25CA1526 Ford v ICAO 01-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1526 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 12645-2025
Erik Ford,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Román, C.J., and Hawthorne*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026
Erik Ford, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, claimant, Erik Ford,
seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office
(Panel). The Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s decision
disqualifying Ford from receiving benefits based on his job
separation from CraneWorks, Inc. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Ford worked as a Branch Services Manager for CraneWorks
from January 2022 to September 2024. He originally took this
position with hopes that he would be able to move up the ranks,
but over time it became clear that there was no opportunity for
growth. Ford therefore started looking for another position and was
offered a Branch Service Manager position for a competitor at
higher pay. Ford gave notice to CraneWorks and started his new
position.
¶3 A deputy determined that Ford was disqualified from receiving
benefits because he was responsible for his separation from
employment when he quit CraneWorks to accept other employment.
As far as we can discern from the record, Ford’s new employer
eliminated his position sometime in March 2025 and he
immediately applied for unemployment benefits. But because
1 Ford’s “base period” included only time he worked for CraneWorks,
the deputy determined that Ford’s eligibility for unemployment
benefits was limited to the circumstances under which he separated
from that employer. See § 8-70-103(2), C.R.S. 2025 (defining “base
period” as “the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters
immediately preceding the first day of the individual’s benefit year”).
The record before us does not include specific dates from which the
base period and the eligibility for unemployment benefits can be
determined. And that is not an issue Ford raised.
¶4 Ford appealed and a hearing was held. The hearing officer
concluded that Ford was disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(V), C.R.S. 2025, because he
quit to accept other employment. Ford appealed the hearing
officer’s decision to the Panel, which affirmed upon review.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶5 As relevant in this case, we may set aside the Panel’s decision
only if the findings of fact do not support the decision or if the
decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6), C.R.S.
2025. We may not disturb the hearing officer’s factual findings if
they are “supported by substantial evidence or reasonable
2 inferences drawn from that evidence.” Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 2013 COA 124, ¶ 10; see also § 8-74-107(4) (facts
supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive). Substantial
evidence is “that which is probative, credible, and competent, of a
character which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence
of facts supporting a particular finding.” Rathburn v. Indus.
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
¶6 A claimant’s entitlement to employment benefits depends on
the reason for the separation from employment, which is a question
of fact for the hearing officer. Eckhart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989); see also § 8-73-108(1)
(unemployment benefits are aimed at persons unemployed through
no fault of their own). A claimant is disqualified from receiving
benefits when the claimant “quit[s] to accept other employment”
(except for certain employment in the construction industry).
§ 8-73-108(5)(e)(V).
III. Analysis
¶7 It is undisputed that Ford quit working for CraneWorks to
accept a job with a competitor. Ford testified accordingly before the
3 hearing officer. Ford neither argued nor presented evidence that
the construction work exception applies. See § 8-73-108(4)(f)(I).
¶8 In his appeal to the Panel, Ford asserted that the hearing
officer erred when she made a factual finding that he left
CraneWorks for a better paying job. Ford argued he left for
“professional growth” rather than better pay. The Panel addressed
Ford’s argument, explaining that Ford said he left for “professional
development” but also that the new position paid more annually
and had the potential for quarterly bonuses — which his
employment at CraneWorks did not. The Panel found, and we
agree, that the hearing officer’s inferences from this evidence that
Ford sought a job with higher pay was not in error. Accordingly,
the hearing officer’s factual findings as to the reason for Ford’s
separation from CraneWorks, are supported by substantial
evidence. See § 8-74-107.
¶9 More importantly, an employee is disqualified for benefits
under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(V), if they quit their job to accept other
employment — quitting for higher pay is not required. Thus, Ford
was not eligible for benefits whether he left CraneWorks for
“professional growth,” for higher pay, or for both.
4 ¶ 10 On appeal, Ford also asserts that had he waited six more days
to file for unemployment benefits, he would have received it from
his new employer, rather than CraneWorks. He asserts that he
should not be disqualified from receiving benefits because he has
worked for thirty consecutive years, does not know how
unemployment benefits work, and did not know the details about
how the timing of benefits worked. He further asserts that the
unemployment office should have told him to wait a week to file for
benefits to ensure that he received them.
¶ 11 Even assuming that Ford would have been entitled to benefits
had he waited a week to file a claim, under the circumstances, it
appears that the hearing officer had no choice but to find Ford
disqualified from receiving benefits because of his voluntary
separation from CraneWorks. See § 8-73-108(5)(e)(V). Further, on
this record and with the issues Ford raised, we cannot conclude
that the Panel’s order upholding the hearing officer’s decision was
legally erroneous or unsupported by the factual findings. See
Yotes, ¶ 10. Consequently, we cannot set aside the Panel’s order on
review.
5 ¶ 12 As we understand Ford’s argument, he claims that had he
waited to file for unemployment benefits, his “base period” would
have encompassed his employment with the new employer who laid
him off and, as such, he would not have been disqualified from
receiving benefits. As mentioned above, that issue was not before
the hearing officer. See § 8-74-104(2), C.R.S. 2025 (the Panel may
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25CA1526 Ford v ICAO 01-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1526 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 12645-2025
Erik Ford,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Román, C.J., and Hawthorne*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026
Erik Ford, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, claimant, Erik Ford,
seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office
(Panel). The Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s decision
disqualifying Ford from receiving benefits based on his job
separation from CraneWorks, Inc. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Ford worked as a Branch Services Manager for CraneWorks
from January 2022 to September 2024. He originally took this
position with hopes that he would be able to move up the ranks,
but over time it became clear that there was no opportunity for
growth. Ford therefore started looking for another position and was
offered a Branch Service Manager position for a competitor at
higher pay. Ford gave notice to CraneWorks and started his new
position.
