IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE ________________________________________________
EDNA FORBES,
Plaintiff-Appellee
Vs. Wilson Chancery No. 9325
WILSON COUNTY EMERGENCY C.A. No. 01A01-9602-CH-00089 COMMUNICATION DISTRICT 911 BOARD and W. J. MCCLUSKEY,
Defendants-Appellants ___________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE WILSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT THE HONORABLE C. K. SMITH, CHANCELLOR
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT
W. Gary Blackburn, Blackburn, Slobey, Freeman & Happell of Nashville, For Appellants
Margaret L. Behm, Anne C. Martin, Dodson Parker & Behm of Nashville, For Appellee
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
Opinion filed:
FILED May 20, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S. CONCURS: ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE
This case, remanded to this Court by the Supreme Court, involves an action brought
pursuant to the Tennessee Open Meetings Act and the Tennessee handicap discrimination statute.
Plaintiff Edna Forbes (Forbes) alleged that Defendant Wilson County Emergency Communication District 911 Board and Defendant W.J. McCluskey violated these statutes by
conducting a secret meeting in which they decided to demote her because of a handicap.1
Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdicts which found
violations of both statutes. Forbes was awarded $65,975.00 in back pay, $38,675.00 in front pay,
$250,000.00 damages for humiliation and embarrassment, $50,000.00 for punitive damages, plus
reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs. The trial court denied the defendants’ Motion for
a New Trial and/or to Alter and Amend.2 The defendants appealed, presenting issues of liability
under both statutes and damages.
In a decision filed September 13, 1996, we held that the defendants violated the Open
Meetings Act, T.C.A. §§ 8-44-101 et seq. (1993 & Supp. 1997). Forbes v. Wilson County
Emergency Communication Dist. 911, No. 01A01-9602-CH-00089, 1996 WL 518073 (Tenn.
App. Sept. 13, 1996). Finding that the defendants’ adverse employment action was void in light
of its violation of the Open Meetings Act, we held that there was no demotion, and plaintiff was
reinstated to her supervisor position. Id. at *4. Therefore, we held that because there was no
demotion, plaintiff was not discriminated against “in the hiring, firing, and other terms and
conditions of employment” as provided for in T.C.A. § 8-50-103 (A)(1993).3 Therefore, we
pretermitted consideration of the damage awards for discrimination. Id.
In an opinion filed April 13, 1998, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed our decision
to the extent that we held that Forbes could not recover for handicap discrimination, and held
that “a discriminatory decision made in violation of the Open Meetings Act can serve as the basis
for a discrimination suit even though the decision is later declared void for violating the Open
Meetings Act.” Forbes v. Wilson County Emergency Dist. 911 Bd., No. 01S01-9702-CH-
00026, 1998 WL 166142, *2 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 1998). After addressing several issues
pretermitted by our holding, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to consider the
sole issue of whether the award of $250,000.00 for humiliation and embarrassment was
1 For a more in depth discussion of the facts of this case, see Forbes v. Wilson County Emergency Dist. 911 Bd., No. 01S01-9702-CH-00026, 1998 WL 166142 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 1998). 2 Counsel for Wilson County also orally moved for a remittitur following the trial, but this request was denied. 3 Judge Lillard wrote separately to dissent to this aspect of the decision. Forbes, 1996 WL 518073 at *4-7 (Lillard, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2 excessive. Id. at *4.
When factual determinations made by a jury have been approved by the trial judge, an
appellate court may only set aside these factual findings in the absence of any material evidence
in the record to support the verdict. Jackson v. Patton, 952 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tenn. 1997).
Thus, an appellate court should be “more deferential” to a trial court that approves a jury’s award
of damages as opposed to a trial court that modifies a jury’s damage award. Coffey v. Fayette
Tubular Prods., 9 2 9 S . W . 2 d 3 2 6 , 3 3 1 n . 2 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 6 ) In Ellis v. White Freightliner Corp., 603
S.W.2d 125 (Tenn. 1980), our Supreme Court said:
The trial judge’s approval of a jury verdict invokes the
material evidence rule with respect to all other issues of fact and
we know of no reason why that rule should not have the same
effect when that approval includes the amount of the award. That
action by the trial judge means that he has accredited the
testimony of the witnesses on the issue of damages and has
evaluated the evidence as supporting the amount awarded.
