Folk v. Folk

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Folk v. Folk

214 A.D.2d 645, 625 N.Y.S.2d 935, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4302

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 17, 1995

StatusPublished

This text of 214 A.D.2d 645 (Folk v. Folk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Folk v. Folk, 214 A.D.2d 645, 625 N.Y.S.2d 935, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4302 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

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Opinion

In a matrimonial action, the plaintiff husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunkin, J.), dated December 2, 1993, as vacated the judgment of divorce dated March 30, 1993, entered upon the defendant wife’s default in appearing.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the defendant wife’s [646]*646submissions demonstrated the existence of a reasonable excuse for her default and a meritorious defense (see, CPLR 5015 [a]; Junowicz v Junowicz, 132 AD2d 527; cf., D’Alleva v DAlleva, 127 AD2d 732; Lesko v Lesko, 79 AD2d 1100). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the defendant’s default. Balletta, J. P., Thompson, Santucci, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.

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In a matrimonial action, the plaintiff husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunkin, J.), dated December 2, 1993, as vacated the judgment of divorce dated March 30, 1993, entered upon the defendant wife’s default in appearing.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the defendant wife’s [646]*646submissions demonstrated the existence of a reasonable excuse for her default and a meritorious defense (see, CPLR 5015 [a]; Junowicz v Junowicz, 132 AD2d 527; cf., D’Alleva v DAlleva, 127 AD2d 732; Lesko v Lesko, 79 AD2d 1100). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the defendant’s default. Balletta, J. P., Thompson, Santucci, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

214 A.D.2d 645, 625 N.Y.S.2d 935, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4302, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/folk-v-folk-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

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