees.

Before DOMENGEAUX, CUTRER and SWIFT, JJ.

CUTRER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a trial court judgment for damages arising out of an intersectional accident occurring in the city of Lake Charles, Louisiana, involving vehicles driven by Ronnie Foreman and David Trahan.

Foreman brought suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), the liability insurer of Trahan, for damages incurred as a result of an accident occurring on January 19, 1978, at the intersection of Ryan Street and Sale Road. A jury trial resulted in a verdict awarding Foreman $11,600.00 in damages. Judgment was rendered accordingly. Foreman appeals seeking an increase in damages. State Farm answered the appeal contending that Trahan was not liable and, in the alternative, if liability is established, the damage award is excessive.

The issues on appeal are:

(1) Whether Trahan was liable for the damages incurred by Foreman in the accident; and
*260 (2) Whether the jury erred in its award of damages.

LIABILITY

The jury answered interrogatories regarding liability of Trahan as follows:

"Do you find that David Trahan was negligent and this negligence was a cause of the accident?
Answer Yes or No Answer: `Yes'
* * * * * *
"Do you find that Ronnie Foreman was negligent and this negligence was a cause of the accident?
Answer Yes or No Answer: `No'"

Implicit in the jury's answers to the above interrogatories is the factual conclusion that Trahan did not comply with the law applying to motorists making a left turn at an intersection.

The law of this state requires that the driver of a vehicle intending to turn left within an intersection yield to oncoming vehicles which are so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Our courts have consistently held that a motorist attempting a left turn is required to exercise a very high degree of care. Such a left-turning motorist, when involved in a collision, is burdened with the presumption of liability for the accident. The left-turning driver must prove that he is free from negligence to avoid liability. This burden of proof applies to the defendant whether or not the intersection is controlled by semaphore lights, including a left-turn signal. If the left-turn motorist is faced with a green arrow left-turn signal, defendant must prove that he was making such turn while the arrow was green or that he had pre-empted the intersection. Dunn v. Snyder, 388 So.2d 450 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1980). With these principles in mind we examine the facts in the case at hand.

The record reflects that on the morning of January 19, 1978, Foreman was driving his 1973 Volvo north on Ryan Street, a four lane thoroughfare, that intersects Sale Road. At the same time, Trahan was proceeding south on Ryan Street, intending to turn left into Sale Road. This intersection is controlled by electric semaphore lights. Motorists approaching the intersection traveling on Ryan Street who desire to make a left turn are afforded a traffic light sequence which includes an illumined green arrow signaling that it is safe to make a left turn. When the left turn arrow is lighted, traffic approaching from the opposite direction faces a red light.

Foreman and his passenger testified that as he approached the intersection the light controlling their lane of traffic turned from red to green. This transpired when they were approximately 200 feet from the light. Foreman proceeded into the intersection and as he did so, Trahan made a left turn into Foreman's lane of travel. Foreman was unable to avoid striking the Trahan vehicle. Foreman's testimony was corroborated by a disinterested witness who was stopped at the light facing north with the intention of making a left turn on Sale Road. She stated that the light had turned green for Foreman before he arrived at the intersection. As Foreman proceeded into the intersection, Trahan turned left in front of Foreman causing the collision. The Foreman car was damaged on the left front and the Trahan car was damaged in the area of the right door.

Trahan and his two sisters, who were his passengers, testified that the left-turn arrow was green when Trahan was making his left turn. This means that the light would have been on red for Foreman when he came into the intersection.

The jury, in making its determination that Trahan was negligent and Foreman was free of negligence, must have rejected the testimony of Trahan and his passengers and accepted the testimony of Foreman, his passenger and the disinterested witness. We find no error in this determination by the jury.

"When there is evidence before the trier of fact which, upon its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a reasonable *261 factual basis for the trial court's finding, on review the appellate court should not disturb the factual finding in the absence of manifest error. ..."

Canter v. Koehring Company, 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973).

QUANTUM

The jury returned a verdict for damages by answering an interrogatory as follows:

"What were the damages suffered by Ronnie Foreman as a result of the accident of January 19, 1978?
$ `11,600' "

The principal issue on appeal is whether the jury erred in its assessment of these damages. In making its quantum determination, the jury was faced with unusual facts and circumstances which greatly increased the usual complexities of determining damages. As will be discussed hereafter, we have concluded that the jury did not err in its determination of quantum.

The question of quantum is made more difficult than usual because Foreman was involved in three automobile accidents, each allegedly causing complaints of injuries and pain in the neck and shoulder areas. Foreman was involved in accidents occurring on the following dates:

August 28, 1977—Foreman's vehicle was struck from the rear at the intersection of Ryan Street and Prien Lake Road in Lake Charles;
January 19, 1978—the accident in question in this suit;
July 8, 1980—Another car changed lanes striking Foreman's car at the left front.

Foreman filed two suits on August 16, 1978. The first suit arose out of Accident # 1 and the second suit arose out of Accident # 2. The suit arising out of Accident # 1 was settled. The suit at hand concerns Accident # 2 which occurred January 19, 1978.

In addition to the problem of multiple accidents, the solution of this suit is further complicated by the fact that the principal complaints following each accident were mainly centered around pain in Foreman's cervical and shoulder area. He also complained of low back pain after Accident # 3.

Foreman argues that following Accident # 2 and before Accident # 3, he incurred $10,704.52 as medical expenses.

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416 So. 2d 258, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 7510, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foreman-v-state-farm-mut-auto-ins-lactapp-1982.