Nevertheless, when the question of remittitur is raised, the Court
of Appeals has the duty to review the proof of damages and the
authority to reduce an excessive award. But when the trial judge
has approved the verdict, the review in the Court of Appeals is
subject to the rule that if there is any material evidence to support
the award, it should not be disturbed.
Id. at 129; see also Coffey, 929 S.W.2d at 331 n.2.
Tennessee’s handicap discrimination statute, T.C.A. § 8-50-103, incorporates the rights
and privileges of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Under this act, a plaintiff may recover
damages for “humiliation and embarrassment.” T.C.A. § 4-21-306 (a)(7) (Supp. 1997). We first
note that under the statute, humiliation and embarrassment is included as an element of
recoverable damages, and the jury in the instant case was specifically instructed to consider this
element separately. In McDowell v. Shoffner Indus. of Tenn., Inc., No. 03A01-9301-CH-
00030, 1993 WL 262846 (Tenn. App. July 13, 1993), this Court discussed the award of such
3 emotional damages under the Human Rights Act with regard to a discharged employee.
Damages for humiliation and embarrassment, if occasioned by the unlawful discharge, may be awarded under the Human Rights Act. The amount is peculiarly within the province of the jury subject to the rule of reasonableness, and necessarily depends on the articulation of personal shame experienced by the discharged plaintiff together with the jury's perception of his sensitivities.
Id. at *4.
T h e p r o o f i n t h e i n s ta n t c a s e d e m o n s tr a t e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f h e r d e m o t i o n , F o r b e s w a s f i f t y - n i n e y e a r s o ld
a n d r e c o v e r i n g f r o m c a n c e r . F o r b e s t e s t if i e d t h a t w h e n s h e w a s n o t i f ie d b y l e t t e r t h a t s h e h a d b e e n d e m o t e d , s h e
e x p e r ie n c e d “ a c o m p le te m e n ta l a n d e m o t io n a l b r e a k d o w n .” S h e a s s e r ts t h a t s h e s u f f e r e d a b r i e f r e l a p s e a n d
i m m e d i a t e l y v i s it e d h e r p h y s i c i a n , w h o t e m p o r a r i l y p r e s c r i b e d m e d i c a t io n .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE ________________________________________________
EDNA FORBES,
Plaintiff-Appellee
Vs. Wilson Chancery No. 9325
WILSON COUNTY EMERGENCY C.A. No. 01A01-9602-CH-00089 COMMUNICATION DISTRICT 911 BOARD and W. J. MCCLUSKEY,
Defendants-Appellants ___________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE WILSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT THE HONORABLE C. K. SMITH, CHANCELLOR
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT
W. Gary Blackburn, Blackburn, Slobey, Freeman & Happell of Nashville, For Appellants
Margaret L. Behm, Anne C. Martin, Dodson Parker & Behm of Nashville, For Appellee
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
Opinion filed:
FILED May 20, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S. CONCURS: ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE
This case, remanded to this Court by the Supreme Court, involves an action brought
pursuant to the Tennessee Open Meetings Act and the Tennessee handicap discrimination statute.
Plaintiff Edna Forbes (Forbes) alleged that Defendant Wilson County Emergency Communication District 911 Board and Defendant W.J. McCluskey violated these statutes by
conducting a secret meeting in which they decided to demote her because of a handicap.1
Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdicts which found
violations of both statutes. Forbes was awarded $65,975.00 in back pay, $38,675.00 in front pay,
$250,000.00 damages for humiliation and embarrassment, $50,000.00 for punitive damages, plus
reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs. The trial court denied the defendants’ Motion for
a New Trial and/or to Alter and Amend.2 The defendants appealed, presenting issues of liability
under both statutes and damages.
In a decision filed September 13, 1996, we held that the defendants violated the Open
Meetings Act, T.C.A. §§ 8-44-101 et seq. (1993 & Supp. 1997). Forbes v. Wilson County
Emergency Communication Dist. 911, No. 01A01-9602-CH-00089, 1996 WL 518073 (Tenn.
