Folin v. Asante

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedJune 20, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-01389
StatusUnknown

This text of Folin v. Asante (Folin v. Asante) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Folin v. Asante, (D. Or. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MEDFORD DIVISION

STACIE FOLIN, No. 1:23-cv-01389-AA

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

ASANTE ROGUE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, et al,

Defendants. _____________________________________ AIKEN, District Judge: Plaintiff brings religious discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Oregon law against her former employer, Defendant Asante Rogue Regional Medical Center, LLC, (“Asante”). She alleges that Asante unlawfully terminated her employment when Plaintiff declined, based on religious belief, to be vaccinated against the COVID-19 virus. Defendant Asante moves to dismiss the case for failing to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, is DENIED. BACKGROUND In August 2021, the Oregon Health Authority (“OHA”) enacted an administrative rule (“the Mandate”) requiring healthcare workers in Oregon to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by a deadline of October 18, 2021. The Mandate permitted healthcare employers to grant religious exceptions to employees upon request. Defendant Asante required employees to be vaccinated

against COVID-19 by September 30, 2021, except employees with approved religious exception requests. Plaintiff joined Asante in 2015 after she graduated from nursing school and worked without incident for approximately seven years as a Registered Nurse at Defendant’s facility, including in the float pool and the Short Stay Unit. Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 1. Throughout her employment, Plaintiff received consistently good feedback from her supervisor, co-workers, and patients. Id. She alleges the following facts to support her claims: Plaintiff is also a devoutly religious individual who adheres to principles of a Christian faith and is dedicated to following the tenets of her faith to the best of her ability. …

For eighteen months, Plaintiff scrupulously followed hospital rules and regulations to protect against [COVID-19] infection, which included the wearing of personal protective equipment (herein, “PPE”), hand-washing and other hygiene protocols, social distancing when possible, and quarantining when necessary.

In the summer of 2021, Defendant announced it would be implementing and enforcing a COVID-19 vaccine mandate in the workplace. Plaintiff was informed that those individuals with religious beliefs in conflict with the vaccine and/or to the taking of the vaccine could apply for religious exceptions. As a devout Christian, Plaintiff had serious objections to taking the vaccine because it would constitute violating her bodily integrity and tainting the purity of her body per her interpretation of her faith in God and the Bible. On or about October 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed the formal paperwork for a religious exception and anticipated it would be granted. Although Plaintiff’s requested religious exemption was accepted, she was placed on unpaid leave on October 19, 2021, and she was terminated on April 30, 2022. The Defendant made no effort to attempt to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious exception.

Compl. ¶¶ 6, 11, 12, 13. LEGAL STANDARD To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations allow the court to infer the defendant’s liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than “the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 678. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000). But the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the complaint is dismissed, leave to amend should be granted unless “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). DISCUSSION Defendant Asante moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims because her allegations are conclusory, and she has not plausibly alleged any facts that would establish that her anti- vaccination beliefs are religious in nature or constitute a religious conflict to be protected under Title VII or ORS 659A.030. Plaintiff alleges employment discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and ORS 659A.030(1)(a).1 Title VII makes it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of their religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993). The term “religion” encompasses all aspects of religious practice and belief. 42 U.S.C. §

2000e(j); Peterson v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 2004). Title VII failure- to-accommodate claims are analyzed under a two-part, burden-shifting framework. Tiano v Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff must first plead a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Id. If an employee articulates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it made good-faith efforts to reasonably accommodate the religious practice or that it could not accommodate without undue hardship. Id. To assert a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must allege that (1) they “had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty;” (2) they “informed [their] employer of the belief and conflict;” and (3) “the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected [them] to an adverse employment action because of

[their] inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 606. “A bona fide religious belief is one that is ‘sincerely held.’” Keene v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *1 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023). A court should generally accept the assertion of a sincerely held religious belief. Id. at *2; Beuca v. Wash. State Univ., No. 23-CV-0069, 2023 WL 3575503, slip op. at *2 (E.D. Wash. May 19, 2023) (declining to “second-guess” or “scrutinize” the plaintiff’s claim that merely stated he had a religious objection to the COVID-19 vaccine). And the burden to allege a religious conflict with an employment duty is minimal.

1 Claims brought under ORS 659A.030

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