Foncham v. Gonzales

Fifth Circuit

Foncham v. Gonzales

224 F. App'x 358

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedApril 2, 2007

Docket06-60436

StatusUnpublished

This text of 224 F. App'x 358 (Foncham v. Gonzales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Foncham v. Gonzales, 224 F. App'x 358 (5th Cir. 2007).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Cameroonian citizen Jenneth Tifuh Foncham petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Foncham contends that the IJ should have deemed her motion unopposed and granted it; that she was in substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988); that application of the Lozada requirements to her case violates due process; and that application of the Lozada requirements violates equal protection by impeding her fundamental right to counsel by placing her in a disadvantageous position vis a vis aliens who are represented by accredited representatives.

The IJ was not required to grant Foncham’s unopposed motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(l)(iv). Foncham has failed to brief the issue whether she can make a prima facie showing that she would have obtained asylum or withholding of deportation but for the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. She therefore has failed to show the prejudice required to succeed on her due process claims. See Miranda-Lores v. INS, 17 F.3d 84, 85 (5th Cir.1994); Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987). Finally, Foncham has failed to show that requiring aliens who are represented by counsel to file complaints with the relevant disciplinary authorities singles out a particular group for discriminatory treatment or impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right. See Hatten v. Rains, 854 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir.1988); Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir.1988).

PETITION DENIED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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PER CURIAM: *

Cameroonian citizen Jenneth Tifuh Foncham petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Foncham contends that the IJ should have deemed her motion unopposed and granted it; that she was in substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988); that application of the Lozada requirements to her case violates due process; and that application of the Lozada requirements violates equal protection by impeding her fundamental right to counsel by placing her in a disadvantageous position vis a vis aliens who are represented by accredited representatives.

The IJ was not required to grant Foncham’s unopposed motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(l)(iv). Foncham has failed to brief the issue whether she can make a prima facie showing that she would have obtained asylum or withholding of deportation but for the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. She therefore has failed to show the prejudice required to succeed on her due process claims. See Miranda-Lores v. INS, 17 F.3d 84, 85 (5th Cir.1994); Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987). Finally, Foncham has failed to show that requiring aliens who are represented by counsel to file complaints with the relevant disciplinary authorities singles out a particular group for discriminatory treatment or impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right. See Hatten v. Rains, 854 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir.1988); Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir.1988).

PETITION DENIED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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224 F. App'x 358, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foncham-v-gonzales-ca5-2007.

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