App. Sept. 13, 1996). Finding that the defendants’ adverse employment action was void in light
of its violation of the Open Meetings Act, we held that there was no demotion, and plaintiff was
reinstated to her supervisor position. Id. at *4. Therefore, we held that because there was no
demotion, plaintiff was not discriminated against “in the hiring, firing, and other terms and
conditions of employment” as provided for in T.C.A. § 8-50-103 (A)(1993).3 Therefore, we
pretermitted consideration of the damage awards for discrimination. Id.
In an opinion filed April 13, 1998, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed our decision
to the extent that we held that Forbes could not recover for handicap discrimination, and held
that “a discriminatory decision made in violation of the Open Meetings Act can serve as the basis
for a discrimination suit even though the decision is later declared void for violating the Open
Meetings Act.” Forbes v. Wilson County Emergency Dist. 911 Bd., No. 01S01-9702-CH-
00026, 1998 WL 166142, *2 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 1998). After addressing several issues
pretermitted by our holding, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to consider the
sole issue of whether the award of $250,000.00 for humiliation and embarrassment was
1 For a more in depth discussion of the facts of this case, see Forbes v. Wilson County Emergency Dist. 911 Bd., No. 01S01-9702-CH-00026, 1998 WL 166142 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 1998). 2 Counsel for Wilson County also orally moved for a remittitur following the trial, but this request was denied. 3 Judge Lillard wrote separately to dissent to this aspect of the decision. Forbes, 1996 WL 518073 at *4-7 (Lillard, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2 excessive. Id. at *4.
When factual determinations made by a jury have been approved by the trial judge, an
appellate court may only set aside these factual findings in the absence of any material evidence
in the record to support the verdict. Jackson v. Patton, 952 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tenn. 1997).
Thus, an appellate court should be “more deferential” to a trial court that approves a jury’s award
of damages as opposed to a trial court that modifies a jury’s damage award. Coffey v. Fayette
Tubular Prods., 9 2 9 S . W . 2 d 3 2 6 , 3 3 1 n . 2 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 6 ) In Ellis v. White Freightliner Corp., 603
S.W.2d 125 (Tenn. 1980), our Supreme Court said:
The trial judge’s approval of a jury verdict invokes the
material evidence rule with respect to all other issues of fact and
we know of no reason why that rule should not have the same
effect when that approval includes the amount of the award. That
action by the trial judge means that he has accredited the
testimony of the witnesses on the issue of damages and has
evaluated the evidence as supporting the amount awarded.
Nevertheless, when the question of remittitur is raised, the Court
of Appeals has the duty to review the proof of damages and the
authority to reduce an excessive award. But when the trial judge
has approved the verdict, the review in the Court of Appeals is
subject to the rule that if there is any material evidence to support
the award, it should not be disturbed.
Id. at 129; see also Coffey, 929 S.W.2d at 331 n.2.
Tennessee’s handicap discrimination statute, T.C.A. § 8-50-103, incorporates the rights
and privileges of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Under this act, a plaintiff may recover
damages for “humiliation and embarrassment.” T.C.A. § 4-21-306 (a)(7) (Supp. 1997). We first
note that under the statute, humiliation and embarrassment is included as an element of
recoverable damages, and the jury in the instant case was specifically instructed to consider this
element separately. In McDowell v. Shoffner Indus. of Tenn., Inc., No. 03A01-9301-CH-
00030, 1993 WL 262846 (Tenn. App. July 13, 1993), this Court discussed the award of such
3 emotional damages under the Human Rights Act with regard to a discharged employee.
Damages for humiliation and embarrassment, if occasioned by the unlawful discharge, may be awarded under the Human Rights Act. The amount is peculiarly within the province of the jury subject to the rule of reasonableness, and necessarily depends on the articulation of personal shame experienced by the discharged plaintiff together with the jury's perception of his sensitivities.
Id. at *4.
