Fordson Coal Company v. Burke

294 S.W. 497, 219 Ky. 770, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 451
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedMay 10, 1927
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 294 S.W. 497 (Fordson Coal Company v. Burke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fordson Coal Company v. Burke, 294 S.W. 497, 219 Ky. 770, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 451 (Ky. 1927).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge McCandless—

Affirming.

On September 30, 1924, James Burke lost Ms life by an accidental injury arising out of Ms employment and wMle engaged as a laborer for the Fordson Coal Company. At the time both employer and employee had accepted the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ky. Stats., section 4880-4987). Subsequently, thereto, his_mother and two. infant brothers filed claim before the Workmen’s Compensation Board for compensation under the act. ¡

On proof heard the board found that the claimants' were total dependents and awarded them the maximum^ compensation of $12.00 per week for 335 weeks. On appeal to the circuit court, the award was affirmed. From-' that judgment the employer appeals. Appellant urges, two grounds for reversal: (1) That under the uncontradictéd facts the board erred in finding that the claimants! werejnial dependents of deceased. (2) The finding was1 based upon incompetent evidence. " 1

1. The facts show, James Burke was approaching his majority at the time of his death. Some 5 years before, his mother, Mrs. Permelia Burke, was divorced from her husband in the state of Arkansas. Thereafter he contributed nothing further to the support of her or her children. Her family consisted of the deceased, James, and his two younger brothers, Jewel and Wylie, now aged 14 and 12, respectively. By their united efforts they acquired a small home. In August, 1923, James enlisted in the United States service-as a marine, but in a short time thereafter Ms mother procured his release. In May, 1924, they sold their property in Arkansas, and moved first to Charleston and later to Williamson, W. Va., all their means being expended by the time, of their *772 arrival. The family were in destitute circumstances, and Mrs. Burke found employment in a hotel for herself, receiving $7 per week and her board. Por a time the younger children worked at the same place for their board. She continued at this work for 2y2 months, when she went to work at a laundry at $10 per week. The coal industry was dull, and James had difficulty in finding’ employment. He worked for a time at a hotel and later for different mining companies under an assumed name, no reason being disclosed for the change of name. About July 24th he procured employment with appellant and worked for it steadily until his death. While working in Kentucky he appears to have spent his week ends at Williamson with his mother, though for two or three weeks he occupied an apartment with a mistress, and there, is evidence that he was otherwise improvident and wasteful. However, he assisted his mother, and during the last 2y2 months preceding his death earned the sum of $428.21, and actually contributed the sum of about $90 per month to the support of his mother and younger brothers. It further appears that since his death the claimants have subsisted largely on donations made to them by charitable organizations of the city of Williamson. Prom these facts it is earnestly insisted that Mrs. Burke was a wage-earner and contributed in part to the support of her Tamily; that James was' profigate, yas wasting his means in riotous living, and, as a matter of law, it should be held that the claimants were not wholly dependent upon him, within the meaning of the statute, but that, on the contrary, they should be listed as partial dependents and be awarded only a pro rata of the maximum amount permitted by statute.

Section 4893, Ky. Statutes, provides:

(2) If there are one or more wholly dependent persons, sixty-five per cent, of the average weekly earnings of the deceased employee, but not to exceed twelve dollars ($12.00) nor less than five dollars ($5.00) per week shall be payable, all such payments to be made for the period between the date of death and 335 weeks after the date of accident to the employee, or until the intervening termination of dependency, but in no case to exceed the maximum sum of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00).
“ (.3) If there are partly dependent persons the payments shall be such part of what would be pay *773 able for total dependency as the partial dependency existing at tbe time of the accident to the employe may be proportionate to - total dependency, all such payments to be made for the period between the date of death and 335 weeks after the date of the accident to the deceased employee, or until the intervening' termination of dependency, but in no case to exceed in the aggregate of compensation on account of such death the maximum sum of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00).
“Partial dependency shall be determined by the proportion of the earnings of the employee which have been contributed to such partial dependent during one year next preceding the date of injury; if the relation of partial dependency shall not have existed for one year next preceding the date of injury, the board shall consider all the facts and circumstances and fix such proportion as may be fair and reasonable thereunder. ’ ’

In defining dependency, section 4894, after referring specifically to the surviving spouse and children of deceased, continues:

“In all other cases the relation of dependency in whole or in part shall be determined in accordance with the facts of each case existing at the time of the accident, but no person shall be considered a dependent in any degree unless he be living in the household of the employee at the time of the accident, or unless such person bears to the employee the relation of father, mother, husband or wife, father-in-law or mother-in-law, grandfather or grandmother, child or grandchild, or brother or sister of the whole or half blood.”

The relation of “the relation of dependency” is to “be determined in accordance with the facts of each case existing at the time of the accident.” But jn estimating the extent of partial dependency the proportion of earnings that the employee had contrfbuted to the dependent for one year preceding the in-j-qry is to be considered, and it further appears that the facts and circumstances may be such that partial depen¿Teñísaré entitled to the maximum amount authorized to bé~awardéd total dependents, or $4,000.

*774 Construing these provisions together, it is manifest that the Legislature intended for the relation of dependency existing at the time of the accident to he determined in the light of prior events and not to be controlled by an unusual, temp or ary situation occasioned by fortuitous circumstances.

The mother and her three sons lived together in Arkansas. Apparently, James was the breadwinner. They arrived in West Virginia without' funds. In their destitution the mother found employment at $7 per week and her board — later at $10 per week without board. In. neither case, was there more than enough for her subsistence. She also for a time found work for the small boys in the hotel where they earned their board. The family circle was thus broken, whether temporarily or permanently being a matter of conjecture.

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Bluebook (online)
294 S.W. 497, 219 Ky. 770, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 451, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fordson-coal-company-v-burke-kyctapphigh-1927.