Foltz, H. v. Foltz, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 17, 2024
• Docket: 304 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S33019-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

HAZEL M. FOLTZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JAMES H. FOLTZ : No. 304 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered January 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-44-SPA-45-2023, PACSES No. 104302030

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 17, 2024

Hazel M. Foltz (Wife) appeals the order issued by the Mifflin County

Court of Common Pleas, which established the obligation of James H. Foltz

(Husband) to pay spousal support. Wife argues that the trial court should

have deviated from the basic guideline amount to increase the amount of the

support award. After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant factual and procedural background is as follows. Husband

and Wife have been married for nearly 60 years. They are now separated,

although no divorce proceedings have been initiated. Wife lives in the marital

home, while Husband lives in a VA long-term care facility. Wife filed for

spousal support. Wife’s only means of income was social security ($1,240);

Husband received social security and retirement income ($3,430.96).

Following a support conference, it was recommended Husband pay Wife J-S33019-24

$636.22 per month in support (plus arrears), pursuant to the statutory

guidelines, which left Wife with a total monthly net income of $1,876.22.

Wife requested a de novo hearing before the trial court. She argued

that Husband’s support obligation should be deviated upward for two reasons.

First, Wife maintained that a deviation under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b) was

appropriate, because she should be treated like “a community spouse” under

the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, which would have entitled her to

$2,465 per month as a “Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance”

(MMMNA). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d);(h).

Alternatively, Wife argued that a personal loan should have been

considered as a part of a mortgage deviation under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e).

After the hearing, trial court took the matter under advisement. On January

26, 2024, the trial court denied Wife’s request, determining that she was not

entitled to any deviation.

Wife timely filed this appeal. She presents the same two issues for our

review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in deviating from the support guidelines in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1910- 16.5(b) by failing to consider the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance for a community spouse where the obligor spouse is in a long-term care facility.

2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to deviate from the support guidelines, or consider [the Rules of Procedure considering mortgage deviation].

Wife’s Brief at 4.

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We review support awards for an abuse of discretion. See Hanrahan

v. Bakker, 186 A.3d 958, 966 (Pa. 2018).

When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse the trial court's determination where the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.

Silver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (citations

omitted).

In Pennsylvania, spousal support awards are calculated in accordance

with specific statutory guidelines. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(a); see also

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1. The guidelines ensure that similarly situated persons

are treated similarly. § 4322(a). The guidelines are based on the reasonable

needs of the spouse seeking support and the ability of the obligor to provide

support. Id. The emphasis is on the parties’ net incomes, with allowable

deviations for unusual needs, extraordinary expenses and other factors that

warrant special attention. Id. There is a rebuttable presumption that the

amount of the award resulting from the application of the guidelines is the

correct amount. § 4322(b).

Should the trier-of-fact deviate from the basic guideline amount, the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure set forth certain factors which must be

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considered: “(1) unusual needs and unusual fixed obligations; (2) a party’s

other support obligations; (3) other household income; (4) the child's age [(in

matters pertaining to child support deviation)]; (5) the parties’ relative assets

and liabilities; (6) medical expenses not covered by insurance; (7) the parties’

and the child’s standard of living [(regarding child support)]; (8) in a spousal

support or alimony pendente lite case, the duration of the marriage from the

date of marriage to the date of final separation; and (9) other relevant and

appropriate factors[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b) (“Support Guidelines.

Deviation”).

Wife does not contest the trial court’s calculation of the basic guideline

amount. Rather, Wife claims the trial court should have deviated upward from

the basic guideline amount, as permitted by the Rules. She maintains

deviation was appropriate for two reasons. We address each in turn.

In her first appellate issue, Wife presents a novel argument. She

analogizes her and Husband’s situation to those spouses receiving Medicaid

Long Term Care (LTC) benefits. Under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage

Act, if one spouse enters a nursing facility (deemed the “institutionalized

spouse”), then the other spouse (deemed the “community spouse”) might be

entitled to a Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance (or “MMMNA”).

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(h). The MMMNA reflects a “legislative judgment that

a [community spouse] should have a basic monthly income to cover housing

and the costs associated with housing, with an additional amount to ensure

that the [community spouse] can afford other necessities of life, such as food

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and clothing.” See Kuznick v. Department of Public Welfare, 5 A.3d 832,

833 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-5(d)(3) and 55 Pa.

Code § 181.452(d)). Put another way, the MMMNA shields the community

spouse from the necessary spenddown of a couple’s financial resources when

the other spouse enters a nursing home.

Wife argues that the trial court should have deviated from the basic

support amount to treat her as if she were a community spouse, even though

Husband does not receive Medicaid LTC benefits. Put in raw numbers, Wife

proposes that an upward deviation ($588.78) be added to recommended

support award ($636.22), which when combined with her social security

income ($1,240), would leave her with the equivalent of an MMMNA ($2,465).