T h e p r o o f i n t h e i n s ta n t c a s e d e m o n s tr a t e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f h e r d e m o t i o n , F o r b e s w a s f i f t y - n i n e y e a r s o ld
a n d r e c o v e r i n g f r o m c a n c e r . F o r b e s t e s t if i e d t h a t w h e n s h e w a s n o t i f ie d b y l e t t e r t h a t s h e h a d b e e n d e m o t e d , s h e
e x p e r ie n c e d “ a c o m p le te m e n ta l a n d e m o t io n a l b r e a k d o w n .” S h e a s s e r ts t h a t s h e s u f f e r e d a b r i e f r e l a p s e a n d
i m m e d i a t e l y v i s it e d h e r p h y s i c i a n , w h o t e m p o r a r i l y p r e s c r i b e d m e d i c a t io n . F o r b e s t e s t if i e d a s f o l lo w s :
W h e n I re c e iv e d th is le tte r [ in d ic a tin g h e r d e m o tio n ], I c o u ld n ’t - - I ju st c o u ld n ’ t b e l i e v e w h a t I h a d r e c e i v e d , a f t e r w o r k i n g a s h a r d a s I h a d a n d th e ty p e o f w o r k I h a d d o n e f o r 9 1 1 , a n d w h a t th e y h a d d o n e to m e .
It c a u s e d m e to - - I c a n ’ t e x p l a in e x a c t ly w h a t y o u r b o d y g o e s t h r o u g h in a s itu a tio n lik e th is . I im m e d ia te ly h a d to g o t o a d o c to r . I w e n t t o t h e d o c to r o n o r a b o u t th re e d ay s . I w a s u n d e r m e d ic a ti o n s o h e a v y th a t I d i d n ’ t h a r d l y k n o w w h e n I w a s h a v in g a m e a l, a n d s o m e tim e s I d id n ’ t e v e n h a v e a m e a l.
I w as jus t m o re o r less o u t. I co u ldn ’t b e lie v e . A n d I g u e ss m y b o d y w a s s till w e a k fr o m th e o th e r s itu a tio n th a t I h a d h a d . T h e n a ll o f th is o n to p o f it r e a lly d i d c a u s e a lo t o f p a in , a lo t o f h e a r ta c h e , a n d I ju s t - - I ’v e n e v e r e x p e r i e n c e d a s i t u a t i o n l ik e t h i s b e f o r e .
F o r b e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e m o t i o n a d v e r s e l y a f f e c te d h e r s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e a n d h e r a b i li ty t o m a k e d e c i s io n s .
I n a d d i t i o n , F o r b e s s ta t e d t h a t s h e h a d d i f fi c u l t y m i n g l in g w i t h f r i e n d s a n d o t h e r s i n t h e c o m m u n i ty , b e c a u s e s h e w a s
c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d a s k h e r a b o u t h e r j o b . F o r b e s te s t i f i e d :
I g o t to th e p o in t th a t I c o u ld n ’ t g o to c h u r c h . I c o u ld ju s t w a lk in a n d w a lk o u t. I w o u ld -- a t o n e tim e , th e fir st tim e I g o t o u t, I re a liz e d th a t I n e e d e d to le a v e th e h o u s e , a n d I w e n t t o K m a r t. A n d w h e n I w e n t t o K m a r t , I c o u l d n ’ t g e t o u t o f c a r [ s i c ] . I h a d t o t u r n a r o u n d a n d c o m e b a c k h o m e . I t’ s s t i l l a f f e c t i n g m e q u i te a b i t .
F o r b e s f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e s u f f e rs f r o m i n s o m n i a e v e r y n i g h t a s a r e s u lt o f h e r d e m o t i o n . T h i s t e s ti m o n y w a s
r e in f o r c e d b y t e s t i m o n y o f F o r b e s ’ s d a u g h t e r , C i n d y B r o w n , w h o a l s o s t a t e d t h a t F o r b e s “ w o u l d h a r d l y d r e s s o r g o
o u t s id e ” a f t e r h e r d e m o t i o n . B r o w n a l s o te s t i f i e d :
S h e ju s t w a s n ’ t th e s a m e . Y o u k n o w , s h e a lw a y s lik e d to c o o k a n d g o o u t a n d w o r k w i t h h e r f l o w e r s a n d t h i n g s l ik e t h a t . A n d s h e j u s t s a t a r o u n d j u s t l i k e r e a l - - s h e ju s t d id n ’t k n o w w h a t to th in k , I th in k .
