Fodera, Jr. v. Equinox Holdings, Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 13, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-05072·Unknown

Opinion

FRANK J. FODERA, JR., et al., Case No. 19-cv-05072-WHO

Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO v. DISMISS THE SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE SECOND AMENDED EQUINOX HOLDINGS, INC., et al., COMPLAINT Defendants. Re: Dkt. No. 28

Plaintiffs Frank J. Fodera, Jr. and Michael M. Bonella filed this class action lawsuit against their employer Equinox Holdings, Inc. (“Equinox”), alleging violation of various California Labor Code sections and related claims. Equinox moves to dismiss the sixth cause of action for failure to furnish accurate wage statements pursuant to California Labor Code section 226(a) because it is insufficiently pleaded, derivative of the other causes of action, and will lead to double recovery. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.1 Equinox owns and operates luxury health clubs throughout California. Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SAC”) [Dkt. No. 24] ¶ 17. It employs plaintiffs as non-exempt group fitness instructors and personal trainers. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs allege that they “often worked more than 40 hours in a workweek and more than 8 hours in a workday.” Id. ¶ 21. Equinox’s policies provided that plaintiffs were to be paid at an hourly rate for clocked-in time and on a piece-rate basis for completing certain tasks. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. It also regularly “permitted Plaintiffs and Class Members to perform a wide range of unpaid, off-the-clock work.” Id. ¶ 24. Off-the-clock tasks included “session related activities,” such as “interacting with clients outside of personal training and group fitness sessions, creating calendars, and preparing client programs,” as well as other work such as “manually scheduling work-related meetings, corresponding with supervisors, and contacting prospective customers.” Id. ¶¶ 24–25 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs allege that Equinox neither paid them for time spent performing off-the-clock work nor counted those hours for purposes of calculating overtime. Id. ¶ 26. Instead, Equinox “discouraged and/or prohibited [them] from recording all time they worked preforming session related activities and other off-the-clock work.” Id. ¶ 28. For example, Equinox’s Personal Trainer Compensation Plan states that personal trainers “should spend no more than two to three (2-3) hours per week on session related activities” and that personal trainers “must speak with management if they feel they need to spend more than two to three hours per week on programming.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But in practice, plaintiffs found that it was not possible to perform all of the programming that Equinox required within the allotted two to three hours per week—and that is without considering other so-called “session related activities,” such as corresponding with clients. Id. Plaintiffs describe at least two occasions when they were told by a manger or supervisor not to record any time spent on session related activities. Id. Consequently, they allege that Equinox’s records did not reflect all hours worked. Id. Plaintiffs originally filed this class action in Alameda County Superior Court, on behalf of themselves and “all similarly situated current and former employees who worked for [Equinox] as non-exempt employees within the State of California within the four years preceding the filing of this lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 16. They bring a total of eight causes of action for violations of: (i) California Labor Code section 1194 (failure to pay minimum wage); (ii) Labor Code sections 510 and 1194 (failure to pay overtime wages); (iii) Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512(a) (failure to provide meal periods); (iv) Labor Code section 226.7 (failure to provide rest periods); (v) Labor Code section 226.2 (failure to pay for rest and recovery periods); (vi) Labor Code section 226(a) (failure earned at termination or discharge); and (viii) California Business and Professions Code section 17200 (Unfair Competition Law, “UCL”). In their sixth cause of action for violation of California Labor Code section 226(a), they allege that Equinox either recklessly or intentionally failed to provide complete and accurate wage statements. SAC ¶ 92. The deficiencies include, but are not limited to: “the actual number of hours worked each workday and workweek by Plaintiffs and Class Members, when Plaintiffs and Class Members took required meal and rest periods, meal and rest period premiums that were owed to Plaintiffs and Class Members, and the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate.” Id.; see also id. ¶ 38 (alleging their section 226(a) claim is derivative of other wage and hour violations). As a result of this unlawful conduct, they allege that they are entitled to damages or penalties. Id. ¶ 93. After removing the case to this court, Equinox filed a motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action. See Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“MTD”) [Dkt. No. 28]. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Factual allegations can be disregarded, however, if contradicted by the facts established by reference to documents attached as exhibits to the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In making this determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). “To recover penalties under section 226(e), an employee must demonstrate three elements: (1) a failure to include in the wage statement one or more of the required it

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Fodera, Jr. v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2020).

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