Ford v. Second Nat. Bank

100 S.W.2d 1112
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 3, 1936
DocketNo. 10288
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 100 S.W.2d 1112 (Ford v. Second Nat. Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ford v. Second Nat. Bank, 100 S.W.2d 1112 (Tex. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinions

GRAVES, Justice.

At the suit of the appellees (J. H. or Jack Rafferty as alleged holder and the-Second National Bank as his pledgee thereof) against the appellant in his stated capacity as Denton W. Cooley’s administrator, upon three promissory notes for $2,500 each, signed “Denton W. Cooley, Trustee,” payable to A. C. Bayless, and expressly reciting upon the face thereof that they were secured by a deed of trust upon a specifically described tract ■ of land out of the A. C. Reynolds league in Harris county, the learned trial court, upon a jury’s verdict in response to special issues that Raf-ferty had paid Cooley a valuable consideration for the notes, that they had been indorsed to him by Bayless at the request of Cooley, and that it had not been the intention of Rafferty and Cooley in having the notes indorsed by Bayless to Rafferty that the latter was to sell them and deliver the proceeds thereof to Cooley, rendered judgment in appellees’ favor against the appellant for the full $14,197.61 then found to be due upon the notes, including interest and attorney’s fees, together with establishment of the recited liens as validly existing against the described land, with also a foreclosure and order of sale thereof; it being further specially provided, however, that no general execution should issue against the administrator, nor should a levy be made upon any property other than the tract so decreed to be covered by the lien established, and that any deficiency upon the judgment — after a sale of that property at foreclosure — should be paid by the appellant in due course of administration by him of the Cooley estate.

In final substance the appellant contends in this court, as he did below, in effect, this:

(1) That the undisputed evidence showed that the tract of land — so recited and decreed to have been mortgaged to secure the payment of the three notes — had been deeded to Denton W. Cooley as trustee; that it was trust property in his hands for the benefit of others than, or along with, himself; and that, not only had both the notes and the deed of trust against the land been executed by Cooley to A. C. Bayless as “trustee,” but, further, the notes had also been directed by Cooley to be and had been assigned by Bayless to the appellee, J. II. Rafferty, to discharge the personal debts of Denton W. Cooley to Rafferty; wherefore, such transaction was null and void, as being in contravention of R.S. art. 7425a.

(2) That the transaction having thus been invalid ab initio, the notes thus sued upon could not constitute a proper claim or debt against appellant as Cooley’s administrator in favor of either of the appellees, especially since it likewise indisputably appeared that Rafferty had known at the time the transactions occurred of all the facts so rendering them invalid for such a use, and the bank had become his assignee thereof after the notes had all matured, after Cooley’s death, and not being an innocent purchaser thereof for value, hence was in no better position than he.

This position is sustained as being supported by the record.

The documentary evidence showed that the property here involved, together with other tracts, had been conveyed to “Denton W. Cooley, Trustee,” by Mrs. Emma Krenzler and husband by deed dated Sep[1114]*1114tember 14, 1926, which had promptly gone to record in Harris county, neither the purpose of the trust nor the names of the beneficiaries, however, being set forth in the conveyance itself; thereafter, on September 1, 1927, these three notes, together with a deed of trust to this property running to Arthur O’Connor as trustee to secure their payment, the notes all maturing three years after date, were executed by “Denton W. Cooley, Trustee,” the notes being payable to A. C. Bayless as payee, and, as recited supra, expressly declaring that they were so secured by such deed of trust; thereafter, the date thereof not appearing upon them, the notes bore the indorsement of the payee, A. C. Bayless, without recourse on himself, to the appellee here, J. H. or Jack Rafferty; still later, on October 11, 1930, the appellee Rafferty executed a written instrument reciting the transfer by him of all three of these notes, together with the mortgage lien securing the same, to his coappellee herein, the Second National Bank.

As interpretative of the meaning of these written- transactions, the oral testimony of the two witnesses who had participated in and knew the facts concerning the transactions they reflected, that is, the appellee Rafferty and the original payee of the notes, Mr. Bayless, seems to this court conclusive of the whole controversy; they — together with Mr. Cooley, the maker of the notes and accompanying deed of trust — were very close friends and operating in business together during all the material time here, up until the death of Mr. Cooley; both the survivors of that trio, Messrs. Rafferty and Bayless, in addition to such facts about their relationships to each other, testified that Mr. Cooley, having first himself executed the notes and deed of trust without the knowledge or .consent of Mr. Bayless, presented them to the latter with the request that he undertake to borrow money upon them, acting for that purpose as accommodation-maker for Cooley, in order that the latter might pay off the personal debts he then acknowledged to Bayless he owed to the appellee Rafferty; that in pursuance of that request from Cooley and in the endeavor to get the money for. that purpose for him, Bayless took the papers to Dallas and requested such a loan from the Southland Company, for which he was then general agent at Houston, but failed in the effort, and so reported to Mr. Cooley 'on his return from Dallas.

This -further pertinent testimony from each of these witnesses is disclosed by the question and answer form of the statement of facts:

From Mr. Bayless:
“Q. At the time Mr. Cooley asked you to go to Dallas to negotiate the loan on these notes did he make any statement to you as to what he proposed to do with the proceeds of the loan? * * * A. Yes, he told me he and Jack Rafferty had this property and he owed Jack Rafferty some money and I objected to him making the notes payable to me. I did not know anything about the deal at that time. When I came in the bank the notes were already made out, he did not make them out when I came in the bank, they were already made out and he assumed I could get the money for him.
“Q. What did Mr. Rafferty have to do with that? ' A. He said he wanted to pay him off, that they had^ several deals that I did not know about, I was acting as a messenger.
“Q. Did you- hear Mr. Cooley make a statement as to whether or not he owed Mr. Rafferty any money? A. Yes, sir, I knew he did.
“Q. Was Mr. Rafferty present at any time in which Mr. Cooley stated he owed Mr. Rafferty any money? A. I am not sure about that, we were usually together an hour or two every day, I do not remember about this transaction, but he told me Jack was mixed up in this deal with him and he and Jack wanted to get this money. I did not know he and Jack was together, they had so many deals together that I did-not know, I did not remember, we were together an hour or two every day for years.
“Q. Who requested you to endorse .the notes over to Jack Rafferty? A. Mr. Cooley.
“Q. Did Mr. Cooley giv-e you any reason or explanation why he was endorsing the notes over to Mr. Rafferty? * * * A.

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Related

Lubbering v. Ellison
342 S.W.2d 796 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1961)
Natl. Bank v. Ford, Administrator
123 S.W.2d 867 (Texas Supreme Court, 1939)

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Bluebook (online)
100 S.W.2d 1112, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ford-v-second-nat-bank-texapp-1936.