O t h e r w i t n e s s e s e m p l o y e d b y E - 9 1 1 t e s t i f ie d t h a t t h e y w e r e “ s h o c k e d ” w h e n t h e y h e a r d t h a t F o r b e s h a d b e e n d e m o t e d ,
b u t th e y d id n o t d e s c rib e F o r b e s ’ s re a c tio n .
T h e d e f e n d a n ts c o n t e n d th a t t h e ju r y ’ s a w a r d o f $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 f o r h u m i l i a t i o n a n d e m b a r r a s s m e n t i s e x c e s s i v e ,
4 s in c e F o r b e s d id n o t o f f e r a n y e v id e n c e f r o m a p s y c h i a t r i s t o r p s y c h o l o g i s t r e g a r d i n g h e r a l l e g e d e m o t i o n a l i n j u r y . T h e
d e f e n d a n ts a s s e r t t h a t F o r b e s d i d n o t a l l e g e t h a t s h e w a s p r e s c r i b e d a n y l o n g - te r m m e d i c a t i o n a n d t h a t s h e f a i l e d t o
d e m o n s t r a te t h a t h e r l i f e a c t i v i t i e s w e r e c u r t a i l e d b e y o n d a s h o r t p e r i o d o f t i m e . T h u s , t h e d e f e n d a n ts c l a i m t h a t t h e
v e r d ic t c a n o n ly b e e x p la in e d b y th e ju r y ’s sy m p a th y a n d p r e ju d i c e .
T h e d e f e n d a n t s c i t e Campbell v. Rust Eng’g Co., N o . 9 0 - 5 6 7 9 , 1 9 9 1 W L 2 7 4 2 3 ( 6 t h C i r . M a r . 5 , 1 9 9 1 ) .
I n Campbell, a l a i d - o f f e m p l o y e e b r o u g h t a c l a i m a g a i n s t h i s e m p l o y e r p u r s u a n t t o t h e A g e D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n
E m p l o y m e n t A c t , 2 9 U . S . C . § § 6 2 1 et seq., a n d t h e T e n n e s s e e H u m a n R i g h t s A c t . A m o n g o t h e r i s s u e s , t h e d e f e n d a n t
a p p e a l e d t h e m a g i s t r a te ’ s f a il u r e t o r e d u c e t h e j u r y ’ s a w a r d o f $ 6 8 , 8 9 7 . 0 0 f o r th e p l a in t i f f ’ s e m b a r r a s s m e n t a n d
h u m i l i a t i o n u n d e r t h e H u m a n R i g h t s A c t . A l t h o u g h t h e d e c i s i o n d o e s n o t d i s c u s s a t - le n g t h t h e p l a in t i f f ’ s e m o t i o n a l
d a m a g e s a s a r e s u l t o f h i s l a y o f f , i t m e n t i o n s t h a t “ [ t] h e e v i d e n c e u s e d t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ’ s a w a r d i s p la i n t i f f ’ s te s t i m o n y
t h a t t h e la y o f f ‘ h u r t m e q u i t e a b it ’ a n d t h a t h e w a s e m b a r r a s s e d w h e n e v e r h e s a w R u s t e m p l o y e e s w i t h w h o m h e h a d
f o r m e r l y w o r k e d . ” Id. a t * 5 . T h e S i x t h C i r c u i t n o t e d t h a t :
P l a i n t if f s u ff e r e d n o a g g ra v a t e d i n j u r i e s a s a r e s u l t o f h i s l a y o f f . R a t h e r , t h e i n j u r i e s h e s u s ta i n e d w e r e m e r e l y t h o s e n o r m a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l o s i n g a j o b , i . e . , o v e ra ll d is a p p o in tm e n t a b o u t n o t b e in g e m p lo y e d .
Id. a t * 6 . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e C o u r t r e m a n d e d t h e c a s e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o r e d u c e t h e a w a r d t o
$ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 .
