Flynn v. Flynn

35 N.W. 817, 68 Mich. 20, 1888 Mich. LEXIS 877
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 5, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 35 N.W. 817 (Flynn v. Flynn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flynn v. Flynn, 35 N.W. 817, 68 Mich. 20, 1888 Mich. LEXIS 877 (Mich. 1888).

Opinion

Champlin, J.

The -bill of complaint is filed by a father against his son, praying that a certain deed, executed by the father to his son, may be rectified so as to express the true consideration, and that a certain mortgage be decreed paid, and for a discharge thereof from the record.

On the fourteenth day of May, 1879, John Flynn was the [21]*21■owner of the east half of the south-east quarter, and the north-west quarter of the south-east quarter, of section 14, in township 6 north, range 2 west, Michigan, being the town of Olive, Clinton county, Michigan. On that day he executed a mortgage of the premises above described, to secure the payment of a certain promissory note,, of even date, for $314.79, on or before three years from the date thereof, with interest at 7 per cent., to B. J. Lounsbury, of Pontiac, Michigan.

The complainant claims that the defendant agreed to pay this mortgage as a consideration for his deeding to his son the east half of the south-east quarter of the section. The deed was drafted, and the consideration expressed therein is ■one dollar. It is a warranty deed, and contains a covenant against incumbrances.

The defendant claims that the consideration of the deed, as agreed upon at the time, was his promise and undertaking to pay certain indebtedness which his father owed to different persons in Oakland county, amounting to about $200, which he paid, and he says that, in addition to the deed, he was also ' to have certain personal property, consisting of two cows, one horse, one wagon, one harness, constituting, substantially, all the personal property his father owned, aside from his household furniture. He further testifies that, at the same time the agreement was made to deed the farm to him, he agreed with his father that he should live with his father, in the house upon his father’s forty, and they should work both parcels, and that he would pay the aforesaid mortgage out of the proceeds of the crops raised.

He moved into the house with his father, and occupied it, with his wife; his father being the only member of the family living with him, although another son appears to have been there for a time. He put in the land to wheat, and received two-thirds of the crop, giving to his father one-third. The 80-acre tract conveyed to the son was mostly a tamarack [22]*22swamp, having only from 8 to 10 acres arable land upon it at the time of the conveyance. The father’s 40 contained from 20 to 30 acres of tillable land. It appears that, during the-first year the parties resided upon the premises, the complainant instigated a quarrel with the defendant’s wife, and in-consequence left the house, and went to reside with a neighbor. The defendant erected thereafter a house upon his land, but before it was completed the complainant returned, and the parties lived together, without further trouble, until defendant’s house was completed, when he removed thereto.

The next season but one, the defendant again worked complainant’s land upon shares, dividing the crop, share and share alike. When the mortgage matured, defendant paid the-money to the mortgagee, and, instead of taking a discharge, took an assignment to himself, and refuses to discharge the-same. He gives as a reason therefor that, instead of permitting him to work the land belonging to his father, so as to obtain the means to pay the mortgage, his father drove him off of the place, and refused to let him work it. He testifies-to this, and is corroborated by the testimony of his wife.

I am not satisfied that this excuse is made out. Mrs. Flynn testifies that, except the one time, she had no further trouble with complainant. He came back and resided in the family with defendant and his wife. He had no team or farming implements to work his farm with. The defendant. did work complainant’s farm afterwards, and it does not seem to me that the statement that his father drove him off' the place, and refused to let him work it, is borne out by the-testimony.

The testimony shows that the 80-acre tract was worth from $300 to $600, and the personal property from $96 to $160. It does not seem probable that complainant should convey to-defendant all this property, upon his undertaking to pay a few debts, less than $200 in amount; especially as Mr. Lounsbury testifies that he considered complainant “financially/ [23]*23busted” at the time. It is true that no great reliance cart be placed upon complainant’s testimony where it is not corroborated. His memory appears to be very defective in regard to his indebtedness at Oakland county, and his whole testimony was indefinite and unsatisfactory. But the testimony of the defendant is not much better. He is quite unable tO' tell, with three or four exceptions, to whom he paid debts, and the amounts. The debts he does recollect foot up about. $160, nearly the same as the value placed upon the personal property by his father.

Samuel W. Smith, the attorney who drew the deed, testifies that the deed was drawn as directed, was read over to-John Flynn, and was satisfactory to him. He testifies, further, that Jason M. Flynn was to have this land free and clear, and was to pay certain debts of his father’s. He understood at the time that there was a mortgage on the 120' acres of land, and that Jason was to have the 80 acres free and clear from the mortgage, and that he was told so by John Flynn. Mr. Smith undoubtedly testifies candidly to-his recollection of the transaction. Nevertheless, in order to-reconcile it with the testimony of Jason M. Flynn, the-defendant, wherein he testifies that he was to pay the mortgage, but was to have the use of his father’s farm to enable him to do so, and that this agreement was made at the same time that the land was agreed to be conveyed, we must conclude that Mr. Smith was not informed of the manner nor by whom the mortgage debt was to be paid, in order to free the-land from the incumbrance.

It must be remembered that this was an arrangement, between father and son; and, on account of the mutual confidence naturally arising out of that relation, the parties, would not be as likely to be so exact, or particular in having all the details and understanding between them stated or reduced to writing, as if the parties did not occupy that relation.

[24]*24Kohert J. Lounsbury testified that John Fljnn said to him that he was going to deed to Jason 80 acres of the Clinton county farm, and that. Jason had paid this claim against the wheat, and had or was to pay certain other claims, and was to furnish him money or the means to move onto the Clinton county farm. He further testified that a deed was made out of the Clinton county farm to Jason, and his recollection is that nothing was said about this 80 acres being subject to this mortgage, but he would not swear positively as to that. In view of Jason’s testimony it is clear that he was not informed of the agreement between Jason and his father above referred to.

Abel Haddrill testified that he heard a conversation between these parties in 1879. He says:

Mr. Flynn told Jason he would deed him 80 acres of land up there if he would pay his debts down here, and give him the privilege of working the whole of it, and living in his [John’s] house till he could build a house of his own, and that he would help work the place.”

This testimony is consistent with that of Jason, if it includes in “ the debts down here ” the mortgage debt.

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Bluebook (online)
35 N.W. 817, 68 Mich. 20, 1888 Mich. LEXIS 877, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flynn-v-flynn-mich-1888.