Folks v. Ellison

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedJanuary 28, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00105
StatusUnknown

This text of Folks v. Ellison (Folks v. Ellison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Folks v. Ellison, (D.S.C. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Jerrald Anthony Folks, ) C/A No.: 1:21-105-MGL-SVH ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ORDER AND NOTICE Aiken Public Safety; Sgt. Ellison; ) EMS; Richmond County; Aiken ) County Medical Staff; Aiken ) County; Aiken County EMS; ) Richard Roundtree; and Mike ) Hunt, ) ) Defendants. ) )

Jerrald Anthony Folks (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Aiken Public Safety, Sgt. Ellison, EMS, Richmond County, Aiken County Medical Staff, Aiken County, Aiken County EMS, Richard Roundtree, and Mike Hunt (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff claims Sgt. Ellison and Officer Hansen used excessive force against him during his arrest. He alleges that EMS was called to the scene but attended to the officers instead of Plaintiff, and he was instead driven to the Aiken Hospital in the police car. Once he arrived at the Aiken Hospital, it was

determined that he needed to be taken to the trauma hospital in Augusta, Georgia, and he was transported by EMS. Plaintiff suffered five broken ribs, a punctured lung, a fractured neck, and head concussions. Plaintiff alleges he did not receive any “aftercare.” He states he was

illegally detained in the Richmond County Detention Center, in Richmond County, Georgia, for 11 days after his 14-day hospitalization. [ECF No. 1-1 at 2]. He alleges he was extradited to Aiken, where he was denied a bond. . He alleges there was no concern for his injuries and he caught COVID-19, causing

him to be hospitalized for eight days at Aiken Regional Medical Center. . at 3. II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss

a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. , 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

attorneys. , 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true. ., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the

pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. ., 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally

construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. , 556 U.S. 662, 677‒78 (2009); , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on

its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. , 556 U.S. at 678‒79. B. Analysis

To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” 1. EMS, Aiken County EMS, Aiken County Medical Staff

Plaintiff has not stated a valid § 1983 claim against EMS, Aiken County EMS, and Aiken County Medical Staff (collectively “Medical Defendants”), as

1 Plaintiff’s complaint is before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. these defendants do not qualify as “persons.” A medical department, including “EMS,” is a group of persons working in a department, building, or facility, and

therefore cannot qualify as a person. , 27 F. App’x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); , No. 3:07CV195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (holding that the use

of the term “staff” or the equivalent as a name for alleged defendants, without the naming of specific staff members, is not adequate to state a claim against a “person” as required in § 1983 actions). Because the Medical Defendants are not individual “persons” pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

on which relief may be granted as to Medical Defendants. 2. Richard Roundtree and Mike Hunt Plaintiff has failed to state viable claims against Richmond County Sheriff Richard Roundtree and Aiken County Sheriff Mike Hunt. The Eleventh

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Bluebook (online)
Folks v. Ellison, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/folks-v-ellison-scd-2021.