I n Harris v. Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn., N o . 0 1 A 0 1 - 9 6 0 9 - C H - 0 0 4 4 4 , 1 9 9 7 W L 2 7 3 9 5 3
( T e n n . A p p . M a y 2 3 , 1 9 9 7 ) , a d i s c h a r g e d e m p l o y e e b r o u g h t s u it a g a in s t h i s f o r m e r e m p l o y e r p u r s u a n t t o t h e H u m a n
R i g h t s A c t , a l l e g i n g t h a t h e w a s d i s c r im i n a t e d a g a i n s t b e c a u s e o f h i s a g e . T h e j u r y e n t e r e d a g e n e r a l v e r d i c t a g a in s t t h e
d e f e n d a n ts a n d a w a r d e d th e p la in t i f f $ 3 0 4 , 2 5 4 . 0 0 , w h i c h a t t r i b u t e d $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 . 0 0 t o t h e p la in t i f f ’ s h u m i l i a ti o n a n d
e m b a r r a s s m e n t i n j u r i e s . 4 Id. a t * 1 , * 3 . C i t i n g Campbell, supra, t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r g u e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s
r e q u i r e d t o “ p r o v e m o r e t h a n t h e h u m i l i a t i o n a n d e m b a r r a s s m e n t t y p i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l o s i n g a j o b . ” Id. a t * 2 . T h e
C o u r t , h o w e v e r , o p i n e d t h a t “ w e s e e n o i n d i c a ti o n t h a t t h e l e g i s la t u r e in t e n d e d t o r e s t r i c t r e c o v e r i e s f o r h u m i l i a ti o n a n d
e m b a r r a s s m e n t b y r e q u i r i n g c o r r o b o r a t i o n o r b y r e q u i r i n g a h i g h e r d e g r e e o f p r o o f . ” Id.
T h e o n l y t e s t i m o n y o f f e r e d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f i n Harris r e g a r d i n g h i s h u m i l i a t i o n a n d e m b a r r a s s m e n t i n j u r i e s
w a s a s f o l lo w s :
Q u e s t i o n b y M r . R a y [ c o u n s e l f o r p l a i n t i f f ] : N o w a f te r y o u r te r m i n a t i o n w h a t w a s
4 Although the verdict did not expressly delineate that $100,000.00 was attributable to the plaintiff’s humiliation and embarrassment injuries, this was deduced from the fact that expert testimony demonstrated that the plaintiff was owed $204,254.00 for lost wages and benefits. Id. at *3.
5 y o u r sta te o f m in d lik e M r. H a rr is [ p la in tiff] ? W h a t w a s y o u r p sy c h o lo g ic a l w e ll- b e i n g l ik e ?
A n s w e r : W e ll, p r o b a b ly o n e o f t h e s c a r i e s t p o s it i o n s I h a v e e v e r b e e n i n b e c a u s e I o w e d a lo t o f m o n ey o n m y d e v e lo p m e n t i n t h e s u b d i v i s io n . I d i d n 't h a v e a n y in c o m e a n d i t w a s p re tty h u m ilia tin g t o b e th e a g e t h a t I w a s a n d to s u d d e n ly f in d o u t y o u n o lo n g e r h ave a jo b .
Q u e s ti o n b y M r . R a y : D i d y o u h a v e a p r o b l e m s le e p i n g ? A n s w e r : W e l l , I d i d n 't h a v e a p r o b l e m s le e p in g t o t h e b e s t I r e m e m b e r , b u t I h a d p r o b l e m s - - y o u k n o w , i t 's a l i t t l e e m b a r r a s s in g t o g e t o u t i n p u b l i c a n d p e o p l e t h i n k y o u 'r e s t i l l a t t h e b a n k a n d y o u 'r e n o t.
Q u e s t io n b y M r . R a y : D i d y o u h a v e to t e ll p e o p le , " I 'v e b e e n t e r m i n a te d , I n o lo n g e r h a v e a jo b " ?
A n s w e r : T h a t 's tr u e .
Q u e s ti o n b y M r . R a y : H o w d i d t h a t m a k e y o u f e e l?
A n s w e r : I t d o n 't m a k e y o u f e e l g o o d .
