Foley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co.

491 So. 2d 934, 1986 Ala. LEXIS 3593
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJune 6, 1986
Docket84-1310
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 491 So. 2d 934 (Foley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Foley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 491 So. 2d 934, 1986 Ala. LEXIS 3593 (Ala. 1986).

Opinion

Mildred Morrow Foley appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company and Kenneth Baker on the issues of breach of contract and *Page 935 slander. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On September 3, 1982, a house owned by Mildred Morrow Foley was damaged by fire within the city limits of Opp, Alabama. At the time of the fire, Mildred Foley, her husband Fred Foley, and her adult son William W. Morrow, resided in the house. The house was insured by defendant State Farm under a typical homeowner's policy. There was $67,110.00 of insurance coverage on the house and its contents and for additional living expenses at the time of the fire in question. Mrs. Foley received checks from State Farm for $23,259.89 for damage to the house, and a check for $2,000.00 for additional living expenses. She also received a check for $7,598.75 for the contents, but she did not negotiate this check.

An investigation of the fire was conducted, and arson was suspected. No criminal charges were filed, however. Opp Fire Chief Jake Benton testified that his investigation of the premises revealed that three separate fires were started in the house at approximately the same time. Chief Benton stated that this indicated that the fire was intentionally set. Furthermore, a laboratory analysis of evidence taken from the scene, including two plastic jugs, revealed the presence of kerosene or petroleum. Chief Benton testified that the most typical kind of motive for an intentionally set fire is financial. Further investigation revealed that William W. Morrow had financial problems with a bakery business that had closed down.

There was evidence that Mrs. and Mr. Foley and William W. Morrow had borrowed $17,500.00 on August 25, 1981, for the purchase of the bakery. The loan, to be repaid by monthly installments, was secured by a real property mortgage on the house that was damaged by the fire in question. Furthermore, at the time of the fire, two installments were overdue. There was also evidence that William Morrow had borrowed an additional $1,000.00 from the bank on June 24, 1982. This loan was secured by bakery equipment and it was to be repaid in monthly installments. No installments were ever made. At the time of the fire, this loan was also two installments behind.

Mrs. Foley testified that she did not know of anyone who may have had any reason to burn her house and that the only persons who had keys to the house were her family members.

On the night of the fire, Mrs. Foley testified that she and her husband locked the house and then went to an auction. She testified that while she and her husband were at the auction, someone told them about the fire and that they immediately left to return to their home. Mrs. Foley contends that she fully cooperated with State Farm throughout the investigation and that she complied with the policy provisions in connection with her claim. This is disputed by State Farm, as evidenced by its numerous letters to her requesting that she cooperate with State Farm in the investigation and that she provide it with the necessary documentation to process her claim, as required in the policy.

Mrs. Foley testified that when State Farm adjuster Baker talked to her about the fire, he said to her: "[W]e found a mysterious liquid in your son's bedroom. The insurance company does not pay for anyone burning their property. That is called arson." Mrs. Foley stated that Baker made these remarks in the presence of her son and husband, and she says the meaning and import of the statement were that she had burned her own house in order to recover the proceeds of the insurance policy. As a result of this alleged defamation, she claimed to have suffered great mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, and cardiac disturbance, requiring her to seek special medical care and counseling.

Mrs. Foley claimed that Baker's allegedly slanderous statement was false and was made with malice intentionally calculated to harm her, and that Baker and State Farm knew she suffered from heart ailments and a nervous condition. Mrs. Foley sought $5,000,000.00 in punitive damages *Page 936 for this alleged defamation. She also demanded judgment on the insurance contract for $39,800.00 (the amount of the repair estimate obtained by Mrs. Foley, but which she admittedly never submitted to State Farm), less $25,259.89 which had already been paid by State Farm to her and the mortgagee bank.

Both claims were submitted to the jury, and a verdict was returned in favor of both State Farm and Baker. Mrs. Foley's motion for new trial was denied, and this appeal followed.

Two sections of the insurance policy are pertinent to this controversy, and they are as follows:

"`[I]nsured' means you and the following residents of your household:

"a. your relatives;

"b. any other person under the age of 21 who is in the care of any person named above.

". . .

"Concealment or Fraud. This entire policy shall be void if any insured has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to his insurance."

Mrs. Foley raises numerous issues for this Court's review. However, the gist of all of the issues is whether the evidence of arson allegedly committed by Mrs. Foley's son, William W. Morrow, was properly admitted in this case, in light of our holding in Hosey v. Seibles Bruce Group, South Carolina Ins.Co., 363 So.2d 751 (Ala. 1978).

In Hosey, supra, Felston Hosey, Sr., an insured of the defendant insurance company, sought to recover on an insurance policy covering property that had been damaged by fire. The damaged property consisted of: (1) a dwelling, owned in fee simple by Mr. Hosey, subject to mortgages; (2) personal property owned by Mr. Hosey individually; (3) personal property owned by Mrs. Hosey individually; and (4) personal property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Hosey jointly. Both Mr. and Mrs. Hosey executed a "Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss," which essentially stated that the loss did not originate by any act, design, or procurement on the part of the insureds.

Subsequent to the fire, Mrs. Hosey was convicted of arson in regard to the insured property, but Mr. Hosey was neither charged nor implicated in the criminal activity. The defendant insurance company refused to pay the claims of either Mr. or Mrs. Hosey, relying on the following provisions and definition in the applicable insurance policy:

"1) `This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss, the insured has wilfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the insured therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating thereto.'

"2) `. . . Unless otherwise provided in writing added hereto this Company shall not be liable for loss occurring

"`(a) while the hazard is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the insured . . .'"

"`8. DEFINITIONS . . .

"`a. "Insured" means

"`(1) the Named Insured stated in the Declarations of this policy;

"`(2) if residents of the Named Insured's household, his spouse, the relatives of either, and any other person under the age of twenty-one in the care of any insured. . . .'"

363 So.2d at 752.

Mr. Hosey initiated suit, alleging breach of the insurance contract. The trial judge, in charging the jury, essentially stated that according to the provisions and definition sections, supra, Mrs. Hosey was an insured, and Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
491 So. 2d 934, 1986 Ala. LEXIS 3593, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/foley-v-state-farm-fire-and-cas-ins-co-ala-1986.