Wife cites no direct authority to support her argument, and we have

discovered none. By way of analogy, however, she offers our decision in Love

v. Love, 33 A.3d 1268 (Pa. Super. 2011).

In Love, the trial court issued an order obligating the husband to pay

spousal and child support to the wife. The wife was an immigrant, and as

such, the husband had previously executed an affidavit of support pursuant

to the Immigration and Nationality Act. The affidavit required the husband to

sponsor the wife by providing her with a minimum level of financial support

(equal to 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines). This level of financial

support was higher than the basic guideline amount of support ordered by the

trial court. The wife argued the trial court erred, because it did not deviate

from the spousal support guideline amount, leaving her short of what the

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husband agreed to pay under the immigration sponsorship affidavit. See

generally Love, 33 A.3d at 1271-73.

Love concerned several important issues, which are not analogous to

the case before us. Notably, we explained that the husband’s sponsorship

affidavit (i.e., his promise of support) was a contractual obligation. Id. at

1273. This obligation was independent of spousal support and would survive

divorce; the obligation was enforceable by wife, the federal government, any

state government, and any governmental agency. Id. We then had to decide

whether the wife could enforce the contractual obligation via our state support

system, or whether she had to seek a separate civil remedy, either in the state

or federal court. See id.; see also Nicholson v. Combs, 703 A.2d 407 (Pa.

1997); but see Love, at 1280-81 (Freedberg, J., Dissenting). Ultimately, we

concluded the trial court had to enforce the husband’s contract to pay the

agreed upon amount, as part of the support action. Id. at 1273.

Relevant here, we held that the trial court should have used the

deviation factors under Rule 1910.16-5(b) to enforce the husband’s

contractual obligation, per the sponsorship affidavit. Id. The trial court “could

have, but failed to, utilize Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b)(1) and (9) to enforce the

affidavit as an allowable deviation from the support guidelines.” Id. at 1275.

As noted above, Rule 1910.16-5(b)(1) pertains to the “unusual needs and

unusual fixed obligations;” (b)(9) includes “other relevant and appropriate

factors.” Thus, we agreed with the wife that a deviation was appropriate

based on the husband’s “uncontested commitment to support her at a

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minimum amount equal to 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines [(as

set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act)].” Id. We found this

agreement was “tantamount to an exceptional circumstance that would

warrant a deviation from the guideline amount.” Id.

Returning to the instant case, Wife argues Love is on point. She

maintains that the trial court had to bring her support award up to the MMMNA

level, just as the trial court in Love had to bring the wife’s support award up

to the level set forth by the husband’s affidavit of sponsorship under the

Immigration and Nationality Act. In both cases, Wife argues, the lynchpin was

Rule 1910.16-5(b).

Wife’s reliance on Love is logical, but in the end unavailing. Critically,

the trial court in Love had no choice but to deviate from the guideline support

amount to enforce the husband’s contractual obligation. Rule 1910.16-5(b)

(the deviation factors) was simply the mechanism that enabled the trial court

to adjust the award.

Here, by contrast, the trial court retained its discretion. There is no

analogous entitlement or contractual obligation mandating the court’s

enforcement. Husband does not receive Medicaid LTC benefits and Wife is not

entitled to an MMMNA. This fact disposes of Wife’s claim.1

____________________________________________

1 We do not reach the question, whether a trial court must utilize the state

support system to enforce an MMMNA entitlement, in the same manner that the Love trial court was required to enforce an immigration sponsorship entitlement.

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Notably, the trial court could have employed Rule 1910.16-5(b) to bring

Wife’s award up to the same level as an MMMNA by considering Husband’s

circumstances and their effect on the parties’ finances. Rule 1910.16-5(b)

provides several applicable factors, to say nothing of the catchall “other

relevant and appropriate factors” enumerated in (b)(9). Unlike in Love, here

the trial court had discretion to determine whether Wife rebutted the

presumption that guideline amount was correct and grant an upward deviation

based on these factors. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5 – 2005 Comment; cf. 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(b). The court considered Wife’s request, but ultimately

determined that no deviation was appropriate. Upon review, nothing in the

record indicates the trial court “overrode or misapplied the law,” or exercised

judgment that was “either manifestly unreasonable or the product of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” See Silver, 981 A.2d at 291. Wife’s first

issue merits no relief.

In her next appellate issue, Wife presents an alternative reason to

support her claim for an upward deviation. Wife argues that a personal loan

she took out for roof repairs should have qualified for the “mortgage

deviation.” To explain, the guidelines assume that the spouse occupying the

marital residence will be solely responsible for the mortgage payment, real

estate taxes, and homeowners’ insurance. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e).

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 1910.16-6(e)(1), the court may require the

obligor (here, Husband) to pay an additional amount, if: the obligee (here,

Wife) is living in the marital residence; and the mortgage payment exceeds

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25% of the obligee’s monthly net income (including spousal support). In such

a circumstance, the court may require the obligor to pay up to half of the

excess.

Importantly, Rule 1910.16-6(e)(4) defines “mortgage” as “a first

mortgage, real estate taxes, and homeowners’ insurance and may include a

subsequent mortgage, a home equity loan, and other marital obligations

secured by the marital residence.” (Emphasis added).

In this case, the parties’ mortgage did not quite meet the 25%

threshold. The mortgage payment was $446.81; Wife’s monthly net income,

including the guideline support award, was $1,876.22; thus, the mortgage

payment constituted 23.81% of Wife’s income, just shy of the 25% threshold.

However, Wife argued to the trial court that if her personal loan payment

was added to the mortgage payment, as permitted by Rule 1910.16-6(e)(4),

then the combined encumbrance would equate 35.37%, well over the 25%

threshold.2 Wife maintained that her the personal loan should have been

considered under the Rule 1910.16-6(e)(4) definition of a mortgage, because

it was related to the house (i.e., roof “weatherization.”).3 If considered, then

pursuant to Rule 1910.16-6(e)(1), Wife would have been entitled to a

2 $446.81 (monthly mortgage payment) + $216.89 (monthly payment on Wife’s personal loan) = $663.70 ÷ $1,876.22 (Wife’s total monthly net income, including the guideline award) = 35.37%.

3 It is unclear whether Wife’s personal loan was a home equity loan. It does not matter. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e)(4).

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mortgage deviation – i.e., up to half of the excess: $97.28.4 All told, Wife’s

maximum deviation would have increased her guideline support award from

$636.22 to $733.50.5 The trial court denied Wife’s request for a mortgage

deviation.

On appeal, Wife claims that the trial court’s opinion did not adequately

address her request. She asks that this Court remand and direct the court to

consider and then opine whether such a deviation was appropriate. See Wife’s

Brief at 10-11. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure, “the judge

who entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for

the order do not already appear of record, shall…file of record at least a brief

opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other errors

complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record where such

reasons may be found.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Here, the trial court issued a statement in lieu of an opinion upon the

filing of Wife’s concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. Therein,

the court stated, after review of Wife’s alleged errors, it believed that the

explanation in its order satisfied the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). ____________________________________________

4 The total excess is 10.37%, or $194.56.

35.37% (combined encumbrance relative to Wife’s total monthly net income) - 25% (threshold percentage) = 10.37% (excess percentage) X $1,876.22 (Wife’s total monthly net income) = $194.56 (raw excess dollars) X 50% (statutory maximum percentage) = $97.28 (statutory maximum Rule 1910.16-6(e) deviation).

5 $636.22 (guideline award) + $97.28 (maximum Rule 1910.16-6(e) deviation) = $733.50.

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Although a more thorough explanation of its decision would have been

welcomed, we find the trial court’s statement and order satisfied Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a). The order indicated that the court did consider the Wife’s

mortgage/loan claim vis-à-vis Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e). The statement in lieu

of an opinion further indicated that the court reviewed Wife’s appellate issues

and concluded they were meritless. Upon review of the transcript of the

proceeding, we observe that the mortgage issue was put squarely before the

court. The court then took the matter under advisement. Simply put, there

is nothing to suggest the court failed to consider Wife’s argument. No remand

is necessary.

To the extent that Wife preserved the substantive claim – namely,

whether the trial court erred when it refused to include a mortgage deviation

– we hold that the court acted within its discretion. Rule 1910.16-6(e) states

clearly the court “may include a subsequent mortgage, home equity loan, and

other marital obligations secured by the marital residence.” (Emphasis

added). The 2005 Comment to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e) clarifies: “While real

estate taxes and homeowners' insurance must be included if the trier-of-fact

applies the provisions of this subdivision, the inclusion of second mortgages,

home equity loans and other obligations secured by the marital residence is

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within the trier-of-fact's discretion based upon the circumstances of the

case.” (Emphasis added).6

Nothing required the trial court to include Wife’s personal loan when

determining whether she qualified for a mortgage deviation. Wife does not

convince us the court abused its discretion for failing to grant her request for

an upward deviation based upon this loan. Upon review of the facts of record,

we cannot hold that the court’s decision was “manifestly unreasonable.” We

discern no “misapplication of law” or “bias, ill-will or prejudice.” See Silver,

supra. Wife’s second issue merits no relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/17/2024

6 Moreover, we have long held that the use of the term “may” denotes the

discretionary options of the trial court. See Raymond v. Raymond, 279 A.3d 620, 629 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing In re Slaughter, 738 A.2d 1013 (Pa. Super. 1999) and 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921).

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