Id. a t * 4 . F i n d i n g t h a t t h e a w a r d o f $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 f o r t h e s e i n j u r i e s w a s “ c l e a r l y e x c e s s i v e , ” t h e C o u r t s u g g e s t e d a r e m i t t i t u r
t o $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . Id. C i t i n g Campbell, supra, t h e C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f “ d i d n o t s u f f e r a n y a g g r a v a t e d i n j u r i e s ;
t h e d i s c o m f o r t h e f e l t w a s t h e s a m e a n y o n e w o u l d f e e l o v e r l o s i n g a j o b . ” Id.
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , it is u n c o n t r o v e r t e d t h a t F o r b e s o f f e r e d p r o o f d e m o n s t r a ti n g t h a t s h e s u f f e r e d s o m e d a m a g e s
a s a r e s u l t o f h e r h u m i l i a t i o n a n d e m b a r r a s s m e n t . A s i n Campbell a n d Harris, F o r b e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e a d v e r s e
e m p l o y m e n t a c t i o n e m o t i o n a l l y s c a r r e d h e r . See Campbell, supra, a t * 5 ; Harris, supra, a t * 4 . A l s o , a s i n t h e s e
c a s e s , F o r b e s c l a i m e d t h a t s h e w a s s o c i a l l y e m b a r r a s s e d b y t h e a d v e r s e e m p l o y m e n t a c t i o n . See id. a t * 4 ;
Campbell, supra, a t * 5 .
U n l i k e t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n Campbell a n d Harris, F o r b e s w a s m e r e l y d e m o t e d a s o p p o s e d t o t e r m i n a t e d .
H o w e v e r , F o r b e s ,w h o w a s d is c rim in a te d a g a i n s t b a s e d o n d is a b ility a s o p p o s e d to a g e , w a s r e c o v e r in g f r o m c a n c e r a n d ,
t h u s , w o u l d l i k e l y b e m o r e p r o n e t o e m o t i o n a l i n j u r i e s d u e t o h e r u n i q u e s e n s i t i v i t i e s . See McDowell, supra, a t
* 4 . U n l i k e t h e p l a in t i f f s i n t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d c a s e s , F o r b e s t e s t i f ie d t h a t s h e s u f f e r e d f r o m a r e l a p s e a n d w a s
p r e s c r ib e d m e d i c a t i o n a s a r e s u l t o f h e r d e m o t i o n a n d t h a t s h e s u f f e r s f r o m i n s o m n i a . F o r b e s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , d i d n o t
p r o f f e r e v i d e n c e t h a t s h e w a s r e c e i v i n g a n y l o n g - te r m t r e a t m e n t f r o m p r o fe s sio n a l s f o r h e r h u m ilia tio n a n d
em b arra ssm en t, n o r d id s h e d es crib e m an y p articu lar in stan ce s o f d isco m fo rt.
A l t h o u g h w e b e l i e v e t h a t m a t e r ia l e v i d e n c e e x i s t s b y w h i c h t h e j u r y c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t F o r b e s s u f f e r e d f r o m
h u m i l i a t i o n a n d e m b a r r a s s m e n t , w e f in d t h a t n o m a t e r ia l e v i d e n c e e x i s ts t o s u p p o r t a n a w a r d o f $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 f o r th e s e
i n j u r i e s . Ellis, 6 0 3 S . W . 2 d a t 1 2 9 .
A f t e r a t h o r o u g h r e v ie w o f th e r e c o r d , w e s u g g e s t a r e m i t t i t u r o f $ 1 7 5 , 0 0 0 .0 0 f o r F o r b e s ’s h u m i l i a t i o n a n d
6 e m b a rr a s s m e n t d a m a g e s, a n d th e ju d g m e n t is re d u c e d to $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 .0 0 . A s o r d e r e d b y t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t, th e c a s e is
r e m a n d e d t o t h e t r ia l c o u r t f o r s u c h f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s a s m a y b e n e c e s s a r y in c l u d i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a n a w a r d o f
a t to r n e y ’ s f e e s o n a p p e a l . C o s t s o f t h e a p p e a l a r e a s s e s s e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s .
_________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
____________________________________ ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
____________________________________ HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE