Flynn v. International Power Co.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Flynn v. International Power Co.

52 A. 1089, 24 R.I. 291, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 70

CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island

DecidedJuly 9, 1902

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 52 A. 1089 (Flynn v. International Power Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Flynn v. International Power Co., 52 A. 1089, 24 R.I. 291, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 70 (R.I. 1902).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

(1) The court is of opinion that the first count is defective for want of allegation that the plaintiff did not know that there were no guy ropes. If he knew that fact, and that the lack of guy ropes constituted a defect, then he was working under a known risk. If he did not know it, the court cannot say that it was obvious, which is the ground of the demurrer. Good pleading requires a case to be stated so that it is apparent in the declaration ; hence we think the declaration should state whether he knew of the defect or not. Mayott v. Norcross, 24 R. I. 187.

(2) The second count sets out separate and distinct breaches of duty. It includes negligently failing to provide a proper place for lifting the casting ; and suitable appliances for doing the work ; negligence in using and adopting the same, and negligence in employing an unfit person to plan and supervise the work. Laporte v. Cook, 20 R. I. 261.

(3) ‘ The court sees no objection to the third count. It alleges that Thomas Brady was negligently employed to do the work; that he did it, and that he was unfit.

*292 John W. Hogan, for plaintiff. William A. Morgan, for defendant.

Demurrer to first and second counts sustained ; demurrer to third count overruled.

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Per Curiam.

(1) The court is of opinion that the first count is defective for want of allegation that the plaintiff did not know that there were no guy ropes. If he knew that fact, and that the lack of guy ropes constituted a defect, then he was working under a known risk. If he did not know it, the court cannot say that it was obvious, which is the ground of the demurrer. Good pleading requires a case to be stated so that it is apparent in the declaration ; hence we think the declaration should state whether he knew of the defect or not. Mayott v. Norcross, 24 R. I. 187.

(2) The second count sets out separate and distinct breaches of duty. It includes negligently failing to provide a proper place for lifting the casting ; and suitable appliances for doing the work ; negligence in using and adopting the same, and negligence in employing an unfit person to plan and supervise the work. Laporte v. Cook, 20 R. I. 261.

(3) ‘ The court sees no objection to the third count. It alleges that Thomas Brady was negligently employed to do the work; that he did it, and that he was unfit.

*292 John W. Hogan, for plaintiff. William A. Morgan, for defendant.

Demurrer to first and second counts sustained ; demurrer to third count overruled.

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Bluebook (online)

52 A. 1089, 24 R.I. 291, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 70, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flynn-v-international-power-co-ri-1902.

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