Fontanez v. Vought

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 10, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-4539
StatusPublished

This text of Fontanez v. Vought (Fontanez v. Vought) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fontanez v. Vought, (D.D.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FERNANDO FONTANEZ,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 25 - 4539 (UNA)

RUSSELL VOUGHT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Fernando Fontanez brings this action against Office of

Management and Budget Director Russel Vought. ECF No. 1. He has also filed a supplement to

his complaint and additional documents, ECF Nos. 5, 7, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis,

ECF No. 2, a motion for a CM/ECF password, ECF No. 3, and a motion to appoint counsel, ECF

No. 4. The court will grant Mr. Fontanez’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss his

complaint and this case without prejudice, and deny his remaining motions as moot.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally presumed that “a cause

lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, “a district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte prior to service

on the defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) when, as here, it is evident that the court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Evans v. Suter, No. 09-5242, 2010 WL 1632902, at *1

(D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010) (per curiam); see Page v. Trump, No. 24-CV-670, 2024 WL 3534752,

at *1 (D.D.C. July 25, 2024); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time

that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). “A dispute does not fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts unless it qualifies as a ‘case’ or

‘controversy’ within the meaning of article III, and it cannot so qualify unless the plaintiff has

suffered ‘injury in fact.’” Ananiev v. Freitas, 37 F. Supp. 3d 297, 305 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting

Nat’l Ass’n of Recycling Indus., Inc. v. Sec’y of Com., 494 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D.D.C. 1980)).

Article III standing is comprised of three elements: “(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an

‘injury in fact’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical’; (2) there must exist ‘a causal connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of’; and (3) it must be ‘likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.’” Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 991-92 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

Plaintiffs’ complaint expresses a variety of concerns about the United States’ political and

economic affairs, including the United States’ national debt and nuclear war. ECF No. 1, at 1. But

he fails to allege that Defendant Vought’s conduct injures him in particular. A plaintiff “must

demonstrate ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’” to have Article III standing.

Hall v. D.C. Bd. of Elections, 141 F.4th 200, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 585

U.S. 48, 65 (2018)). “Absent any allegations to suggest [Mr. Fontanez] ha[s] some ‘particularized

stake in the litigation,’ this suit presents ‘precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized

grievance’ . . . that federal courts may not hear.” Davis v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. 25-CV-1895,

2025 WL 1743940, at *1 (D.D.C. June 24, 2025) (quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442

(2007)). Instead, a “general interest common to all members of the public” is properly resolved

through the political process rather than the judicial process. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575 (quoting Ex

parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)). Because Mr. Fontanez has failed to

demonstrate that he has suffered an “actual or imminent” injury that is “concrete and

2 particularized” to him, this court must dismiss his case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

pursuant.

The court will accordingly grant Mr. Fontanez’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF

No. 2, and dismiss his complaint, ECF No. 1, and the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The court will also deny as moot his motions for CM/ECF password, ECF No. 3, and to appoint

counsel, ECF No. 4. A contemporaneous order will issue.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: February 9, 2026

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Related

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Lance v. Coffman
549 U.S. 437 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ananiev v. Freitas
37 F. Supp. 3d 297 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Friends of Animals v. Sally Jewell
828 F.3d 989 (D.C. Circuit, 2016)
Gill v. Whitford
585 U.S. 48 (Supreme Court, 2018)
National Ass'n of Recycling Industries v. Secretary of Commerce
494 F. Supp. 158 (District of Columbia, 1980)

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Fontanez v. Vought, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fontanez-v-vought-dcd-2026.