Flynn v. Inman
This text of 174 S.E. 551 (Flynn v. Inman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The petition, construed most favorably to the plaintiff in this case, shows that he was at most a licensee, if not an actual trespasser. The owner of premises owes to a licensee no duty of keeping the condition of the premises up to any given standard of safety, except that they must not contain pitfalls, mantraps, or things of that character. Kinnebrew v. Ocean Steamship Co., 47 Ga. App. 704 (171 S. E. 385); Rollestone v. Cassirer, 3 Ga. App. 161 (59 S. E. 442); Mandeville Mills v. Dale, 2 Ga. App. 607 (58 S. E. 1060); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Ledbetter, 46 Ga. App. 500 (168 S. E. 81); Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., 30 Ga. App. 490 (118 S. E. 697); Southern Ry. Co. v. Chatmam, 124 Ga. 1026 (53 S. E. 692, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 283, 4 Ann. Cas. 675). An allegation in such a petition that the defendant knew or ought to have known of the alleged defective condition is at best but an allegation of implied notice. Babcock v. Johnson, 120 Ga. 1030 (48 S. E. 438). The court did not err in sustaining the demurrer.
Judgment affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
174 S.E. 551, 49 Ga. App. 186, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 319, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flynn-v-inman-gactapp-1934.