FM Holding Company LLC v. Pekin Insurance Company

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 FM Holding Company LLC, et al., No. CV-24-00337-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Pekin Insurance Company,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is the parties’ joint motion for a protective order. The 16 parties neither show cause for needing a protective order, nor define what they will mark 17 as confidential besides saying it is information “that is deemed to be Confidential 18 Information by any party.” (Doc. 33-1 at 2). 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) permits district courts, upon motion by a 20 person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause, to “issue an order to protect a 21 party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” 22 including by “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 23 commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specific way.” Fed. R. 24 Civ. P. 26(c)(1), (G). This Rule “confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when 25 a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times 26 Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). 27 Generally, however, global protective orders are not appropriate. See AGA 28 Shareholders, LLC v. CSK Auto, Inc., 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2007). 1 Again, Rule 26(c) requires a party seeking a protective order to show good cause for 2 issuance of such an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist under Rule 3 26(c), ‘the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm 4 will result if no protective order is granted.’” AGA Shareholders, 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 5 (quoting Phillips v. G.M. Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002)). The party 6 seeking protection “must make a ‘particularized showing of good cause with respect to 7 [each] individual document.’” Id. (quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 8 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)). Thus, “[t]he burden is on the party requesting a 9 protective order to demonstrate that (1) the material in question is a trade secret or other 10 confidential information within the scope of Rule 26(c), and (2) disclosure would cause an 11 identifiable, significant harm.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 12 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Deford v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 653 (D. Md. 13 1987)). 14 A permissible subcategory of global protective orders is umbrella or blanket 15 protective orders. Blanket protective orders delay the requirement to show good cause with 16 respect to individual documents until the designation of that document as confidential is 17 challenged or when a party attempts to file it under seal. Rocky Mountain Bank v. Google, 18 Inc., 428 Fed. App’x 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 19 Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that Foltz held that “where [a] 20 blanket protective order [is] issued, an actual showing of good cause must be made if 21 another seeks access to the document.”); Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 22 1172, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006) (“we have held that … reliance on a blanket protective order is 23 unreasonable and is not a ‘compelling reason’ that rebuts the presumption of access” once 24 a document is filed in the record); Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475– 25 76 (9th Cir. 1992) (reliance on a stipulated ... blanket protective order does not justify 26 sealing court records). Umbrella/blanket protective orders “routinely are approved by 27 courts in civil cases.” Van v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C 08–5296, 2011 WL 62499, at 28 *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2011); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 1|| Ltd., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 2 Before such orders may be granted however, the movant must make a preliminary 3 || showing of good cause, which requires limiting the scope of the protective order to well- 4|| defined categories for which the existence of good cause can be determined. Compare || IceMOS Tech. Corp. v. Omron Corp., No. CV 17-02575-PHX-JAT (Doc. 87) (granting a 6|| protective order limited to two categories); with Rose v. Dignity Health, No. CV-21-00775- PHX-JAT, 2021 WL 5084277, at *1-3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2021) (denying a requested 8 || protective order where the parties did not indicate whether a list of categories was “the 9|| universe of what they intend[ed] to mark confidential’); see also Gann v. Gen. Motors 10]) LLC, No. CV-22-00080-TUC-RM, 2022 WL 3552484, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2022). 11 In this case, as stated above, the parties do not show good cause. The parties do not || designate limited categories they intend to mark as confidential, nor explain why such 13 || categories would justify protection. Because the parties’ motion makes no showing of good cause, 15 IT IS ORDERED that the motion for protective order (Doc. 33) is denied without prejudice. 17 Dated this 13th day of August, 2024. 18 19 i C 20 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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