Flynn v. Central Realty of Louisiana, Inc.

338 So. 2d 774, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 3562
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 13, 1976
DocketNo. 7629
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 338 So. 2d 774 (Flynn v. Central Realty of Louisiana, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flynn v. Central Realty of Louisiana, Inc., 338 So. 2d 774, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 3562 (La. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinions

GULOTTA, Judge.

Plaintiff, a lessee, appeals from a dismissal of his claim for damages against the lessor because of lessor’s alleged failure to comply with LSA-R.S. 9:3251 et seq.,1 requiring the landlord to forward to the tenant, within one month after the date the tenancy terminates, an itemized statement accounting for the retained proceeds of a rental deposit and giving the reasons therefor. We affirm.

The facts are that plaintiff posted a $25.00 deposit when he rented the premises on a month-to-month basis on July 7, 1972; that he vacated the premises on July 12, 1975; and that the monthly rent in the sum of $79.00 was paid through June, 1975. In response to a request for a return of the deposit, lessor orally informed lessee-plaintiff that the deposit was being applied against the rent due for one half of the month of July and, accordingly, that plaintiff was not entitled to a return of the deposit.

On August 20, 1975, a written request was made to the lessor for return of the security deposit. This request was received by the lessor on August 21. The lessor testified that he made no written response2 to the demand for the return of the deposit.

The trial judge concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to return of the deposit or statutory damages for the reason that he had been timely informed by the lessor that the deposit was being deducted from the rent due for the month of July.

We are confronted with the question whether a timely oral explanation by a lessor to a lessee that the return of a deposit is not due lessee, will suffice as a satisfactory response to a subsequent written demand for return of the deposit.

The statute clearly contemplates, as plaintiff argues on appeal, a response in writing. The statute (LSA-R.S. 9:3251) requires that the lessor “shall forward to the tenant” a statement accounting for the proceeds and giving reasons for the retention of the deposit.

[776]*776It would appear, on the face of the statute, that anything less than a response in writing would not suffice. However, the record is clear that several months prior to Flynn’s leaving the premises in mid-July, he had been asked to leave by the lessor. Jacob Cohen, president of Central Realty, testified that several teenagers in Flynn’s family were living in the apartment and were “terrorizing the neighbors.” Cohen testified further that Flynn knew “long ahead of time” of Central’s desire that he leave the premises or get rid of the teenagers. On June 4, 1975, Flynn was served with a notice to vacate. Though he had paid rent through the end of June, Flynn remained in the apartment until July 12 when he vacated the premises.3 Rent in excess, of the $25.00 deposit was owed from July 1 through July 12. Not disputed also is the fact that Cohen timely explained to plaintiff that the deposit was being applied to July’s rent.

Although the language of the statute is clear, when we consider the facts surrounding the instant case and recognize that plaintiff’s petition was not filed in good faith, we are led to conclude that the legislature could not have contemplated recovery by a lessee against a lessor under these circumstances. Confining our decision to the narrow facts of the instant case, we conclude that the purposes of the statute were met by the lessor’s oral explanation of his retention of the rent deposit. This is not to say that an oral explanation will suffice in every case. To so hold would defeat the clear language of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

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Related

Ball v. Fellom
406 So. 2d 781 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1981)
Flynn v. Central Realty
341 So. 2d 417 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
338 So. 2d 774, 1976 La. App. LEXIS 3562, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flynn-v-central-realty-of-louisiana-inc-lactapp-1976.