¶3 A deputy determined that Ford was disqualified from receiving
benefits because he was responsible for his separation from
employment when he quit CraneWorks to accept other employment.
As far as we can discern from the record, Ford’s new employer
eliminated his position sometime in March 2025 and he
immediately applied for unemployment benefits. But because
1 Ford’s “base period” included only time he worked for CraneWorks,
the deputy determined that Ford’s eligibility for unemployment
benefits was limited to the circumstances under which he separated
from that employer. See § 8-70-103(2), C.R.S. 2025 (defining “base
period” as “the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters
immediately preceding the first day of the individual’s benefit year”).
The record before us does not include specific dates from which the
base period and the eligibility for unemployment benefits can be
determined. And that is not an issue Ford raised.
¶4 Ford appealed and a hearing was held. The hearing officer
concluded that Ford was disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(V), C.R.S. 2025, because he
quit to accept other employment. Ford appealed the hearing
officer’s decision to the Panel, which affirmed upon review.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶5 As relevant in this case, we may set aside the Panel’s decision
only if the findings of fact do not support the decision or if the
decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6), C.R.S.
2025. We may not disturb the hearing officer’s factual findings if
they are “supported by substantial evidence or reasonable
2 inferences drawn from that evidence.” Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 2013 COA 124, ¶ 10; see also § 8-74-107(4) (facts
supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive). Substantial
evidence is “that which is probative, credible, and competent, of a
character which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence
of facts supporting a particular finding.” Rathburn v. Indus.
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
¶6 A claimant’s entitlement to employment benefits depends on
the reason for the separation from employment, which is a question
of fact for the hearing officer. Eckhart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989); see also § 8-73-108(1)
(unemployment benefits are aimed at persons unemployed through
no fault of their own). A claimant is disqualified from receiving
benefits when the claimant “quit[s] to accept other employment”
(except for certain employment in the construction industry).
§ 8-73-108(5)(e)(V).
III. Analysis
¶7 It is undisputed that Ford quit working for CraneWorks to
accept a job with a competitor. Ford testified accordingly before the
3 hearing officer. Ford neither argued nor presented evidence that
the construction work exception applies. See § 8-73-108(4)(f)(I).
¶8 In his appeal to the Panel, Ford asserted that the hearing
officer erred when she made a factual finding that he left
CraneWorks for a better paying job. Ford argued he left for
“professional growth” rather than better pay. The Panel addressed
Ford’s argument, explaining that Ford said he left for “professional
development” but also that the new position paid more annually
and had the potential for quarterly bonuses — which his
employment at CraneWorks did not. The Panel found, and we
agree, that the hearing officer’s inferences from this evidence that
Ford sought a job with higher pay was not in error. Accordingly,
the hearing officer’s factual findings as to the reason for Ford’s
separation from CraneWorks, are supported by substantial
evidence. See § 8-74-107.
¶9 More importantly, an employee is disqualified for benefits
under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(V), if they quit their job to accept other
employment — quitting for higher pay is not required. Thus, Ford
was not eligible for benefits whether he left CraneWorks for
“professional growth,” for higher pay, or for both.
4 ¶ 10 On appeal, Ford also asserts that had he waited six more days
to file for unemployment benefits, he would have received it from
his new employer, rather than CraneWorks. He asserts that he
should not be disqualified from receiving benefits because he has
worked for thirty consecutive years, does not know how
unemployment benefits work, and did not know the details about
how the timing of benefits worked. He further asserts that the
unemployment office should have told him to wait a week to file for
benefits to ensure that he received them.
¶ 11 Even assuming that Ford would have been entitled to benefits
had he waited a week to file a claim, under the circumstances, it
appears that the hearing officer had no choice but to find Ford
disqualified from receiving benefits because of his voluntary
separation from CraneWorks. See § 8-73-108(5)(e)(V). Further, on
this record and with the issues Ford raised, we cannot conclude
that the Panel’s order upholding the hearing officer’s decision was
legally erroneous or unsupported by the factual findings. See
Yotes, ¶ 10. Consequently, we cannot set aside the Panel’s order on
review.
5 ¶ 12 As we understand Ford’s argument, he claims that had he
waited to file for unemployment benefits, his “base period” would
have encompassed his employment with the new employer who laid
him off and, as such, he would not have been disqualified from
receiving benefits. As mentioned above, that issue was not before
the hearing officer. See § 8-74-104(2), C.R.S. 2025 (the Panel may
only consider evidence in the record previously submitted in the
case). Accordingly, the Panel could not consider any of Ford’s
factual assertions related to timing, and neither can this court. See
Voisnet v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 757 P.2d 171, 173 (Colo. App.
1988); see also Velo v. Emp. Sols. Pers., 988 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Colo.
App. 1998) (declining to address “arguments [that] were not raised
and preserved for our review in the administrative proceedings”).
¶ 13 Nor are we persuaded to reach a different result by Ford’s
argument that the unemployment office should have told him to
wait to file his claim. Generally, information given by the
unemployment office about an application for benefits “d[oes] not
provide a basis for awarding benefits contrary to the statutory
provisions.” Boeheim v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 23 P.3d 1247,
1249 (Colo. App. 2001).
6 ¶ 14 We acknowledge that many claimants may not realize how the
timing of their claim filing can impact their eligibility to receive
benefits and lead to harsh results. Nevertheless, there is a strong
presumption that the public has knowledge of the law, and having
requested benefits, claimants are presumed to know the contents of
the unemployment statutes. See id.; Paul v. Indus. Comm’n, 632
P.2d 638, 639 (Colo. App. 1981).
IV. Disposition
¶ 15 We affirm the order.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.