Foley v. Pacchiega

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided July 22, 2020·No. 2:15-cv-02047·Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 MICHAEL FOLEY, Case No. 2:15-cv-02047-JCM-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 ORDER AND v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 8 FERNANDO PACCHIEGA, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 28), 12 submitted on July17, 2020, but not docketed until July 20, 2020. Plaintiff erroneously titled this 13 filing as a Second Amended Complaint rather than Third Amended Complaint. The Court will 14 direct the Clerk of the Court to correct the filing name to Third Amended Complaint. 15 Further, the Court hereby withdraws its Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 29) filed 16 on July 21, 2020 as it recommended dismissal of this case and it will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s 17 Third Amended Complaint now. 18 Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis was granted and his Second Amended 19 Complaint was found to not be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) as he alleged 20 he had not been arrested or convicted for a criminal offense given that the arrest in question was 21 for civil contempt. Upon granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts additionally 22 screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to 23 dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which 24 relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be 26 given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear 27 from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. 1 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint 2 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is 3 essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th 4 Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim 5 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands 7 “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 9 The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in the complaint, but the 10 same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the 11 elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. 12 Secondly, where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to 13 plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Allegations of a pro se 14 complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. 15 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal construction of pro se pleadings 16 is required after Twombly and Iqbal). 17 In this case, Plaintiff‘s Third Amended Complaint is not substantially different from his 18 Second Amended Complaint. Again, he attempts to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 19 two police officers in their individual and official capacities, former Sheriff Gillespie, the Las 20 Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Clark County Detention Center/Clark County, two 21 attorneys, and a card dealer. (ECF No. 28). He seeks damages along with injunctive relief for 22 alleged false arrest and false imprisonment. Further, Plaintiff appears to attempt to state a claim 23 for violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because when he arrived 24 at the residence of Patricia Foley, his ex-wife, he was denied entry by her and Juan Carlos Valdes, 25 which resulted in a report being filed with the LVMPD. He further alleges that he was later 26 detained and arrested for civil contempt, which violated the Fourth Amendment. 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a path for the private enforcement of substantive rights created 1 the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege the 2 violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show 3 that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law.” West v. 4 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A person acts under “color of law” if he “exercise[s] power 5 possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with 6 the authority of state law.” Id. 7 Plaintiff does not allege that Foley was acting under the color of law and the Court cannot 8 infer based on the allegations provided in the Third Amendment Complaint that he can state a viable 9 Section 1983 claim against her. It will recommend that Foley be dismissed. Similarly, for the 10 attorneys named as Defendants, Plaintiff does not articulate how they acted under color of state law 11 or that they were employed as attorneys for the government, which may involve an issue of 12 immunity. The Court will recommend dismissal of Davis and Ewert. 13 It is unclear if LVMPD is subject to 1983 liability based on Plaintiff’s allegations. In 14 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a 15 municipality could be held liable under Section 1983 if an official policy or custom directly 16 caused the violation of an individual's constitutional rights. A plaintiff must establish “(1) that he 17 possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; 18 (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and 19 (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt v. Pearce, 20 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389–91 21 (1989)). A plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom based only on the 22 occurrence of a single constitutional violation by a law enforcement officer. Davis v. City of 23 Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Foley v. Pacchiega, (D. Nev. 2020).

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