Fontenot v. Soileau
This text of 336 So. 2d 1006 (Fontenot v. Soileau) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Clarence FONTENOT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Donald SOILEAU, Defendant-Appellee.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
*1007 White & Pitre by Joshua J. Pitre, Opelousas, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Donald Soileau, Mamou, for defendant-appellee.
Before DOMENGEAUX, GUIDRY and BERTRAND, JJ.
BERTRAND, Judge.
This is a suit for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff's minor son when he fell from or was thrown from a horse owned by defendant. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm.
The allegations set forth in the petition are summarized as follows: that on November 14, 1974, plaintiff's minor son, Mitchell Fontenot, was employed by defendant to exercise his horses and do other odd jobs; that while Mitchell was riding defendant's horse, it began to buck and became uncontrollable, throwing Mitchell to the ground, causing him very severe injuries; that defendant knew of the dangerous propensities of this particular animal, yet failed to warn and advise Mitchell of these propensities, but instead had [sic] him to believe that the animal was gentle. Defendant contends that the deposition of Mitchell Fontenot shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Mitchell's father filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment stating that the defendant did know that the horse which caused Mitchell's injuries had vicious and uncontrollable propensities and that the same was never revealed to Mitchell. Furthermore, in his affidavit, Clarence Fontenot stated for the first time that, as owner of the horse which caused Mitchell's injuries, defendant is strictly liable for the damages caused by his horse. Therefore, the two issues to be resolved are (1) whether defendant is strictly liable to plaintiff for his injuries, and (2) whether defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately caused Mitchell's injuries.
I. STRICT LIABILITY
Plaintiff contends that the present case is governed by the holding in Holland v. Buckley, 305 So.2d 113 (La.1974). The *1008 Supreme Court summarized its holding therein as follows:
"We hold, therefore, that the correct interpretation of Civil Code Article 2321 is as follows: When a domesticated animal harms another, the master of the animal is presumed to be at fault. The fault so provided is in the nature of strict liability, as an exception to or in addition to any ground of recovery on the basis of negligence, Article 2316. The owner may exculpate himself from such presumed fault only by showing that the harm was caused by the fault of the victim, by the fault of a third person for whom he is not responsible, or by a fortuitous event."
We agree with the trial court that Holland is distinguishable from the present case. As stated by the court in Holland:
"The underlying reason for the owner's liability is that, as between him who created the risk of harm and the innocent victim thereby injured, the risk-creator should bear the loss. He maintains the animal for his own use or pleasure."
In Holland, the victim of the dog-bite was an innocent bystander. In the instant case, plaintiff was paid to do a job which encompassed the precise risk of harm that befell him, i.e., being thrown from a horse. The deposition of Mitchell, the person in the best position to know, supports the conclusion that nothing unusual happened to cause the horse to behave as he did, and that such behavior can be expected from horses when they want to run and are held back by the rider. The deposition further establishes that Mitchell had exercised race horses at a track for three (3) months prior to working for defendant, and had been working with defendant's horses for three (3) months prior to the accident. Under the facts of this case, Mitchell, an experienced rider who was used to working with race horses, was more a consenting victim than an innocent victim.
The following quotation from Holland, supra, presents a further ground of distinction:
"Article 2321 places the master of the animal under a legal obligation to keep his animal under such guard that it does no damage to others. A fault in this obligation to control the animal and guard others from harm by it entitles the victim to recover damages thereby sustained."
This rule of law is inapplicable to the instant case. Here, the horse was under the care, custody and control of the "victim," Mitchell, and not the defendant-owner. What occurred was a natural and ordinary risk of his employment as is evident from Mitchell's own testimony. Nothing to the contrary was even suggested by way of opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
II. NEGLIGENCE
Holland v. Buckley, supra, states that the owner's liability under Article 2321 is, "as an exception to or in addition to any ground of recovery on the basis of negligence, Article 2316." This article provides that, "Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill." A comprehensive summary of the decisions wherein the fault or negligence of the owner was at issue is contained in the case of Holland v. Buckley, supra. In Holland, Justice Tate noted that these decisions fall into three main categories: (1) those which allow the victim to recover from the animal owner upon proof of the dangerous propensites of the animal and the owner's presumed knowledge thereof; (2) those which hold that the harm caused by the animal creates a presumption of fault on the part of its owner, which places a burden upon the owner to show that he is free from even the slightest fault; and (3) those which hold that, in order to recover damages caused him by the accident, the victim has the burden of proving both the existence of a dangerous propensity of the animal inflicting the injury and also knowledge of such propensity on the part of the owner.
We realize that the cases cited as illustrative of these categories were overruled in Holland, but it is our understanding *1009 that these cases were overruled only insofar as they represent incorrect judicial interpretations of Civil Code Article 2321. Apparently, they are still viable at least for the purpose of providing guidelines for the determination of whether a defendant is negligent under Article 2316.
After reading the deposition offered in support of the motion for summary judgment, we are convinced that the plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant is guilty of any fault whatsoever. In his deposition, Mitchell Fontenot stated that he had been riding horses for about five (5) years (since he was about twelve years old) and began riding horses for pay when he was sixteen (16) years old. His first employment was at Evangeline Downs where he worked as an exercise boy. His answers to the deposition questions show that he knew how to handle horses and was aware that race horses are more spirited and move more quickly than other horses. After three (3) months at Evangeline Downs, Mitchell went to work for the defendant, who owned several racing quarter horses. He had worked for the defendant for three (3) months before he fell from the horse.
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336 So. 2d 1006, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fontenot-v-soileau-lactapp-1976.